Disclosure Regulation, Governance Mechanisms and their Implementation in Practice : Empirical Evidence on Critical Accounting Policies and Board Diversity by Rupertus, Hendrik
Disclosure Regulation, Governance Mechanisms  
and their Implementation in Practice  
Empirical Evidence on  
Critical Accounting Policies and Board Diversity 
Dissertation 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines  
Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften der 
Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der Universität Bayreuth 
vorgelegt von 
Hendrik Rupertus 
aus Weinheim 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Jörg Gundel 
Erstberichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Rolf Uwe Fülbier, StB 
Zweitberichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Friedrich Sommer 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 17.06.2019  
  
  
Danksagung 
Die vorliegende Arbeit entstand während meiner Tätigkeit als wissenschaftlicher Mitar-
beiter am Lehrstuhl für Internationale Rechnungslegung von Herrn Prof. Dr. Rolf Uwe 
Fülbier an der Universität Bayreuth. Sie wurde im Sommersemester 2019 von der Rechts- 
und Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Bayreuth als Dissertation an-
genommen. 
Der erfolgreiche Abschluss dieses „Großprojekts“ wäre ohne die Unterstützung einer 
Vielzahl an Personen nicht möglich gewesen. Mein größter Dank gilt meinem Doktorva-
ter Herrn Prof. Dr. Rolf Uwe Fülbier, der mir nicht nur die Möglichkeit einer Promotion 
gegeben, sondern auch meine Begeisterung und Freude an der (empirischen) Rechnungs-
legungsforschung entfacht und neue Blickwinkel auf die Internationale Rechnungslegung 
aufgezeigt hat. Ohne seine fortwährende Unterstützung, stetige Diskussionsbereitschaft 
und immerzu hilfreichen Anmerkungen würde es diese Arbeit nicht geben. Doch auch 
abseits des beruflichen Alltags haben mich viele seiner persönlichen und menschlichen 
Eigenschaften geprägt. Danke für diese unvergessliche und lehrreiche Zeit!  
Herrn Prof. Dr. Friedrich Sommer danke ich für die freundliche Übernahme und Mühen 
des Zweitgutachtens sowie die spannende, konstruktive und unterhaltsame Zusammenar-
beit, nicht nur im Rahmen meiner Dissertation. Herrn Prof. Dr. Klaus Schäfer gilt mein 
Dank für seinen Vorsitz der Prüfungskommission sowie für die Zusammenarbeit in den 
vergangenen Jahren.  
Meinen (ehemaligen) Kolleginnen und Kollegen danke ich für eine unvergessliche ge-
meinsame Zeit am Lehrstuhl! Mit Marcus Bravidor, Thomas Loy, Christian Mehnert, 
Claudia Roberts, Christina Scharf, Christian Wittmann, Niko J. Wolf sowie den „Jung-
bullen“ Klara Lösse, Lorenz Piering und Jan Seitz verbinde ich wundervolle Erinnerun-
gen, spannende Diskussionen sowie zahlreiche unterhaltsame Momente, auch abseits des 
Lehrstuhls. Dies gilt auch für Johanna Held, Benjamin Keller, Malte Klein, Maximilian 
Mayer, Alfred Nickisch, Claudia Schulze und Michael Popp. Vielen Dank auch an alle 
studentischen Hilfskräfte für die intensive Zusammenarbeit sowie die Unterstützung beim 
Gelingen meiner Promotion. Besonders hervorheben möchte ich hierbei Florian Federsel, 
Isabell Keller, Elisabeth Kuhn, Simon Lemnitzer, Marie-Thérèse Meyer, Anna Mollat 
und Johanna Paraknewitz. 
Besonderer Dank gebührt meiner wunderbaren Familie, insbesondere meiner Mutter Ast-
rid, meinem Vater Hans-Jürgen, meinen Schwestern Annika und Mareike, meinen Groß-
eltern Elfriede, Erika und Jan und meinen baldigen Schwiegereltern Elfriede und Walter 
für ihre fortwährende Unterstützung und aufmunternden Worte. Insbesondere möchte ich 
Mareike für das Korrekturlesen meiner gesamten Arbeit danken! Zu guter Letzt danke 
ich meiner Freundin Laura, die mich nicht nur während der Promotionszeit „ertragen“, 
sondern auch an jedem einzelnen Tag bei meinem Vorhaben unterstützt und mir in an-
strengenden Zeiten den Rücken freigehalten hat. Vielen Dank, dass es dich gibt! 
 
Bayreuth, 02. Juli 2019 Hendrik Rupertus 
  
ABSTRACT   
 
Abstract 
This dissertation presents four chapters on disclosure regulation and corporate govern-
ance mechanisms. While Chapter 1 and 2 focus on disclosures about highly uncertain 
accounting policies (‘critical accounting policies’, CAPs), Chapter 3 and 4 examine gen-
der diversity on corporate boards. 
The first chapter analyzes the regulatory framework, existing research, as well as imple-
mentation in practice of CAP disclosures. Using a sample of Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 firms between 2001 and 2016 with hand-collected data about 35,686 CAPs, I 
provide initial evidence on the occurrence of CAPs over time and how related disclosures 
comply with SEC guidelines. In addition, I explore the reporting characteristics of CAPs 
by analyzing the length, textual similarity, specificity, and readability of respective dis-
closures. My results enhance current knowledge about the number, regulatory framework, 
and content of CAPs. In particular, it further allows indications about factors that deter-
mine a firm’s decision to flag an accounting policy as critical, potential effects of CAPs 
on capital markets, and their usefulness for financial statement users. 
The second chapter analyzes whether CAPs are useful to identify single financial state-
ment positions that are highly uncertain. In accordance with prior literature, we assume 
that financial statement positions flagged as CAPs contain a higher degree of measure-
ment uncertainties, and are thus less persistent with respect to future cash flows. Our 
results support this assumption. We further find that accrual components flagged as CAPs 
are in fact not less useful in predicting future cash flows per se. It additionally depends 
on the importance and to a certain extent on the specificity for a given firm. To best of 
our knowledge, there is no evidence on how to identify subjective and uncertain accruals 
that are less persistent with respect to future cash flows. We show that CAPs provide such 
information. Thus, we empirically demonstrate that CAPs represents a suitable channel 
to communicate measurement uncertainties. 
The third chapter explores institutional supply- and demand-side factors associated with 
global differences in female board representation. The results show that functioning out-
side investor protection and a societal climate of gender equality contributes to more 
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women on boards, mainly by fostering the supply of suitable candidates. Our results re-
veal that longer-term supply side factors seem to be necessary to complement short-term 
demand-side regulation to increase female board representation. 
The fourth chapter examines long-term effects of board gender diversity on capital mar-
kets. We analyze how stakeholders perceive female board members in the long-term. Fur-
ther, we explore whether firms get punished by investors if they do not ‘comply’ with 
investors’ and other stakeholders’ expectations about gender diverse boards. Based on 
8,872 firm-year observation from 13 countries, we conclude that investors seem to per-
ceive female and male board members as being equivalent in the long-term and do not 
base their investment decisions on directors’ gender. Moreover, we find no evidence for 
significant reduced or increased stock returns for firms that deviate from the expected 
ratio of female board members. While academic research claims that female board ap-
pointments may have short-term effects on capital markets, it seems that the market cor-
rects this mispricing over the long run. 
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Individual parties, such as share- and stakeholders, negotiate a set of agreements, obliga-
tions and rights with the corporation, which can be seen as a nexus of contractual rela-
tionships to reduce transaction and contracting costs (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972; 
Coase 1937; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Principal-
agent theory elaborates on the relationship between two contractual parties, in which the 
principal (e.g., shareholder) delegates decision-making authority, responsibilities and 
work to the agent (e.g., management) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Since most contracts 
are incomplete and not easily enforceable, problems between the agent and principal arise 
(Fama and Jensen 1983). Such conflicts lead to agency costs, including costs of writing, 
monitoring, structuring, and bonding a set of contracts (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983; Jen-
sen and Meckling 1976; Maassen 1999; Mallin 2016). Furthermore, in contrast to the 
principal, the agent has access to proprietary and superior information about a firm’s cur-
rent and future performance, resulting in information asymmetries.  
In order to resolve the above-mentioned disadvantages, individuals contracting with a 
firm desire information and specific corporate structures that reduce agency costs, infor-
mation asymmetries, and ensure satisfaction and compliance with the contractual terms 
and obligations (Bushman and Smith 2003; Healy and Palepu 2001). Agency theory 
views corporate disclosures as well as governance mechanisms as two potential channels 
through which principal-agent conflicts can be mitigated (Bushman and Smith 2003; 
Healy and Palepu 2001; Mallin 2016; Williamson 1984). On the one hand, the disclosure 
of relevant information enables principals to monitor contractual rights and duties, and to 
evaluate how the agent has allocated a firm’s resources. On the other hand, governance 
mechanisms monitor and discipline the agents and ensure that they act in the interest of 
the principals (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001).1 Overall, in order to assess that a firm’s 
management is compliant with the contractual arrangements, a firm has to be financially 
stable, well managed, and profitable in the future (e.g., Bushman and Smith 2003; Mallin 
2016). 
                                                 
1  For instance, investors and other shareholders need information and assurance about the efficiency and 
uncertainties of their financial investments. Other stakeholder groups, such as employees, suppliers, or 
customers are interested in a firm’s ability to pay salaries, to secure future pension obligations, or to 
supply goods and services. 
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In practice, corporate disclosures, and especially financial reporting, can be defined as 
the communication of financial and non-financial information between insiders of a com-
pany (e.g., the management) and outsiders (e.g., investors2) (Healy and Palepu 2001). The 
firm provides its disclosures in the form of primary financial statements, notes to the fi-
nancial statements, the Management, Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), and other regu-
latory filings (Barckow 2018; Healy and Palepu 2001).3 Thereby, financial statement fig-
ures are supplemented by narrative information to enhance the understanding of investors 
about a firm’s economic, business, and accounting environment (Palepu et al. 2016). Ac-
cording to the conceptual frameworks provided by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) as well as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the main 
objective of financial reporting is to give a ‘true and fair view’ about the financial condi-
tion of the firm and to provide decision useful information to current and potential inves-
tors (FASB 2010; IASB 2018). Having said that, corporate disclosures shall have the 
ability to enhance a firm’s information environment, reduce agency costs, and costs of 
external financing (Bushman and Smith 2003).4 In this context, prior studies find that 
how and which financial accounting information are presented affects investors’ assess-
ment of future cash flows, mitigate information asymmetries, as well as the average cost 
of capital (e.g., Barth and Schipper 2008; Bushman and Smith 2003; Easley and O'Hara 
2004; Lambert et al. 2012). Thus, financial transparency, defined as the overall availabil-
ity of reliable and relevant firm-specific information, plays a key role in the context of 
corporate disclosures (Bushman et al. 2004).  
Although financial reporting might be helpful to reduce information asymmetries be-
tween insiders and outsiders, corporate governance represents another channel to reduce 
agency conflicts (e.g., Mallin 2016; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Tricker 2015; Williamson 
1984). From an international point of view, the development of corporate governance has 
                                                 
2  Corporate disclosures can also be directed to share- and stakeholders other than investors. However, 
investors are the primary users in the context of financial reporting (FASB 2010; IASB 2018). Conse-
quently, I focus on investors thereafter.  
3  There are also other documents attached to financial reports such as the corporate governance reports, 
quarterly reports/statements, half year reports, and ad hoc announcements. There are also other channels 
to communicate information, such as management forecasts, conference calls, press releases, analyst 
meetings, and the internet (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
4  Bushman and Smith (2003) also argue that financial accounting information helps managers and inves-
tors in identifying ‘good’ and ‘bad’ projects to evaluate investment opportunities. 
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been affected by various disciplines (e.g., accounting, finance, economics, and organiza-
tional behaviour), economic theories5, cultural and legally aspects, and other structural 
differences (Mallin 2016). Consequently, several definitions of corporate governance ex-
ist.6 For example, Sir Adrian Cadbury’s Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance defines corporate governance as a system in which companies are directed, 
managed, and controlled, while the board of directors is responsible for the governance 
of a company (Cadbury 1992). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) see corporate governance as a 
way how “suppliers of finance assure themselves of getting a return on investment” 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 737). Blair (1995) describes corporate governance in the 
context of who controls public companies, how the control is carried out, and what com-
panies are capable of. In particular, the board of directors represents a key role for reduc-
ing agency problems because it controls and leads a company. Moreover, it ensures that 
the management acts in the interest of share- and stakeholders (e.g., Healy and Palepu 
2001) and represents the link between both parties (Mallin 2016; Monks and Minow 
2011; Tricker 2015).  
The board has several responsibilities that are essential for a good corporate governance. 
It formulates strategies, defines a company’s direction, monitors the management, and 
executives activities, as well as provides accountability towards the shareholders (e.g., 
Burke 1997; Fondas 2000; Palepu et al. 2016). Moreover, the board can appoint subcom-
mittee, such as the audit committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee, and 
ethics committee, enabling directors to meet independently from the board and delegating 
board activities to better focus on specific tasks (e.g., Mallin 2016; Tricker 2015). The 
composition of boards, in particular the diversity of the board members, has received 
great attention in the academic literature, international press (e.g., Grosvold et al. 2007; 
McGregor 2014; Olson 2019), and on the side of institutional investors, regulators, and 
other stakeholders (e.g., Byoun et al. 2016; Cao and Donnelly 2010; Coffey and Fryxell 
                                                 
5  There exist several theories in explaining corporate governance, such as agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama 1980), transaction cost economics (Coase 1937; Williamson 1984), stakeholder 
theory (Jensen 2001; Mallin 2016), and stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis 1991). However, I 
mainly refer to agency theory because it can be seen as one of the main theories associated with the 
development of corporate governance (e.g., Mallin 2016). 
6  According to Tricker (2015), corporate governance can be defined from five distinct perspectives: The 
operational perspective (Cadbury 1992), relationship perspective (Monks and Minow 2011), stake-
holder perspective (Demb and Neubauer 1992), financial economics perspective (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997), and social perspective (Blair 1995). 
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1991; SEC 2009). Board diversity should ensure a broad spectrum of members with dis-
tinct skills, experience, and knowledge relevant to a firm’s business and industry. Further, 
diversity in terms of gender, age, race, and nationality should provide different perspec-
tives on tasks of the board and develop new approaches to solutions and strategies. From 
a theoretical perspective, a balance of representatives with distinct contractual interests 
might strengthen the capability of boards and reflect the views of various stakeholder 
groups (Adams and Kirchmaier 2015; Mallin 2016; Tricker 2015).7 To sum up, the board 
of directors and its composition is essential for an effective corporate governance (Fama 
and Jensen 1983; Mallin 2016). 
Nonetheless, dubious governance practices and missing corporate disclosures have led to 
corporate scandals and failures at the beginning of the 21st century, such as Enron, World-
Com, Tyco, and the financial crisis (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2003; Mallin 2016). Conse-
quently, financial transparency and corporate governance structures were questioned 
leading to a loss of confidence on capital markets. Since then, standard setters, regulators, 
practitioners, and the international press extensively discuss the improvement of corpo-
rate disclosures and governance mechanisms. In response to the scandals, various major 
regulatory changes have taken place in recent years. On the one hand, there has been an 
increasing concern that financial reporting requirements do not fulfil their intended pur-
pose due to complex, unspecific, and opaque information. Thus, regulators revised and 
supplemented disclosure requirements to enhance the quality and transparency of finan-
cial disclosures to make capital markets more efficient. On the other hand, several coun-
tries and institutions introduced laws and revised their corporate governance codes8 to 
sharpen the regulatory framework in the areas of leadership, management control, respon-
sibilities, and board composition. Central to these debates is the board of directors, in 
                                                 
7  There exist different types of board structures. The unitary board structure is predominant in the major-
ity of European Union (EU) Member States and in the U.S. and consists of one single board with exec-
utive and non-executive directors. The unitary board is responsible for all tasks and activities of a com-
pany. Austria, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands have a dual board system, which is character-
ized by a supervisory board and an executive board of management. The shareholders appoint the mem-
bers of the supervisory board and the supervisory board appoints the members of the management board. 
Whereas the supervisory board monitor the business and the activities of the management board, the 
management board runs the business (e.g., Mallin 2016; Monks and Minow 2011). 
8  Corporate governance codes have been issued by a variety of countries and institutions, such as the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act in the U.S. (U.S. Government 2002), the German Corporate Governance Code 
(Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 2017), the U.K. Corporate Govern-
ance Code (Financial Reporting Council 2018), and Principles of Corporate Governance published by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2015). 
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particular the issue of board diversity. These developments and discussions triggered my 
deep interest in disclosures and corporate governance. In this dissertation, I focus espe-
cially on two major topics that are imposed and discussed by standard setters, regulators, 
and the international press to improve the transparency and effectiveness of corporate 
disclosures and corporate governance. 
The first part of this dissertation (Chapter 1 and 2) addresses one initiative of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the early 2000s, which focuses especially on the 
interplay of firm-specific measurement uncertainties in the application of complex and 
highly uncertain accounting policies that are used in the preparation of financial state-
ments. The main goal of the SEC is to improve the understanding of financial statement 
users about measurement uncertainties embedded in financial statements and, particu-
larly, in accounting estimates. Since 2001, the SEC encourages firms to provide detailed 
information about their ‘critical accounting policies’ (CAPs), which are those highly un-
certain and complex accounting policies with a material impact on a firm’s financial con-
dition. Focusing on CAPs is of great interest because of two reasons. First, there is limited 
knowledge in this field of research as only a few studies have analyzed CAPs to this day. 
Second, there is no streamlined disclosure regulation within the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). An article published in a German practitioners journal by 
Fülbier et al. (2017)9 compares the CAP regulation with the disclosure requirements about 
estimation uncertainties according to International Accounting Standards (IAS) 1.125. 
We find that there are some commonalities between CAPs and estimation uncertainties. 
However, the SEC requires more detailed and profound information about measurement 
uncertainties. Interestingly, the IASB is currently discussing on how to improve disclo-
sures about accounting policies, estimates, and estimation uncertainties (IASB 2019). 
Thus, providing further evidence about CAPs, which do not exist within the IFRS, might 
provide new interesting implications for standard setters that could enrich future discus-
sions on accounting policy disclosures.   
                                                 
9  The second author of Fülbier et al. (2017) is the same author of this dissertation. 
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Each chapter of the first part of this dissertation fills one gap in the literature of CAPs. 
While both chapters are based on hand-collected data and share a quantitative-empirical 
approach, each one offers distinct features in the data and research design. The first anal-
ysis is grounded on quantitative content analysis (Krippendorff 2019) and descriptive sta-
tistics (Smith 2017). The second chapter employs an empirical-archival analysis on mul-
tivariate grounds (e.g., Merchant 2010; Oler et al. 2010). Figure 1 depicts an overview of 
Chapter 1 and 2.  
Figure 1 
Overview Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 
 
Chapter 110 provides the first comprehensive study about the regulatory framework, ex-
isting research, and implementation in practice of CAP disclosures. Focusing on a 16-
year period from 2001 to 2016 and using hand-collected data about 35,686 CAPs, I pro-
vide initial evidence on the occurrence of highly uncertain accounting policies and esti-
mates over time. Furthermore, my study is the first focusing on the (qualitative) reporting 
characteristics of CAP disclosures. Using tools from computational linguistics, I charac-
terize CAP disclosures across a number of distinct dimensions that stand in line with the 
evolving textual analysis literature (e.g., Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015) and are in the 
                                                 
10  An earlier version of Chapter 1 has been presented at the 14th Workshop of Financial Reporting 
(EUFIN) in Stockholm. A paper version of Chapter 1 is available as Rupertus (2019). 
Regulation, Reporting Characteristics and 
Disclosure Compliance of Critical 
Accounting Policies
Critical Accounting Policy Disclosures and
the Identification of Measurement 
Uncertainties
Main Research Question:
Are CAP disclosures useful to identify
subjective and uncertain single accrual-based
measures?
Main Research Questions: 
(1) How do the number and topics of CAPs
have evolved over time?
(2) What are the reporting characteristics of
CAPs with respect to length, textual
similarity, specificty, and readability?
(3) Do CAP disclosures comply with the SEC
guidelines?
Chapter 1 Chapter 2
Part 1: Disclosure Regulation
Critical Accounting Policies
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interest of investors and regulators (e.g., Holtzmann 2007; SEC 2003a, 2016). In partic-
ular, I determine the length, textual similarity, specificity, and readability of CAP disclo-
sures. There is a lack in prior research analyzing whether CAP disclosures currently com-
ply with the SEC guidelines. Studying the content of CAP disclosures is interesting be-
cause to this day, the content of CAPs is still left to managerial discretion due to missing 
legal requirements. For this purpose, I conduct a content analysis of CAP sections of the 
largest 100 U.S. companies and expose how disclosures have been complied with the 
SEC guidelines in 2016.  
My results provide several interesting new insights about CAP disclosures. First, firms 
provide six CAPs on average that mostly relate to deferred taxes, intangibles, property, 
plant and equipment, retirement benefits, revenue recognition and contingencies. Further-
more, accounting topics that are flagged as CAPs vary between firms and industries. 
While some CAPs are more common (e.g., retirement benefits, property, plant and equip-
ment, and intangibles), others occur only in certain industries (e.g., warranties, financial 
instruments, and inventories). Nonetheless, CAPs do not vary significantly over time. 
Second, the average length of the complete section and for each CAP separately has con-
stantly increased between 2001 and 2016. In accordance with prior literature, I argue that 
the prevention of litigation (Levine and Smith 2011), a higher precedence, or an intensive 
enforcement of the SEC (Cassell et al. 2013) might explain this development. The textual 
similarity of CAP disclosures is very high, indicating that the occurrence of uncertainties 
embedded in accounting estimates is relatively stable over time and that firms provide 
nearly identical disclosures each year. Moreover, CAP disclosures are largely unspecific 
(on average two specific words out of 100) and highly complex (i.e., difficult to read). 
Whereas prior studies find that textual similar disclosures have a positive effect on a 
firm’s information environment (e.g., Peterson et al. 2015), it seems that specificity and 
readability only fulfil the requirements of the SEC in certain parts. Third, in comparison 
to the early results of prior literature (e.g., Hughes et al. 2009), I show that the content of 
CAP disclosures seem to have qualitatively improved in 2016, measured by the compli-
ance with the subject’s required by the SEC. In particular, I find that 98 percent of my 
sample firms include at least one CAP that comply with nearly 50 percent of the subjects 
required by the SEC. The majority of CAPs contain information with respect to the meth-
odology, assumptions, as well as factors affecting the underlying assumptions and meth-
odology.  
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Chapter 211 focus on the usefulness of CAP disclosures. This part is a joint project with 
Marcus Bravidor. We answer a call for additional research and extent the literature by 
examining whether CAPs fulfil their intended purpose and depict instances of measure-
ment uncertainties embedded in individual financial statement positions. Existing litera-
ture finds that accruals are less useful in predicting future cash flows due to subjectivity 
in their estimation (e.g., Richardson et al. 2005; Sloan 1996). Following prior findings, 
we examine whether ‘uncertain’ (if the component is flagged as a CAP) accruals are less 
persistent with respect to future cash flows than accruals that are ‘certain’ (if the compo-
nent is not flagged as a CAP). We argue further that the effect of measurement uncertain-
ties on the persistence of uncertain accruals varies across firms and industries. Accord-
ingly, we analyze whether the lower persistence of uncertain accruals depends on their 
importance and specificity for a given firm.  
Using the disaggregated cash flow prediction model of Barth et al. (2001), we find that 
accruals flagged as CAPs are less persistent with respect to future cash flows. This finding 
is consistent with the SEC’s intention that CAPs capture instances of greater measurement 
uncertainty embedded in the underlying accrual measurement. In an additional analysis, 
we provide initial evidence and find that uncertain accrual components are in fact not less 
useful in predicting future cash flows per se. It also depends on their importance and, to 
a certain extent, on the specificity for a given firm. As there is no evidence on how to 
identify subjective and uncertain accruals, we demonstrate that CAP disclosures provide 
such information. Our results are robust to alternative specifications of the model as well 
as to our measure of importance and specificity.  
The second part of this dissertation (Chapter 3 and 4) focuses to the current debate about 
gender diversity on corporate boards. Board gender equality and the lack of female board 
representation has increasingly become the focus of international political and societal 
debates in recent years (e.g., Grosvold and Brammer 2011; Pande and Ford 2011; Singh 
et al. 2015; Terjesen et al. 2016). For instance, several European countries obligate a ratio 
of women on corporate boards to foster equal female participation in economic activity. 
In 2008, Norway adopted the first mandatory gender quota regulation. Similar require-
                                                 
11  An earlier version of Chapter 2 has been presented at the 40th European Accounting Association (EAA) 
Annual Congress in Milan. This version is accepted for presentation at the 41th EAA Annual Congress 
in Paphos and the 2019 Doctoral Colloquium in Larnaca. A paper version of Chapter 2 is available as 
Rupertus and Bravidor (2019). 
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ments have already been or will be adopted in Belgium, France, Germany and the Neth-
erlands (Deloitte 2017; Terjesen et al. 2015). Gender quotas are stipulated on an interna-
tional level in a wide range of voluntary corporate governance codes (Terjesen et al. 
2015).12 Various institutional investors demand a higher ratio of female board members 
and consider board diversity in their investment decisions (e.g., Cao and Donnelly 2010; 
Coffey and Fryxell 1991).13 Despite these efforts, there still are considerable differences 
in terms of average female board membership (e.g., Loy and Rupertus 2018a; Terjesen 
and Singh 2008). Yet, academic research lacks studies that elaborate on why women in 
some countries are far more underrepresented in the boardroom. Furthermore, most of the 
above-mentioned initiatives are based on the view that board gender diversity could en-
hance corporate performance (e.g., Grosvold et al. 2016). Existing empirical research fo-
cuses on the association of female board representation with accounting performance and 
short-term market reactions. These studies neglect the long-term market performance at-
tributable to board gender diversity. The following two chapters address these gaps in the 
literature. Whereas, both chapters are grounded on multivariate empirical-archival anal-
ysis, Chapter 3 uses data on the country-level, while Chapter 4 focuses on the firm-level 
perspective. Figure 2 depicts an overview of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
Chapter 314 is a joint project with Thomas R. Loy. We systematically and empirically 
disentangle institutional supply- and demand-side factors associated with global differ-
ences in female board representation. Our analysis is based on the World Economic Fo-
rum’s Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) that captures the overall level of societal gender 
equality across countries. The score captures 14 variables covering topics such as health 
and survival, political empowerment, economic participation, as well as opportunity. We 
classify these individual indicators as either supply or demand factors and extract both 
components using confirmatory principal component analysis (PCA).  
 
                                                 
12  For an overview about mandatory gender quotas and voluntary corporate governance codes, cf. 
Deloitte (2017). 
13  For instance, the mutual fund ‘Pax Global Women’s Leadership Index’ only invests exclusively in cor-
porations that have established strict guidelines for female representation. 
14  Chapter 3 has been published as Loy and Rupertus (2018a). 
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Figure 2 
Overview Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
Our result show that functioning outside investor protection and a societal climate of gen-
der equality (GGGI) contributes to more women on boards, mainly by fostering the sup-
ply of suitable candidates. Furthermore, we provide initial evidence that longer-term sup-
ply-side factors need to complement short-term demand-side regulation. While gender 
quotas might regulate the demand for female upper echelons, they are ineffective to in-
crease the supply of suitable candidates in the short run. Thereby, legislators might rather 
focus on supply-side measures, such as education, and giving women more opportunities 
to move into managerial and professional roles. 
Chapter 415 focus on the association of female board participation and shareholders’ 
wealth. This chapter is a joint project with Thomas R. Loy. We examine investors’ per-
ception and long-term effects of board gender diversity on firms’ capital market perfor-
mance in an international setting. Building upon role congruity theory, our study contrib-
utes to the social and economic debate about board gender diversity by analyzing how 
stakeholders (e.g., investors) perceive female board members in the long-term. Increased 
                                                 
15  An earlier version of Chapter 4 has been presented at the 38th EAA Annual Congress in Maastricht and 
the 78th Annual Congress of the German Academic Association of Business Administration in Munich. 
A paper version is available as Loy and Rupertus (2018b) and is currently under review at Business & 
Society (3rd round). 
Institutional Correlates with Female Board 
Representation
Board Gender Diversity and its Effects on 
Capital Markets: New International 
Evidence
Main Research Questions:
(1) Is female board participation associated
with systematic differences in the long-
term development of investors’ wealth in a
global setting?
(2) Is female board participation associated
with systematic differences in investors’
perception of firms which do (not) cater to
the market demand for board gender
diversity?
Main Research Question: 
Which supply- and demand-side factors are
associated with the rate of female board
representation on the country-level?
Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Part 2: Governance Mechanisms
Board Diversity
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board gender diversity demanded from a wide variety of stakeholders, such as institu-
tional investors (Byoun et al. 2016; Coffey and Fryxell 1991), stock exchanges (Terjesen 
et al. 2016) as well as regulators (SEC 2009). Subsequently, catering theory argues that 
firms cater to investors’ and other stakeholders’ demands by appointing women to their 
boards (Ghosh et al. 2016). We evaluate further whether societal pressures result in firms 
fulfilling these expectations or punishments by investors if firms fail to ‘comply’.  
Our results indicate that female board representation neither improves nor reduces firms’ 
long-term stock performance. Investors seem to perceive female and male board members 
as being equivalent in the long-term and do not base their investment decisions on direc-
tors’ gender. Moreover, we fail to document significant reduced stock return for firms 
that deviate from the expected ratio of female board membership and vice versa. While 
female board appointments may have reported short-term effects (e.g., Kang et al. 2010; 
Lee and James 2007; Schmid and Urban 2016), it seems that the market corrects this 
(negative) mispricing over the long run. 
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1BCHAPTER 1: 
REGULATION, REPORTING CHARACTERISTICS 
AND DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE OF 
CRITICAL ACCOUNTING POLICIES 
 
 
A b s t r a c t  
Since 2001, U.S.-firms have been encouraged to disclose all highly uncer-
tain accounting policies with a material impact on the presentation of the 
financial condition of the firm (‘critical accounting policies’, CAPs). Using 
a sample of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms between 2001 and 2016, I 
find that the number of CAPs has increased over time and that there is a huge 
variation in uncertain accounting topics across firms and industries. Moreo-
ver, I provide first evidence on (qualitative) reporting characteristics of 
CAPs. Specifically, CAP disclosures are very similar over time, remain 
largely unspecific, and are difficult to understand. Furthermore, the content 
improved qualitatively in 2016, as measured by the level of compliance with 
the subjects required by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Overall, the results expand the understanding about the occurrence, regula-
tory framework, and content of CAPs. In particular, it further allows indica-
tions about factors that determine a firm’s decision to flag an accounting 
policy as critical, potential effects of CAPs on capital markets, and their use-
fulness for financial statement users. 
A paper version of Chapter 1 is available as Rupertus (2019). 
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1 Introduction 
In the early 2000s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) started a series of 
initiatives to enhance the quality and transparency of corporate disclosures, in order to 
make capital markets more efficient (Hughes et al. 2009; SEC 2001). One initiative fo-
cused especially on the interplay of firm-specific uncertainties in the application of highly 
complex accounting policies and estimates that are used in determining financial state-
ment positions. Since 2001, firms have been encouraged to disclose their ‘critical ac-
counting policies’ (CAPs), which are those policies requiring “management’s most diffi-
cult, subjective, or complex judgements” (SEC 2001, p. 1) with a material impact on a 
firm’s financial condition. The SEC suggested that disclosures about CAPs would in-
crease investor understanding of a firm’s financial condition, enabling more informed 
investment decisions (e.g., Hughes et al. 2009; SEC 2001). Guidance related to CAP dis-
closures is included in several SEC releases (Financial Reporting Release (FR) 60, the 
Proposed Rule and FR-72) from 2001 to 2003, requiring firms to provide detailed infor-
mation about the uncertainties underlying their accounting estimates, as well as the effect 
on a firm’s financial condition in the Management, Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) sec-
tion of each 10-K (SEC 2001, 2002a, 2003a). 
Prior empirical studies in this field have primarily analyzed the relationship between CAP 
disclosures and earning properties or economic outcomes (e.g., Glendening 2017; Levine 
and Smith 2011, cf. Chapter 2). However, to this day, there is only limited evidence on 
the implementation in practice of CAPs as well as on the information content provided in 
each CAP section. First, only a few studies analyze which accounting policies and esti-
mates are flagged as CAPs and how related disclosures comply with SEC guidelines (e.g., 
Bauman and Shaw 2014; Hughes et al. 2009; Levine and Smith 2011). Second, most prior 
research focuses on single years immediately after the initial SEC releases and is based 
on single CAPs or on relatively small samples. To my surprise, previous studies have 
generally failed to analyze how CAP disclosures have evolved over time and how firms 
respond to SEC guidelines in later years. Furthermore, there is no prior research analyzing 
the qualitative information content of CAPs. Thus, current knowledge in this field is lim-
ited, so that in order to shed more light on this issue, I attempt to answer the following 
research questions: (1) How have the number and nature of accounting topics on CAPs 
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across firms and industries evolved over time, (2) what are the reporting characteristics 
of CAPs and (3) how do they comply with the SEC guidelines. 
Focusing on my research questions, I provide several important contributions. First, 
whereas prior studies focus on single years or in particular on the years immediately after 
2001, I focus on a 16-year period between 2001 and 2016. Therefore, I provide new ho-
listic evidence about the occurrence of highly uncertain accounting topics as well as how 
they changed over time. Second, the SEC has repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
providing clear, insightful and understandable information. While quantitative infor-
mation about CAP disclosures has been studied before, there is, to the best of my 
knowledge, no study analyzing the qualitative characteristics of CAPs. Focusing explic-
itly on the qualitative attributes of CAPs provides new evidence on the extent to which 
financial statement users might assess the information presented in each CAP section, as 
well as the impact of estimates, judgements, and uncertainties on a firm’s financial status. 
Using tools from computational linguistics, I characterize CAP disclosures across a num-
ber of distinct dimensions that are in line with the evolving textual analysis literature (e.g., 
Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015; Loughran and McDonald 2016). Specifically, I deter-
mine the length16, textual similarity, specificity, as well as readability of CAP disclosures. 
Third, the SEC still emphasizes to include CAP disclosures in Regulation S-K and is 
attentive to any noncompliance with their releases (Cassell et al. 2013; Holtzmann 2007). 
Due to the missing legal requirements, FR-60, the Proposed Rule, as well as FR-72 still 
serve as major guidelines in the preparation of CAP disclosures and thus, the content of 
each CAP section is still left to the discretion of each firm. There is a lack of research on 
whether current CAP disclosures comply with SEC guidelines. Studying the content of 
CAP disclosures provide new evidence on disclosure compliance with the information 
provided in each CAP section, as well as on whether the SEC should strive to provide 
further releases to enhance the quality of CAP disclosures. 
First, my results show that the number of highly uncertain accounting topics increased 
significantly in the first years after the introduction of CAPs and remain similarly high in 
subsequent years. On average, firms provide about six CAPs that mostly relate to deferred 
taxes, intangibles, property, plant and equipment, retirement benefits, revenue recogni-
tion, and contingencies. Whereas the identified accounting topics flagged as CAPs do not 
                                                 
16  Although the average length of CAPs is a quantitative measure, I present related results with the other 
qualitative characteristics. 
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change significantly over time, there are huge discrepancies at the industry level. Thus, 
industry seems to be a significant explanatory factor with respect to some CAPs. Second, 
I find that the average length of the complete section, as well as for each CAP separately, 
has increased constantly between 2001 and 2016. Firms gradually disclose more infor-
mation about their CAPs over time. The prevention of litigation (e.g., Levine and Smith 
2011), a higher priority or intensive enforcement by the SEC (e.g., Cassell et al. 2013) 
might be reasons for this development. Furthermore, the textual similarity of CAP disclo-
sures is very high over time, indicating that the occurrence of uncertainties embedded in 
accounting estimates is relatively stable and that firms provide almost identical disclo-
sures each year. Moreover, CAP disclosures are largely unspecific (on average only two 
specific words out of 100) and are extremely complex in terms of readability (i.e., difficult 
to understand). Whereas prior studies find a positive association between textually similar 
disclosures and a firm’s information environment (e.g., Peterson et al. 2015), it seems that 
specificity and readability only fulfil the requirements of the SEC to a certain extent. 
However, further research is needed to empirically analyze the association between the 
aforementioned characteristics and firm fundamentals, analyst data, or economic out-
comes, in order to make a more comprehensive statement about whether CAPs provide 
useful information to outsiders. Third, I conclude that the content of CAP disclosures 
improved qualitatively in 2016, compared to the prior literature, measured by compliance 
with the subjects required by the SEC. Most CAP disclosures conform to the requirements 
included in SEC releases. I further find that 98 percent of my sample firms include at least 
one CAP that complies with almost 50 percent of the subjects required by the SEC. More-
over, the majority of CAPs contain general information with respect to the methodology, 
assumptions, as well as factors affecting the underlying assumptions and methodology.  
I structure the remainder of the paper as follows. First, I describe the regulatory frame-
work, discuss prior literature, and derive my research questions. Second, I describe my 
sample selection and methodological approaches. Third, I present and discuss my results. 
Fourth, I derive practical implications as well as fruitful avenues for future research. The 
final section concludes. 
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2 Regulatory Framework about Critical Accounting Policies  
In response to a call for more transparent information regarding accounting methods, as-
sumptions, and estimations, the SEC announced new disclosure requirements in the early 
2000s to enhance investor understanding of judgements, assumptions, and uncertainties 
affecting the application of accounting policies and estimates with a material impact on a 
firm’s financial condition (SEC 2001). Specifically, the SEC focused on additional dis-
closures other than those required by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
in Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 235-10-5017 and ASC 275-10-5018 and en-
couraged firms to disclose those accounting policies and estimates requiring “manage-
ment’s most difficult, subjective, or complex judgements, often as a result of the need to 
make estimates about the effect of matters that are inherently uncertain” (SEC 
2001, p. 1) (CAPs). The main goal of the new regulation is to provide greater insights 
into the interplay of highly uncertain accounting estimates, operating performance, and a 
firm’s financial condition “through management’s eyes” (SEC 2002a, p. 9). Thus, CAP 
disclosures are included in the MD&A section, rather than in the notes to the financial 
statements. Figure 3 presents a timeline of SEC releases that focus on CAP disclosures. 
The initial guidance of this new disclosure regulation is included in FR-60, Cautionary 
Advice Regarding Disclosure about Critical Accounting Policies. FR-60 was released in 
December 2001 and encourages firms to include a full explanation of the judgements and 
uncertainties affecting the application of accounting principles, as well as the likelihood 
that materially distinct amounts are reported under different conditions or by using dif-
ferent assumptions (SEC 2001). Nevertheless, FR-60 does not contain specific guidance 
with respect to the implementation of CAP disclosures and thus, the SEC announced that 
it would be releasing further clarifications (Hughes et al. 2009; SEC 2001, 2002b). 
                                                 
17  ASC 235-10-50 requires firms to identify and describe all significant accounting policies, methods, and 
judgements that are required in the valuation of financial statement positions and have a material effect 
on a firm’s financial situation (Flood 2018). The accounting policy section should also include the se-
lection from existing acceptable alternatives, industry specific methods in which the firm operates or 
unique and unusual applications of accounting principles (ASC 235-10-50-3 (a) – (c)).  
18  ASC 275-10-50 provides guidelines that should help outsiders to identify risks and uncertainties in the 
preparation of financial statements (Flood 2018). On the one hand, firms should provide an explanation 
of the preparation of financial statements and information required about the use of estimates (ASC 
275-10-50-1 (b); ASC 275-10-50-4; Flood 2018). On the other hand, ASC 275-10-50-1 (c) requires a 
discussion of estimates when it is reasonably possible that they will change soon and would have a 
material effect on the financial condition (ASC 275-10-50-6; ASC 275-10-50-8). Additionally, a com-
pany’s disclosure shall encompass the nature of the uncertainties as well as an indication that it is rea-
sonably likely that a change in the estimate will occur (ASC 275-10-50-9). 
CHAPTER 1: REGULATION AND DISCLOSURE OF CRITICAL ACCOUNTING POLICIES AND ESTIMATES  
21 
Figure 3 
Timeline of CAP Regulation 
 
One year later, in May 2002, the SEC issued a Proposed Rule entitled “Disclosure in 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis about the Application of Critical Accounting Pol-
icies” containing detailed guidelines on quantitative as well as qualitative disclosures 
about a firm’s CAPs (SEC 2002a). The rules explicitly distinguish between ‘critical ac-
counting estimates’ (CAE) and CAPs. Whereas the former are defined as judgmental and 
subjective estimates involved in the application of (critical) accounting policies with a 
material impact on a firm’s financial condition, the latter are those accounting policies 
which require management’s most difficult, subjective, and complex judgements (SEC 
2002a). However, empirical evidence shows that companies still do not differentiate ad-
equately between both terms (e.g., Fülbier et al. 2017). Thus, the terms CAEs and CAPs 
are used interchangeably within this study and I will refer mainly to CAPs. The primary 
goal of the Proposed Rule is to increase the transparency of CAP disclosures so that in-
vestors would gain a greater understanding about highly subjective and complex account-
ing policies and estimates. Consequently, financial statement users might better assess 
the quality as well as potential variability of current and future earnings (SEC 2002a). 
According to the Proposed Rule, each section should include disclosures about the nature, 
methodology, assumptions, and significance of each CAP. Firms should also disclose a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis about the sensitivity of each estimate and how earn-
ings would be affected by changing an uncertain estimate, if material. Furthermore, each 
firm should include an explanation about whether the selection and application of CAPs 
were discussed with the audit committee as well as a discussion on a segment basis 
FR-60
„Cautionary Advice 
Regarding Disclosure about 
Critical Accounting Policies”
December 2001
Proposed Rule
„Disclosure in Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis about the 
Application of Critical Accounting 
Policies”
May 2002
FR-72
„Interpretation: Commission 
Guidance Regarding Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis”
December 2003
Concept Release
„Business and Financial 
Disclosure Required by 
Regulation S-K”
April 2016
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(Holtzmann 2007; SEC 2002a). Due to extensive criticism for obscuring rather than re-
vealing information to investors in their decision-making (e.g., Sullivan and Cromwell 
2002), the Proposed Rule was not adopted within Item 303 of Regulation S-K (Bauman 
and Shaw 2014).  
In 2003, the Division of Corporate Finance reviewed the 10-Ks of Fortune 500 companies 
and focused primarily on disclosures according to the recommendations included in FR-
60. As an overall result, the SEC noted that a substantial number of companies did not 
provide any CAP disclosures. However, in case of CAP disclosures, they were not ade-
quately congruent with the SEC guidance (SEC 2003b). To provide further guidance, the 
SEC released FR-72, Interpretation: Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, in December 
2003. The commission emphasized that the description of CAPs should supplement, and 
therefore not duplicate the accounting policy section that is already disclosed within the 
notes to the financial statements. While the notes about accounting policies generally de-
scribe the methods used to apply accounting principles (ASC 235-10-50), each CAP sec-
tion within the MD&A should provide an analysis of the company’s uncertainties in-
volved in applying their accounting policies and estimates. Furthermore, a company 
should provide a sensitivity analysis and a discussion regarding the accuracy of past and 
future estimates. Firms further have to add how they arrived at the estimate (SEC 2003a). 
However, most disclosure subjects in FR-72 reproduce the contents of the Proposed Rule 
(Hughes et al. 2009).  
In 2016, as a reaction to the evolving criticism regarding the usefulness of overall corpo-
rate disclosures, the SEC published a Concept Release, Business and Financial Disclo-
sure Required by Regulation S-K (S7-06-16), to assess whether Regulation S-K still in-
cludes guidelines to provide decision useful information to investors (SEC 2016). One 
part of the Concept Release focuses on CAP disclosures. Based on eight questions, the 
Commission strived to receive feedback from users and firms on whether they should 
revise Item 303 to mandate CAP disclosures and how to make them more informative for 
investors.19 Overall feedback in response to the comment letters has been mixed. While 
most respondents support the idea of revising Item 303 of Regulation S-K to mandate 
CAP disclosures (e.g., California Public Employees' Retirement System 2016; Center for 
                                                 
19  To date the commission has received 376 comment letters, of which only 32 address CAP disclosures. 
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Audit Quality 2016; PwC 2016), there are others stating that there is no need to include a 
CAP section in the MD&A (e.g., Fenwick & West LLP 2016; Chevron Corporation 
2016). Table 1 presents an overview of the recommended disclosures about CAPs (SEC 
2001, 2002a, 2016). 
 
There have been several SEC releases emphasizing the importance of communicating 
highly uncertain accounting estimates and assumptions, as well as providing companies 
with guidelines for improving their disclosures, and this continues to this day. Despite all 
regulatory efforts, no final rule has in fact been published and it remains unclear whether 
the Commission will revise Item 303 of Regulation S-K to mandate CAP disclosures in 
the near future. However, overall opinion from the comment letters received from the 
Concept Release is that CAP disclosures are helpful and that the SEC should incorporate 
principal-based requirements to enhance investor understanding of the measurement pro-
cess of highly complex accounting estimates and policies and their impact on financial 
statements (e.g., California Public Employees' Retirement System 2016; Center for Audit 
Quality 2016; PwC 2016). 
Table 1 
Content of CAP Disclosures according to FR-60, the Proposed Rule and FR-72 
Subject 
Description about the nature of the estimate, how firms arrived at the estimate, the methodology, and 
material assumptions that are highly uncertain in the application of the estimate. 
Explanation of all trends, circumstances, and factors that materially affect the application of the  
methodology and assumptions. 
Quantitative and qualitative information about the impact of the estimate on the company’s financial con-
dition and results of operations. 
Identification of the financial statement line items that are affected by the CAP. 
Quantitative and qualitative information about the accuracy of the estimate in the past. 
Quantitative and qualitative information about material changes made to the CAP in the past three years. 
Quantitative discussion about the sensitivity of the estimate with respect to the overall financial  
performance. 
Statement of whether or not the selection and development of the CAP was discussed with the audit com-
mittee. 
A discussion of the accounting estimates on a segment basis. 
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3 Prior Literature 
This section provides an overview of research on CAPs. For this purpose, I collect and 
review eight published articles and three working papers devoted mainly to CAP disclo-
sures. All identified studies were published between 2004 and 2019. Table 2 depicts the 
reviewed literature.  
To date, research on CAP disclosures has focused mainly on the following subjects: De-
scriptive statistics on the number of CAPs and related accounting topics, quality of CAP 
disclosures and its association with earning properties and economic outcomes, the con-
tent, as well as determinants of CAP disclosures. Studies presenting descriptive findings 
about the accounting topics find that deferred income taxes, revenue recognition, pen-
sions, property, plant and equipment, financial instruments, as well as impairments are 
the most frequent CAPs and that most firms disclose around five to six CAPs (Cho et 
al. 2005; Fülbier et al. 2017; Holtzmann 2007; Levine and Smith 2011; Paprocki and 
Stone 2004). Furthermore, only two studies analyze the disclosure quality of CAPs and 
its association with economic outcomes or earnings properties. Using a self-constructed 
disclosure index based on the SEC guidelines, Paprocki and Stone (2004) conclude that 
higher disclosure quality is associated with an improved information environment. Cho 
et al. (2005) show that the quality of CAP disclosures varies both across and within in-
dustries and is positively associated with accrual quality. Both studies provide some evi-
dence that CAP disclosures contain information about the underlying accrual positions, 
and might be useful for reducing information asymmetries. The content of CAP disclo-
sures has mostly been measured as compliance with the evolving SEC guidelines (e.g., 
Hughes et al. 2009; O'Shaughnessy and Rasthy 2005) or single subjects required by the 
SEC (such as a quantitative discussions about the sensitivity of the underlying estimates) 
(e.g., Bauman and Shaw 2014; Glendening 2017). While the compliance with the SEC 
guidelines improved between 2001 and 2003, the aforementioned studies conclude that 
various subjects mentioned in the releases remain underdisclosed. Thus, there might be 
room for improvement.  
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As CAP disclosures vary between industries and firms, one strand of prior studies focused 
especially on the determinants of CAPs. Whereas Levine and Smith (2011) argue that 
firms use CAPs to mitigate litigation, Glendening et al. (2019) find that a firm’s decision 
to provide quantitative sensitivity disclosures reflects strategic preferences of those that 
are responsible for financial reporting and is negatively (positively) associated with in-
centives to misreport (with audit committee accounting expertise). Another strand of stud-
ies focuses on the association of CAP disclosures with earning properties, such as earn-
ings and accruals persistence, or how market participants perceive financial statement 
positions that are flagged as CAPs. For instance, Glendening (2017) shows that earnings 
are less useful in predicting future cash flows, if a firm provides quantitative sensitivity 
disclosures about highly uncertain accounting policies and estimates. Glendening (2012) 
provides evidence that investors perceive financial statement positions that have been 
flagged as CAPs as less reliable. Levine and Smith (2011) conclude that market returns 
are more likely to reverse and firms have less reliable earnings if they provide more CAPs 
than expected. By comparing CAP disclosures with related disclosures in the notes to the 
financial statements, O'Shaughnessy and Rasthy (2005) state that CAP disclosures are far 
more robust than related footnote disclosures. Moreover, Fülbier et al. (2017) find that 
the SEC requires more profound information about a firm’s CAPs than the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) about estimation uncertainties according to Interna-
tional Accounting Standard (IAS) 1.125.  
To sum up, whereas one strand of prior studies focuses mainly on the relationship to 
earning properties, economic outcomes, and market perceptions, only some studies ana-
lyze how CAP disclosures are compliant with the SEC guidance and how the implemen-
tation in practice of CAPs have evolved over time. As can be seen in Table 2, the majority 
of prior studies focus on single years or on the years immediately after FR-60, the Pro-
posed Rule, and FR-72. Thus, there is little evidence on the number and most frequent 
accounting topics across firms and industries, as well as on the compliance of CAP dis-
closures with the SEC guidelines, especially in later years and over time. To the best of 
my knowledge, a comprehensive empirical study analyzing CAP disclosures over a 
longer period has not yet been conducted.  
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4 Research Questions 
The disclosure of CAPs has received great attention in the literature as well as from stand-
ard setters and practitioners (e.g., Bauman and Shaw 2014; Billings 2011; Glendening 
2012; Glendening 2017; Henry and Holtzmann 2006; Levine and Smith 2011; Pitt 2002). 
Having said that, the majority of previous studies analyzing the implementation of CAP 
disclosures focus on single years immediately after the initial SEC releases or base their 
studies on relatively small samples. Due to all this, current knowledge on how firms re-
spond to the SEC guidelines and communicate their CAPs over time is almost non-exist-
ent. This is significantly interesting, because, despite the fact that there have been no 
further releases after FR-72, the SEC still emphasizes the importance of providing in-
formative CAP disclosures (SEC 2007a, 2016). Moreover, recent studies reveal that there 
is increasing complexity arising from the market, business, and accounting environment 
(e.g., Fülbier and Kuschel 2012; Kuschel 2015; Ojala et al. 2011) that might be reflected 
in a firm’s CAPs. So far, there is no study analyzing how the implementation of CAPs 
has evolved and how firms communicate measurement uncertainties embedded in ac-
counting numbers over a longer period. Explicitly taking a longer-term perspective may 
provide useful new insights into the distribution and variation of highly uncertain ac-
counting topics across firms and industries. Based on this lack of research, I state my first 
research question as follows: 
RQ 1: How do the number and topics of CAPs have evolved over time? 
Second, CAP disclosures are narrative and included in the MD&A section of a firm’s 
10-K. The SEC and practitioners repeatedly emphasize the importance of providing clear, 
insightful, specific, and understandable information in plain English (e.g., Herdman 2002; 
SEC 2003a, 2016). Furthermore, firms should use simple sentences, avoid complex 
words, and use the active rather than the passive voice (Holtzmann 2007). However, an-
alyzing to what extent CAP disclosures fulfil these requirements has so far received no 
attention in published research. I argue that the aforementioned attributes are important 
characteristics of CAP disclosures for two reasons: First, they show the extent to which 
financial statement users might assess the information presented in each CAP section. 
Second, they provide greater insights into the quality of related disclosures. To shed light 
on this issue, I use tools from computational linguistics to characterize CAP disclosures 
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across a number of distinct dimensions that are in conformity with the evolving textual 
analysis literature and are in the interest of investors and regulators in terms of affecting 
the information content (e.g., Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015; Loughran and McDonald 
2016). Specifically, I determine the length, textual similarity, specificity, as well as the 
readability of CAP disclosures. This procedure allows me to approximate the information 
content of CAPs across firms, industries and time. Thus, my second research question is 
as follows: 
RQ 2: What are the reporting characteristics of CAPs with respect to length, textual sim-
ilarity, specificity and readability? 
Third, as shown in the previous section, only a handful of studies focus on the compliance 
of CAP disclosures with the SEC requirements. In this context, previous studies focus 
solely on the years immediately after FR-60 (Hughes et al. 2009) or on single accounting 
topics, such as retirement benefits (Bauman and Shaw 2014). Nonetheless, the SEC still 
emphasizes including CAP disclosures into Regulation S-K and is attentive to any non-
compliance with their releases (Cassell et al. 2013; Holtzmann 2007; Glendening 2017). 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence on how current CAP disclosures com-
ply with the SEC guidelines and how the content varies between distinct topics. Thus, my 
third research question is as follows: 
RQ 3: Do CAP disclosures comply with the SEC guidelines? 
5 Sample, Data and Methodology 
5.1 Sample Selection 
To answer my research questions, I initially consider all firms of the Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 as of 31.12.2016. The S&P 500 includes the largest listed companies in the 
U.S. with the highest market capitalization. This may provide useful new insights into the 
occurrence of highly uncertain accounting estimates and accounting positions of the larg-
est and most important companies in the U.S. Moreover, S&P 500 firms may more often 
be the focal point of the SEC and thus, should strive to be compliant with their guidance 
regarding CAP disclosures. First, I start my sample selection by downloading all 10-Ks 
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of each firm of the initial sample from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Re-
trieval (EDGAR) platform between 2001 and 2016. I rely on this period, because the 
SEC’s first announcement of CAP disclosures was in 2001. Second, I limit my sample to 
firms with complete time series data. The final sample for my first and second research 
question consists of 402 firms and 6,432 firm-year observations. Furthermore, I consider 
the largest 100 companies in 2016 for my third research question. Table 3 depicts the 
sample selection procedure.  
5.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 Research Question 1 
To answer my first research question, I extract the CAP section from each 10-K using 
Python.20 Afterwards, I hand-collect each CAP heading and use a keyword-based coding 
system to assign each CAP to a single accounting position. My coding system consists 
of 30 accounting positions and is based on the FASB Taxonomy (FASB 2019) and the 
study of Levine and Smith (2011). In order to assign each CAP to an accounting topic, I 
select various keywords that pick up a related policy disclosure. To determine these key-
words, I manually code CAPs from 100 firms between 2001 and 2016. I then code all 
remaining CAPs based on my defined keywords. This procedure enables a replicable cod-
ing approach. I present my coding system in Appendix A. Subsequently, I determine the 
average number of CAPs, as well as related accounting topics for each firm separately 
from 2001 to 2016. I present the most common CAPs for the whole sample and for each 
industry separately.  
                                                 
20  Specifically, I use regular expressions to identify the CAP section within the MD&A. See Hering (2016) 
for a detailed explanation of how to retrieve textual information from 10-Ks. Because the raw text is in 
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) format, I use regular expressions to parse the CAP section fol-
lowing the procedure of Loughran and McDonald (2019a). 
Table 3 
Sample Selection 
   No. of Observations 
 Total number of observations with available 10-Ks between 2001 and 2016  7,303 
- Observations without complete time-series data  871 
= Finale Sample Research Question 1 and 2  6,432 
= Finale Sample Research Question 3  100 
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5.2.2 Research Question 2 
With respect to my second research question, I use four textual attributes in line with the 
evolving textual analysis literature (Hope et al. 2016; Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015; 
Loughran and McDonald 2016) to characterize CAP disclosures. I first consider the 
length, measured by the number of characters in each CAP section. To control for the 
number of highly uncertain accounting topics, I determine the average length per CAP, 
measured as the length of each section divided by the total number of CAPs.  
Second, textual similarity was introduced into the accounting literature by Brown and 
Tucker (2011). I measure textual similarity as the cosine similarity of a firm’s CAP dis-
closures from year to year. Cosine similarity is based on the vector space model (VSM) 
which reflects the degree of similarity between two strings (Salton et al. 1975). The cosine 
similarity measures the cosine of the angle between two vectors that include unique words 
of a text after removing stop words and stemming remaining words (e.g., Peterson et al. 
2015).21 The cosine similarity (Equation 1) is defined as: 
×
×
 
(1) 
 and  represent the vectors of two documents and  the vector norm . 
The measure identifies similar documents by comparing the relative word frequencies 
across two documents and can have values between zero and one. If two documents are 
identical, the cosine similarity is one; if there are no overlapping words, the score is zero. 
This measure is widely used in accounting research to estimate the similarity of textual 
financial information (e.g., Bozanic and Thevenot 2015; Brown and Tucker 2011; Hoberg 
and Phillips 2010; Peterson et al. 2015). 
Third, Hope et al. (2016) introduce a specificity score that enables researchers to assess 
the level of specificity of qualitative information. This measure captures another dimen-
sion of quality. Specificity is defined as “the number of specific words or phrases con-
veying specific information relevant to the disclosing firm, divided by the number of total 
                                                 
21  Stop words include common words such as ‘an’, ‘become’ or ‘among’ that have no content. I use the 
Loughran and McDonald stop word list that is based on the Python’s Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) 
(Loughran and McDonald 2019b). The list is accessible on https://sraf.nd.edu/textual-analysis/re-
sources/#StopWords (22.03.2019). Stemming remove suffices from words to obtain the ‘stem’ of the 
words. 
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words” (Hope et al. 2016, p. 1013). I follow Hope et al. (2016) and determine the speci-
ficity of each CAP disclosure by using the Named Entity Recognition (NER) technique 
and specifically the SpaCy toolkit.22 NER is based on a natural language processing tech-
nology that allows finding and classifying elements of a text into predefined categories 
(Hope et al. 2016). The specific entity names of the SpaCy tool belong to 17 categories 
such as people, company names, percentages, monetary values, measurements, and dates. 
The higher the specificity score, the more specific the text. For instance, a score of 0.05 
indicates that 5 out of 100 words are specific. 
Fourth, financial reports should be understandable and written in plain English (e.g., SEC 
1998, 2007b). Financial statements users should also be able to easily process the infor-
mation they need to make their decisions (e.g., Li 2008; SEC 2000). Thus, processing 
costs might be reduced when disclosures are more informative and contain clear messages 
(Bloomfield 2002). Consistent with the literature as well as SEC guidance, I measure the 
readability of CAP sections regarding the extent to which they are clear and understand-
able. Readability is measured by using the Gunning Fog Index (thereafter named as the 
Fog index) (Gunning 1952). Up to the present, several prior studies use the Fog index to 
measure the text complexity and readability (e.g., Lawrence 2013; Li 2008; Miller 2010). 
The Fox index is based on the length of sentences as well as the proportion of complex 
words, where the latter refer to words with more than three syllables (e.g., Lang and Stice-
Lawrence 2015). More specifically, the Fog Index (Equation 2) is defined as: 
×  
(2) 
The higher the Fog index, the more complex (i.e., less readable) a text. A Fog Index 
greater than 18 implies that a text is unreadable and a score of 14-18 (less than 14) means 
that the text is difficult (easy) to read (Li 2008).23  
                                                 
22  In comparison, Hope et al. (2016) use the Stanford NER tool that can extract seven specific entity names 
including names of people, locations, organizations, percentages, money values, times, and dates (The 
Stanford Natural Language Processing Group 2019). However, I use the SpaCy toolkit, because it pro-
vides a greater number of categories (ExplosionAI 2019). In an additional analysis, I also use the San-
ford NER tool to measure the specificity of CAP disclosures. My main inferences remain qualitatively 
unchanged.  
23  According to Li (2008), a Fog Index of 12-14 implies that the text is optimally readable; 10-12 accepta-
ble; and 8-10 childishly simple. However, the Fog index comes along with several limitations (e.g., 
Loughran and McDonald 2014). Amongst others, it considers neither the technical language of 10-Ks, 
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5.2.3 Research Question 3 
I use content analysis to collect the data for my third research question. Content analysis 
is commonly used in prior studies to analyze how firms respond to new disclosure re-
quirements as well as how the disclosure behavior has changed over time (e.g., Hughes 
et al. 2009; Marquardt and Wiedman 2007; Roulstone 1999). The aim of the technique is 
to describe, abstract, simplify, and structure the content of text to allow researchers to 
make specific inferences (e.g., Berelson 1952; Krippendorff 1978, 2019; Neuendorf 
2017). To go beyond the data and abstract from the original complexity, text of the same 
or similar meaning are assigned into defined categories (e.g., Elo and Kyngäs 2008; Klein 
and Fülbier 2018; Krippendorff 2019). There are two ways to perform data categorization. 
First, the inductive approach enables researchers to process codes by identifying, refining, 
and validating categories directly from the text. Second, there is the deductive approach 
where categories are deduced ex ante from prior evidence, theoretical considerations, or 
regulatory frameworks (e.g., Elo and Kyngäs 2008; Mayring 2010). Because my third 
research question focuses on the compliance of CAP disclosures with SEC guidelines, I 
consider deductive content analysis and derive the categories based on the subjects men-
tioned in FR-60, the Proposed Rule, FR-72, the Concept Release, and the study of Hughes 
et al. (2009). To answer my third research question, I focus on CAP disclosures of the 
largest 100 firms of my sample in 2016. This enables me to analyze to what extent firms 
are compliant with the current guidelines. My sample size is in line with prior literature 
analyzing disclosure behavior with respect to SEC releases (e.g., Herrmann and Thomas 
2000; Hughes et al. 2009; Roulstone 1999). To obtain the relevant data, I read all CAP 
sections and assigned the sentences to my predefined subject categories. After coding 
about 30 percent of the CAP sections, I recoded for intracoder-realiability-reasons the 
same data, and then, I resolved classification differences and coded the other sections. 
Afterwards, I went through all assignments again to ensure consistency.  
                                                 
nor the academic background of the reader. Furthermore, words like ‘business’ or ‘corporations’ are 
classified as complex words, yet are easy to understand for investors. 
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6 Results 
6.1 Number and Topics of CAPs 
Research question 1 focuses on the number as well as distinct accounting topics that are 
flagged as CAPs over time. First, I present the number of firms with and without CAP 
disclosures by year (Panel A) and industry (Panel B) in Table 4.24 Table 5 presents de-
scriptive statistics about the total number of CAPs, as well as the average number of CAPs 
per year (Panel A) and industry (Panel B).  
  
                                                 
24  Industry titles are based on four-digit Standards Industrial Classification (SIC) 12 codes provided by 
Fama and French. 
Table 4 
Sample Distribution 
Panel A: By Year 
 
 
All firms  
Firms with  
CAP Disclosures 
 %  
Firms without  
CAP Disclosures 
 % 
2001  402  284  70.65  118  29.35 
2002  402  395  98.26  7  1.74 
2003  402  401  99.75  1  0.25 
2004  402  402  100.00  0  0.00 
2005 – 2016  402  402  100.00  0  0.00 
Sum  6,432  6,306    126   
Panel B: By Industry 
NoDur  384  377  98.18  7  1.82 
Durbl  128  125  97.66  3  2.34 
Manuf  522  515  97.54  13  2.46 
Enrgy  352  345  98.01  7  1.99 
Chems  240  232  96.67  8  3.33 
BusEq  928  903  97.31  25  2.69 
Telcm  160  158  98.75  2  1.25 
Utils  448  446  99.55  2  0.45 
Shops  736  721  97.96  15  2.04 
Hlth  544  531  97.61  13  2.39 
Finance  1,232  1210  98.21  22  1.79 
Others  758  743  98.80  9  1.20 
Sum  6,432  6,306    126   
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As can be seen, all firms in my final sample provide CAP disclosures since 2004. In 
comparison, only one firm in 2003, seven firms in 2002 and 118 firms in 2001 did not 
provide any discussion of their CAPs.  
Immediately after the SEC issued FR-60 in 2001, 284 companies (about 70 percent) pro-
vided on average three accounting topics (in sum 1,107 CAPs) as critical. In the following 
years, the average (total) number of CAPs steadily increased to six (2,478) in 2010 and 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics – Number of CAPs per Year and Industry 
Panel A: By Year 
  Mean  Min  25 %  Median  75 %  Max  SD  N 
2001  3  0  0  3  4  11  2  1,107 
2002  5  0  3  5  6  13  2  1,880 
2003  5  0  4  5  6  12  2  2,036 
2004  5  1  4  5  6  12  2  2,128 
2005  5  1  4  5  7  12  2  2,170 
2006  6  1  4  5  7  13  2  2,297 
2007  6  1  4  6  7  13  2  2,357 
2008  6  2  5  6  7  14  2  2,422 
2009  6  1  5  6  7  14  2  2,460 
2010  6  2  5  6  7  14  2  2,478 
2011  6  1  5  6  7  14  2  2,446 
2012  6  2  5  6  7  14  2  2,430 
2013  6  1  5  6  7  14  2  2,419 
2014  6  1  5  6  7  14  2  2,377 
2015  6  1  4  6  7  14  2  2,344 
2016  6  1  4  6  7  14  2  2,335 
Σ  6  0  4  5  7  14  2  35,686 
Panel B: By Industry 
NoDur  6  0  5  6  7  12  2  2,246 
Durbl  6  0  5  6  7  11  2  756 
Manuf  6  0  5  6  8  13  2  3,262 
Enrgy  6  0  4  5  7  11  2  1,979 
Chems  5  0  4  5  6  11  2  1,238 
BusEq  6  0  4  6  8  13  2  5,627 
Telcm  5  0  4  5  6  8  1  835 
Utils  6  0  4  5  7  11  2  2,545 
Shops  6  0  4  6  7  14  2  4,368 
Hlth  6  0  5  6  7  13  2  3,229 
Finance  5  0  3  5  6  9  2  5,623 
Others  5  0  4  5  7  10  2  3,978 
Σ  6  0  4  5  7  14  2  35,686 
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remains similar in subsequent years (2,335 CAPs in 2016).25 There are huge discrepancies 
in the number of CAPs across firms and industries. While some firms only have one or 
two CAPs, there are others with 14 highly uncertain and complex accounting topics. 
Moreover, most firms in the sample are from the finance sector, followed by business 
equipment, retail shops and manufacturing. Firms from the telecommunication (finance) 
sector have the lowest number of CAPs, with a mean of five (five) and a maximum of 
eight (nine) CAPs. Overall, by looking at other industries, the average number of CAPs 
is between five and six, with a minimum of zero and a maximum between eleven and 14. 
This variation remains equal over time and across industries. 
Table 6 provides the total number of observations as well as firms that flag an accounting 
topic as critical. Deferred taxes, intangibles, property, plant and equipment, retirement 
benefits, and revenue recognition are the five most frequent CAPs, followed by contin-
gencies, inventories, stock-based compensation, and receivables. Accounting topics such 
as equity, cash and cash equivalents, commitments, and foreign currencies are less com-
mon. Furthermore, about 90 percent of my sample firms flag deferred taxes and intangi-
bles at least once as critical, followed by property, plant and equipment and revenue 
recognition. Other CAPs such as receivables, investments, inventories, retirement bene-
fits, and contingencies occur in about 50 percent of the sample. To sum up, all accounting 
topics (except deferred revenue) are classified as highly uncertain by at least one firm 
between 2001 and 2016. This demonstrates the variation of highly uncertain accounting 
topics across firms. The most frequent highly uncertain accounting topics are in line with 
the evolving financial statement complexity literature (e.g., Chychyla et al. 2018; Filzen 
and Peterson 2015). In addition, I present the number of observations that flag an account-
ing topic relating to the coding system as critical for each year (industry) in Appendix B 
(Appendix C).  
  
                                                 
25  It is possible that ambiguity in CAP headings actually led to more CAPs than headings. According to 
my pre-test, I identified several firms with two or more accounting positions in a single heading. As a 
result, I manually went through the data to identify headings with multiple CAPs and coded them as 
single CAPs. 
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Below, I take a closer look at nine CAPs over time (Figure 4). The number of all CAPs 
presented in Figure 4 increased in the years immediately after FR-60. Subsequently, the 
number of firms that classified their deferred taxes, intangibles or contingencies increased 
further, whereas the number of CAPs that relate to retirement benefits, property, plant 
and equipment, as well as revenue recognition does not change at all. A look at the curve 
of stock-based compensation and financial instruments reveals a significant increase in 
2006 and 2008/2009, respectively. The former might originate from an accounting change 
Table 6 
Number of CAPs per Accounting Topic 
Category  
No. of 
Unique Firms 
 %  
No. of  
Observations 
 % 
Deferred Taxes  353  87.81  4,434  69.91 
Intangibles - Goodwill and Others  344  85.57  3,926  61.90 
Revenue Recognition  268  66.67  3,196  50.39 
Property, Plant and Equipment  296  73.63  3,173  50.03 
Retirement Benefits  224  55.72  2,907  45.84 
Contingencies  215  53.48  2,096  33.05 
Inventories  158  39.30  1,907  30.07 
Stock-Based Compensation  205  51.00  1,788  28.19 
Receivables  165  41.04  1,635  25.78 
Other Assets and Deferred Costs  151  37.56  1,500  23.65 
Investments  183  45.52  1,471  23.19 
Financial Instruments  159  39.55  1,411  22.25 
Other Expenses  98  24.38  789  12.44 
Asset Retirement / Environmental  78  19.40  759  11.97 
Debt  86  21.39  757  11.94 
Business Combination  127  31.59  710  11.20 
Guarantees  67  16.67  630  9.93 
Liabilities  76  18.91  561  8.85 
Regulatory Accounting  29  7.21  356  5.61 
Consolidation  53  13.18  320  5.05 
Leasing  48  11.94  315  4.97 
Exit or Disposal Cost Obligations  53  13.18  307  4.84 
Oil and Gas Accounting  21  5.22  255  4.02 
Commitments  23  5.72  154  2.43 
Foreign Currency Matters  25  6.22  115  1.81 
Research and Development  16  3.98  114  1.80 
Cash and Cash Equivalents  9  2.24  39  0.61 
Interest  13  3.23  38  0.60 
Equity  7  1.74  23  0.36 
Deferred Revenue  0  0.00  0  0.00 
Σ  402    6,432   
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regarding stock-based compensation in 2005 (Statement of Financial Accounting Stand-
ards (SFAS) 123 to SFAS 123R). This change led to material changes with respect to the 
recognition of share-based payments (Frederickson et al. 2006). The latter one might be 
attributable to the global financial crisis between 2007 and 2009. Thus, it does not seem 
particularly surprising that there is an increased number of firms classifying their financial 
instruments (including fair value accounting) as highly uncertain. However, both curves 
decrease slightly afterwards. To sum up, whereas most CAPs occur consistently between 
2001 and 2016, there are others with slight changes over time. 
Figure 4 
Occurrence of Nine CAPs Between 2001 and 2016 
 
Lastly, to evaluate differential disclosures practices, I provide disclosure frequencies per 
year (Panel A) and industry (Panel B) in Table 7. Whereas the most frequent CAPs only 
changed slightly, there is huge variation across industries. For instance, CAPs regarding 
investment occurs mainly in firms of the financial sector, whereas uncertain oil, gas and 
regulatory accounting topics appear more frequently in firms from the energy and utility 
industry. Moreover, retailers (shops) tend to flag inventories as critical, while firms from 
the business equipment and healthcare industry mostly have CAPs relating to revenue 
recognition. However, while other CAPs occur across all industries, I follow Levine and 
Smith (2011) and argue that there still might be industry- or firm-specific judgements and 
uncertainties in the application of related accounting policies.  
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6.2 Reporting Characteristics 
Research question 2 focuses on the characteristics of CAP disclosures. Figure 5 depicts 
the mean of all four textual attributes over time and Table 8 presents detailed descriptive 
statistics. 
Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics – Reporting Characteristics 
Panel A: Reporting Characteristics - Pooled 
 n Mean Min p5 p25 p50 p75 p95 max sd 
Length per CAP 6,308 2,907 95 894 1,668 2,411 3,521 6,459 26,162 2,073 
Length per Section 6,308 15,612 192 3,880 8,732 13,703 19,573 33,694 106,569 10,594 
Similarity 5,906 0.973 0.511 0.896 0.971 0.989 0.996 0.999 1.000 0.044 
Specificity 6,308 0.022 0.000 0.006 0.014 0.021 0.029 0.041 0.097 0.011 
Readability 6,308 20.68 14.73 18.51 19.81 20.64 21.46 23.09 30.16 1.400 
Panel B: Average Textual Attributes per Year 
 
 Length  
per CAP 
 Length  
per Section 
 
Similarity 
 
Specificity 
 
Readability 
2001  1,516  5,334  .  0.016  20.81 
2002  2,039  9,027  0.888  0.020  20.51 
2003  2,266  10,664  0.945  0.022  20.54 
2004  2,467  12,136  0.965  0.023  20.57 
2005  2,553  12,864  0.975  0.023  20.57 
2006  2,746  14,554  0.970  0.023  20.58 
2007  2,798  15,247  0.977  0.023  20.65 
2008  3,153  17,642  0.975  0.023  20.73 
2009  3,252  18,623  0.976  0.023  20.65 
2010  3,243  18,842  0.986  0.022  20.67 
2011  3,300  18,866  0.984  0.022  20.68 
2012  3,324  18,919  0.987  0.022  20.74 
2013  3,405  19,112  0.988  0.022  20.76 
2014  3,311  18,381  0.987  0.022  20.84 
2015  3,395  18,418  0.986  0.022  20.82 
2016  3,319  18,067  0.986  0.021  20.83 
Panel C: Average Textual Attributes per Industry 
NoDur  2,592  15,103  0.975  0.026  20.26 
Durbl  2,184  13,014  0.964  0.025  20.23 
Manuf  2,397  14,516  0.974  0.023  20.57 
Enrgy  2,958  15,962  0.979  0.020  20.62 
Chems  2,575  13,305  0.980  0.027  20.93 
BusEq  2,696  15,475  0.976  0.019  20.67 
Telcm  2,658  13,616  0.971  0.028  20.85 
Utils  2,857  16,259  0.966  0.027  20.98 
Shops  1,921  11,611  0.973  0.020  20.32 
Hlth  2,582  15,485  0.972  0.020  20.73 
Finance  4,097  19,116  0.973  0.020  21.07 
Others  3,210  16,105  0.972  0.023  20.49 
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6.2.1 Length 
Figure 5 (Panel A) and Table 8 depict the average length per CAP between 2001 and 
2016. Most notably, the average length per CAP increased significantly from about 1,500 
in 2001 to 2,000 characters in 2002.26 This may be attributable to the missing disclosure 
guidelines in 2001 and the detailed Proposed Rule in 2002. Subsequently, the average 
length of each CAP increased substantially and by roughly the same rate to about 3,400 
characters in 2013, and decreased slightly to 3,300 characters in 2016. Table 8 reveals 
that there is substantial variation in the number of characters disclosed by firms. Whereas 
the fifth (95th) percentile is 894 (6,459) characters, the median (standard deviation) is 
2,411 (2,073) characters. Additionally, while some firms have complete CAP sections 
with more than 90,000 characters (e.g., Hartford Financial Service Group Inc. 2009), 
there are others with less than 2,000 characters (e.g., Warner Media LLC 2009) or 400 
characters (e.g., Progressive Corporation 2009). Moreover, there is also a constant in-
crease in the total number of characters per CAP section. The average length is about 
11,000 characters in 2003 and increases constantly to about 18,000 characters in 2016, 
with a maximum of more than 19,000 characters in 2013. By considering each year sep-
arately, I find that the huge variation in the average length of each CAP, as well as the 
CAP section, remains unchanged. 
6.2.2 Textual Similarity 
Results with respect to the textual similarity of CAP disclosures over time are presented 
in Panel B of Figure 5 and Table 8. There are no values in 2001, because there were no 
disclosures in 2000. Whereas the average cosine similarity is 0.888 in 2002, it increases 
constantly to 0.986 in 2016. This indicates that CAP disclosures are quite similar over 
time and the year-to-year change in the content is up to only two to three percent on 
average. Table 8 shows the variation of the cosine similarity. Note that there is modest 
variation with scores of 0.896 (0.999) at the fifth (95th) percentile and 0.971 (0.996) at 
the 25th (75th) percentile. Thus, the application and occurrence of highly complex ac-
counting policies and estimates for each firm separately, as well as the related disclosure 
does not change substantially over time. Moreover, the standard deviation is relatively 
                                                 
26  One page contains on average 3,000 characters. 
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low (0.044), which can be expected, since the occurrence of highly complex accounting 
topics should be relatively stable over time.  
6.2.3 Specificity 
The mean (median) value of specificity is 0.022 (0.021), suggesting that on average, two 
out of 100 words are specific (Table 8). As in the case of similarity, I find slight variation 
for specificity over time (Panel C of Figure 5). On the one hand, the 25th (75th) percentile 
implies that about one (three) out of 100 words are specific. On the other hand, whereas 
some CAP sections do not contain any specific information, there are others with a score 
of 0.097, indicating that 10 out of 100 words are specific. Most importantly, whereas the 
specificity of CAP disclosures increases slightly before 2008, there is a continuous de-
crease in subsequent years. Comparing my results with prior findings, Hope et al. (2016) 
find that five out of 100 words are specific by analyzing risk-factor disclosures.27 
6.2.4 Readability 
As can be seen in Panel D of Figure 5 and Table 8, most of the CAP sections are on 
average very difficult to understand (i.e., Fog index above 18). The mean (median) of the 
Fog index for the entire CAP section is about 20.7 (20.6) that indicates ‘unreadable’ ac-
cording to the interpretation of the index (e.g., Li 2008). Comparing my findings with 
prior literature, Lang and Stice-Lawrence (2015) find that the average readability score 
of annual reports out of 42 countries is about 19.5 (for similar results see Li (2008)). 
Therefore, CAP sections are on average slightly less readable than the remaining 10-K. 
In addition, Panel D of Figure 5 shows a sharp decrease in the readability score in 2002, 
indicating CAP sections that are more readable. Nonetheless, the score increases again 
constantly in subsequent years, implying less readable disclosures. However, these 
changes are negligible, because overall, CAPs remain ‘unreadable’. The standard devia-
tion is 1.4, indicating that there is only modest variation. According to the interpretation 
of the index, only a few observations (< 5 %) have CAP sections that are ‘difficult’ (read-
ability score < 18) and no CAP section is ‘easy’ to read (readability score < 14). Assum-
ing that the complexity of the underlying accounting topics involve the use of complex 
                                                 
27  Using the Standford NER tool instead of the SpaCy toolkit, I identify between one and two specific 
words out of each 100 words. However, the difference between both toolkits may be attributed to the 
smaller number of categories. 
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and technical language, it is not surprising that CAP disclosures are on average unreada-
ble.  
6.3 Compliance with the SEC Guidance 
Research question 3 asks whether CAP disclosures comply with the SEC guidelines. 
Herewith, I analyze CAP disclosures of the largest 100 firms in 2016 using content anal-
ysis. 
Table 9 breaks down the content of each CAP by the main topics of the SEC guidelines.28 
In sum, the sample of 100 firms disclosed 569 CAPs in 2016. The most frequent topics 
are deferred taxes (80 firms), retirement benefits (72), intangibles, goodwill and oth-
ers (60), and property, plant and equipment (60). The results in Table 9 show that 95 firms 
provide a general description at the beginning of each CAP section and 24 firms already 
present a short overview of their CAPs. Moreover, 52 firms include a reference to related 
notes or financial line items for further information.  
By looking separately at each subject in the SEC guidance, firms provide, for 98 percent 
of their CAPs (556 out of 569), a description of the methodology and for 56 percent (320), 
general information regarding the nature of the estimate. Moreover, about 50 percent of 
all CAP disclosures (261) include a discussion of the underlying assumptions needed for 
the estimate, the overall result of the estimate (276), and its impact on financials (293). 
Nearly 70 percent of all CAPs (392) contain information about the factors that affect the 
method and/or assumption. Furthermore, firms include a sensitivity analysis providing 
quantitative information with respect to the impact of a change in the estimate for 156 of 
their CAPs (27 %). Most of them relate to retirement benefits (65), property, plant and 
equipment (16), intangibles (14), asset retirement (9), and revenue recognition (8). Com-
pared to that, very few firms provide quantitative information on the impact of the esti-
mate on financials (eight firms for nine CAPs) and the accuracy of the estimate in the past 
(ten firms for twelve CAPs). Whereas 37 firms explain the reasons for undertaken 
changes to the estimates of 47 CAPs (8.3 %) in the past years, only 30 CAPs include a 
quantitative discussion of these changes.  
                                                 
28  See Table 1 for an overview of the required subjects mentioned in the SEC releases. I further aggregate 
two additional subjects: Result of the estimate as well as references to the notes of the financial state-
ments.  
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In addition, eleven CAPs (1.9 %) were discussed on a segment basis, and only 34 firms 
discussed the selection of their CAPs with the audit committee. 
Table 10 presents the average proportion of each subject (estimated by the number of 
characters) compared to the length of each CAP.29 As can be seen, information regarding 
the underlying methodology captures about 50 percent of the presented disclosures, 
whereas on average, 20 percent of the content relates to the nature of the estimate, the 
underlying assumptions, factors affecting the method and/or assumption, as well as quan-
titative and qualitative information with respect to changes made to the estimate. Subse-
quently, 12.5 percent of the content contain information regarding the impact of the esti-
mate on other financial statements and 8.6 percent relate to the past accuracy of the esti-
mate. A quantitative discussion of the sensitivity of each CAP comprises about 12.4 per-
cent, with a minimum of 1.6 percent and a maximum of 52.4 percent and is highest for 
topics that relate to retirement benefits, stock-based compensation, inventories, contin-
gencies, and liabilities.  
 
  
                                                 
29  Appendix D depicts the average length of each accounting topic and Appendix E presents the average 
proportion of each subject compared to the length of each accounting topic. 
Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics – Proportion of each CAP Subject 
  Mean  Min  25 %  Median  75 %  Max  SD 
Nature of the Estimate  0.175  0.012  0.074  0.141  0.234  0.744  0.136 
Methodology  0.478  0.033  0.335  0.466  0.610  1.000  0.211 
Assumptions  0.162  0.010  0.088  0.133  0.207  0.618  0.110 
Factors affecting the  
Methodology 
 0.196  0.017  0.097  0.172  0.263  0.650  0.123 
Result of the Estimate  0.152  0.007  0.080  0.132  0.192  0.551  0.101 
Impact on Financials               
Narrative Information  0.125  0.010  0.053  0.100  0.168  0.748  0.100 
Quantitative Information  0.079  0.027  0.041  0.067  0.118  0.157  0.048 
Accuracy of the Estimate               
Narrative Information  0.086  0.007  0.044  0.062  0.082  0.390  0.096 
Quantitative Information  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
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Having said that, the main part of each CAP discussion captures information on the meth-
odology used to determine the estimate, followed by general information about the esti-
mate, the underlying assumptions, and factors affecting the methodology and assump-
tions. By contrast, firms provide less information with respect to the impact of the esti-
mate on financials, the accuracy of the estimate in the past, and changes made to the 
estimate in past years. However, this finding is not surprising, since the SEC only requires 
such disclosures if applicable. Other subjects such as a statement on whether the firm has 
discussed the selection of their CAPs with the audit committee, or references to the notes, 
are mostly presented in a short statement. In addition, while some firms discuss almost 
all subjects required by the SEC, there are others that only describe the methodology used 
to determine the estimate (e.g., AbbVie Inc. 2016; Alphabet Inc. 2016; Merck & Co. Inc. 
2016) or refer only to the related notes, without providing any further information (e.g., 
Mondelez International 2016; Pfizer Inc. 2016). 
7 Discussion, Practical Implications and Future Research 
Suggestions 
Over the years, the SEC has continued to focus on the regulatory framework, as well as 
improvements to CAP disclosures, especially in the first few years after 2001. Despite all 
regulatory efforts to mandate CAP disclosures, no final rule has been published to this 
day. Nevertheless, the percentage of companies providing CAP disclosures increased 
from 70 percent in 2001 to 100 percent in 2004. This finding suggests that the SEC’s 
recommendations to disclose CAPs have a quasi-statutory binding effect for companies. 
In their initial releases, the SEC states that the number of CAPs will be about three to five 
Table 10 - continued 
Descriptive Statistics – Proportion of each CAP Subject 
  Mean  Min  25 %  Median  75 %  Max  SD 
Changes in Past Years               
Narrative Information  0.135  0.014  0.059  0.107  0.207  0.372  0.097 
Quantitative Information  0.082  0.015  0.035  0.066  0.109  0.223  0.060 
Sensitivity Analysis  0.124  0.016  0.061  0.105  0.158  0.524  0.093 
Discussion with the Audit Committee  0.167  0.067  0.111  0.155  0.202  0.324  0.069 
Discussion on a Segment Basis  0.056  0.002  0.017  0.039  0.080  0.235  0.065 
Reference to the Notes  0.102  0.003  0.042  0.071  0.117  1.000  0.116 
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CAPs and should vary between companies (Levine and Smith 2011; SEC 2002a). I find 
that firms flag on average six accounting topics as highly uncertain. Thus, firms provide 
slightly more CAPs than the SEC suggested. Whereas my results show a significant in-
crease in the number of CAPs between 2001 and 2007, there are only slight changes in 
the years thereafter. This finding might be attributed to the evolving and in part, unspe-
cific guidelines provided by the SEC, as well as to the fact that firms initially had to learn 
how to implement the new regulation. Furthermore, the identified accounting topics that 
are flagged as CAPs vary between firms and industries. This finding is in line with the 
SEC’s intention that each firm should flag those accounting policies and estimate that are 
most important and representative for their business (e.g., SEC 2002a). However, while 
some CAPs are more common (i.e., retirement benefits, property, plant and equipment, 
and intangibles), there might be still industry- or firm-specific judgements and uncertain-
ties in the application of related accounting policies.  
In contrast to the assumption that the occurrence of highly uncertain accounting policies 
might usually be stable over time, I find that the number of uncertain accounting topics 
and the total number of CAPs vary (slightly) from year to year. This finding raises the 
question as to what determines a firm’s decision to flag an accounting topic as critical. 
First, I provide some exploratory evidence that accounting-standard changes, as well as 
macroeconomic developments, might affect the number of single complex accounting 
topics. This assumption is consistent with the idea that firms should communicate the 
effects of specific trends, events, and uncertainties on their methods, assumptions, and 
estimates used to determine their financial statements (SEC 2001). Second, firms might 
be confronted with an overall increasing uncertainty at the market, business, and account-
ing levels that determine the uncertainty associated with new and/or existing accounting 
topics. However, analyzing the main drivers is difficult, because the overall uncertainty 
in financial statements depends upon a complex entanglement of several factors at the 
organizational, market, business, and accounting levels (e.g., Filzen and Peterson 2015; 
Kuschel 2015). As shown in the review of prior studies, only some studies analyze the 
determinants of CAP disclosures. However, none focuses on macroeconomic develop-
ments or accounting-standard changes. While the aforementioned findings are explora-
tory in their nature, more research is needed to expand and deepen our understanding of 
the factors that determine the decision to flag accounting policies and their estimates as 
highly uncertain. 
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With respect to my second research question, I use tools from computational linguistics 
to characterize the textual data provided in a firm’s CAP section across a number of dis-
tinct dimensions. I find that the average length of the complete section, as well as for each 
CAP, has constantly increased over time and that there is great variation between firms 
(Panel A of Figure 5 and Table 8). In this context, the SEC emphasizes that companies 
should not provide a “lengthy discussion of a multitude of accounting estimates in which 
the truly critical ones are obscured” (SEC 2002a, p. 12). Nevertheless, it is not clear 
whether firms with longer CAP sections also provide disclosures that are more informa-
tive. Whereas prior studies argue that longer disclosures tend to be more informative (e.g., 
Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015), it is possible that firms may still try to obscure relevant 
information either by providing non-disclosures or lengthy discussions of their CAPs 
(SEC 2002a). Future research might focus on this issue and analyze whether related dis-
closures are to a large extent boilerplate information, or firm-specific with respect to 
measurement uncertainties in accounting estimates. Furthermore, CAP disclosures pro-
vided by each firm are very similar over time. However, there are ambiguous interpreta-
tions of similar CAP disclosures. On the one hand, providing similar disclosures from 
year-to-year might imply consistency in the occurrence of uncertainties in the measure-
ment process. In this context, the FASB argues that consistency is an important aspect of 
financial reporting (FASB 2010; Peterson et al. 2015). Consequently, financial statement 
users may be used to the information provided by CAPs that might resolve, to some ex-
tent, the degree of uncertainty about the future (Bozanic and Thevenot 2015). On the other 
hand, similar disclosures might also be interpreted as redundant information that had been 
disclosed before, thus indicating no additional information content. Accordingly, it re-
mains an empirical question analyzing the effects of similar CAP disclosures. Besides, 
CAP disclosures are on average complex and do not generally contain specific infor-
mation. On the one hand, CAP disclosures that are more specific might enable investors 
to interpret more accurately the uncertainties within the measurement process of financial 
statements, whereas less readable information might be more difficult to understand. It 
seems that my descriptive findings might contrast with the SEC intention to provide un-
derstandable, clear, and specific disclosures in plain English. Nonetheless, to this day, it 
remains unknown whether the aforementioned characteristics are really associated with 
(negative) consequences.  
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While quantitative information about CAP disclosures and their association with firm and 
economic outcomes has been studied before, prior research has failed to analyze the con-
sequences of the qualitative information beyond CAP disclosures. Yet, this is important, 
because one might expect them to be correlated with the information content, and thus to 
how outsiders perceive related disclosures (Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015). Future re-
search could assess how the aforementioned attributes are associated with economic out-
comes (i.e., information asymmetry) or analyst data (i.e., analyst coverage, analyst fore-
casts, and analyst dispersion) in order to contribute to the current debate about the useful-
ness of CAP disclosures. Furthermore, it remains unknown whether CAPs actually cap-
ture uncertainties embedded in accounting positions. In this context, CAPs might simply 
reflect hypothetical uncertainties, so that firms are only minimally compliant with the 
SEC guidelines, so as to avoid further scrutiny (Glendening 2017) or litigation (Levine 
and Smith 2011). In this context, future research might focus on whether CAPs actually 
reflect instances of greater measurement uncertainty embedded in financial statement po-
sitions. For instance, in accordance with prior literature (e.g., Barth et al. 2016; Barth et 
al. 2001; Dechow and Dichev 2002), one might analyze whether accruals that are flagged 
as CAPs still have predictive value with respect to future cash flows or earnings.  
FR-60, the Proposed Rule, as well as FR-72, still serve as major guidelines in the prepa-
ration of CAP disclosures. However, the content of each CAP section is still left to the 
discretion of each firm, due to the absence of a legal requirement. In their 2003 review of 
Fortune 500 firms, the SEC identified 14 accounting topics that could be more transparent 
with respect to the discussion of estimates and assumptions. Hughes et al. (2009) find an 
increased trend towards compliance with the SEC guidance from 2001 to 2003. Although 
he finds some slight improvements, various subjects mentioned in FR-72 remain under-
disclosed and most firms still did not respond to the specific guidance included in the 
Proposed Rule. Compared to their study, my findings show that CAP disclosures in 2016 
have improved qualitatively, as estimated by the level of compliance with the SEC guid-
ance, as well as the breadth and depth of each CAP. I find that almost all firms that dis-
close changes to their estimates also provide a discussion including quantitative elements 
of these changes. Moreover, the majority of CAPs contain information with respect to the 
methodology, assumptions, as well as factors affecting the underlying assumptions and 
methodology. This allows financial statement users to obtain in-depth knowledge about 
the measurement and underlying assumptions of each CAP, the various factors included 
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in the estimates, as well as being able to predict future changes in the estimate and the 
related effects on a firm’s financial condition.  
My results further reveal that there are still some discrepancies in compliance with the 
SEC guidelines across the accounting topics. On the one hand, firms refer to almost all 
subjects required by the SEC when discussing CAPs that relate to inventories, other assets 
and deferred costs, intangibles, property, plant and equipment, asset retirement, revenue 
recognition, retirement benefits, and deferred taxes. On the other hand, disclosures about 
stock compensation, research and development, foreign currency matters, commitments, 
and liabilities comply at least with the requirements. Having said that, it seems that firms 
provide disclosures that are more comprehensive for those CAPs which occur more fre-
quently. About 98 percent of my sample firms disclose information with respect to the 
nature of the estimate, the methodology and assumptions used to determine the estimate, 
factors affecting the method and/or assumption, as well as the result of the estimate. Fur-
thermore, 81 percent of the firms provide a quantitative sensitivity analysis for at least 
one of their CAPs. Also, most firms (96 %) disclose a discussion of the impact of the 
estimate on their financials for one of their CAPs. The other subjects only appear occa-
sionally across all CAPs. 
Despite the trend towards increased compliance with the SEC guidance, some subjects 
remain underdisclosed. Although the number of firms that discuss their CAPs with the 
audit committee has increased, the majority of firms do not. This is contrary to the SEC’s 
efforts, because the SEC still suggests discussing the identification and discussion of their 
CAPs with the audit committee, so as to improve the quality and transparency of related 
disclosures (Hughes et al. 2009; SEC 2002a). In this context, the SEC assumes that a 
discussion with the audit committee would give investors greater insight into the reliabil-
ity of a firm’s reported earnings and overall financial performance (SEC 2002a). As a 
result, firms that still do not discuss their CAPs with the audit committee should do so. 
Moreover, it is also problematic that the majority of firms provide information with re-
spect to the impact of the estimate on financials, whereas only a few firms include a quan-
titative discussion. Providing investors with such information may improve their under-
standing of the extent to which other financial statements may be affected by CAPs, as 
well as the interplay of uncertainties with the measurement of financial statements. None-
theless, there are still huge discrepancies across the subjects mentioned in the releases of 
the SEC. Despite increased compliance with the SEC guidelines, there seems to be still 
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room for improvement. Thus, the SEC should be attentive to any missing subjects when 
reviewing a firm’s CAP disclosures, for instance, in their filing review process (e.g., Cas-
sell et al. 2013). 
8 Conclusion 
In the early 2000s, the SEC issued guidance on the disclosure of CAPs, so that financial 
statement users should be able to assess information about highly complex and uncertain 
accounting policies and estimates that are helpful for understanding the measurement ba-
sis of financial statements. The primary research questions in this study are: (1) How have 
the number and most frequent topics of CAPs across firms and industries evolved over 
time, (2) what are the reporting characteristics of CAP disclosures and (3) how did they 
comply with the SEC guidelines in 2016. Whereas most prior studies focus on single 
years or on those immediately after FR-60, this is the first comprehensive empirical study 
analyzing CAP disclosures over a 16-year period from 2001 to 2016. My findings there-
fore offer new insights and key contributions compared to prior literature. 
I conclude that CAP disclosures provide detailed insights into the distribution, variation, 
and occurrence of highly uncertain accounting policies and estimates across firms, indus-
tries, and over time. Compared to prior literature, I find that there is an increased compli-
ance with SEC guidelines in 2016. Related disclosures include detailed information about 
measurement basis, as well as the effect of uncertainty on other financial variables that 
might enhance investor understanding about the reliability of accounting estimates. How-
ever, my findings are only descriptive in nature, and thus have to be interpreted with 
caution. Future research might use multivariate approaches to enhance our understanding 
of the effectiveness, usefulness, and quality of CAP disclosures. Nonetheless, my findings 
enhance current knowledge about the occurrence and regulatory framework of CAPs, 
how CAPs are reported, as well as the content provided in each CAP section. Having said 
that, the SEC still strives to mandate CAP disclosures. Despite all regulatory efforts, no 
final rule has been published and still it is questionable whether the SEC will revise 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K in the near future. Given an apparent increased compliance 
with the SEC guidance, there should be clearer principal-based guidelines for removing 
current regulatory gaps, so as to improve the quality and transparency of CAP disclosures. 
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To sum up, CAPs contribute to the SEC’s goal of communicating highly uncertain ac-
counting policies and estimates and how uncertainties inherent in accounting estimates 
affecting a company’s financial performance. 
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Appendix A: Category System – CAPs 
  Topic Category 1  Topic Category 2 
1  Cash and Cash Equivalents  Cash and Cash Equivalents 
2  Receivables  Receivables 
3  Investments  Debt and Equity Securities 
     Equity Method and Joint Ventures 
4  Inventories  Inventories 
5  Other Assets and Deferred Costs  Insurance Contracts 
     Contracts With Customers 
     Other Assets 
6  Intangibles - Goodwill and Others  Goodwill 
     Intangibles – Other than Goodwill 
     Internal-Use Software 
7  Property, Plant and Equipment  Property, Plant and Equipment 
8  Liabilities  Liabilities 
9  Asset Retirement / Environmental  Asset Retirement Obligations 
     Environmental Obligations 
10  Exit or Disposal Cost Obligations  Restructuring 
     Exit and Closing Obligations 
11  Deferred Revenue  Deferred Revenue 
12  Commitments  Commitments 
13  Contingencies  Contingencies 
14  Guarantees  Guarantees 
15  Debt  Reserves 
     Loans 
     Other Debt 
16  Equity  Equity 
17  Revenue Recognition  Revenue Recognition 
     Returns 
     Rebates 
     Other Income 
18  Retirement Benefits  Retirement Benefits 
19  Stock-based Compensation  Stock Compensation 
     Other Incentives 
20  Other Expenses  Other Expenses 
21  Research and Development  Research and Development 
22  Deferred Taxes  Deferred Taxes 
23  Business Combination  Business Combination 
24  Consolidation  Consolidation 
25  Financial Instruments  Derivatives 
     Hedging 
     Financial Instruments 
     Fair Value Accounting 
26  Foreign Currency Matters  Foreign Currency Matters 
27  Interest  Interest 
28  Leasing  Leasing 
29  Regulatory Accounting  Regulatory Accounting 
30  Oil and Gas Accounting  Oil and Gas Accounting 
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Appendix B: Number of Accounting Topics per Year 
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Appendix B: Number of Accounting Topics per Year 
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Appendix C: Number of Accounting Topics per Industry 
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Appendix C: Number of Accounting Topics per Industry 
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Appendix D: Average Length per Accounting Topic 
  
Category  
Average Length 
(# Characters) 
Oil and Gas Accounting  6,395 
Retirement Benefits  4,494 
Property, Plant and Equipment  4,175 
Intangibles - Goodwill and Others  3,829 
Revenue Recognition  3,757 
Asset Retirement / Environmental  3,339 
Business Combination  3,165 
Financial Instruments  3,049 
Other Assets and Deferred Costs  2,645 
Foreign Currency Matters  2,577 
Deferred Taxes  2,459 
Regulatory Accounting  2,434 
Consolidation  2,343 
Leasing  2,328 
Commitments  2,004 
Other Expenses  1,966 
Investments  1,930 
Stock-Based Compensation  1,849 
Debt  1,826 
Contingencies  1,740 
Receivables  1,550 
Guarantees  1,414 
Exit or Disposal Cost Obligations  1,362 
Inventories  1,354 
Liabilities  1,247 
Research and Development  776 
Cash and Cash Equivalents  - 
Deferred Revenue  - 
Equity  - 
Interest  - 
Average Length (# Characters)  2,481 
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Appendix E: Proportion of each CAP Subject per Accounting Topic 
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2BCHAPTER 2: 
Critical Accounting Policy Disclosures and the 
Identification of Measurement Uncertainties 
 
 
A b s t r a c t  
The communication of measurement uncertainties in financial reporting is 
of increasing concern for investors, analysts, regulators, and auditors. 
Since 2001, U.S. firms have been encouraged to disclose their highly uncer-
tain accounting policies and estimates, which have a material impact on how 
the financial condition of a firm is presented (‘critical accounting policies’, 
CAPs). We find that accruals which are flagged as CAPs are less persistent 
with respect to future cash flows. This is consistent with the SEC’s intention 
that CAPs should capture instances of greater measurement uncertainties 
embedded in the underlying accrual-based measure. We argue further that 
the lower persistence of single uncertain accruals is not equal across firms 
and industries. Specifically, we find that uncertain accrual components are 
not less useful in predicting future cash flows per se; it also depends on their 
importance and, to a certain extent, the specificity for a given firm. Thus, we 
empirically document that CAP disclosures provide a suitable channel for 
communicating measurement uncertainties embedded in accounting esti-
mates and financial statement positions, thus contributing to the fundamental 
goal of financial reporting. 
This part of the thesis is a joint project with Marcus Bravidor. The paper has been accepted for presenta-
tion at the 2019 EAA Annual Congress in Paphos and the 2019 EAA Doctoral Colloquium in Larnaca. A 
paper version of this part is available as Rupertus and Bravidor (2019). 
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1 Introduction 
The ability of financial statement information (e.g., accruals) to predict future outcomes 
depends partly on the level of uncertainty in the reporting environment of each firm 
(Yeung 2009). Uncertainties in financial statements exist to a large extent because of the 
use of subjective judgements, estimates and assumptions in the measurement process that 
are inherently unreliable (SEC 2011a). As the level of measurement uncertainty increases, 
financial statement users find it increasingly more difficult to interpret accounting num-
bers, such as net income, in order to predict future cash flows (Barth 2006; SEC 2011a). 
Accordingly, it is necessary to identify precisely which assets and liabilities are affected 
by measurement uncertainties, to understand their effect on a firm’s financial condition 
and to incorporate them appropriately in one’s own investment decisions. For years, 
standard setters, auditors, and financial statement preparers have constantly been dealing 
with how to communicate uncertainties in business transactions and accounting estimates, 
which exert a significant effect on a firm’s financial performance (Christensen et al. 2012; 
Majors 2016; SEC 2011b). Increasing business complexity, dynamic changes in the so-
cial, technological, political, and economic environment, as well as the use of highly sub-
jective future-orientated estimation models, have amplified these efforts in recent years 
(AICPA 1994; Christensen et al. 2012; Christensen et al. 2014; Eilifsen et al. 2017; 
Mayorga and Sidhu 2012; Lev et al. 2010).  
In the early 2000s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed new dis-
closure requirements within a firm’s Management, Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), in 
order to enhance investor understanding of measurement uncertainties in a company’s 
financial statements (SEC 2001). Since 2001, firms have been encouraged to disclose 
their ‘critical accounting policies’ (CAPs),0F30 , which are those accounting policies and es-
timates that require “management’s most difficult, subjective, or complex judgements, 
                                                 
30  In their initial Financial Reporting Release 60 (FR-60), Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About 
Critical Accounting Policies in 2001 (SEC 2001), the SEC refers to CAPs, whereas in their Proposed 
Rule, Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about the Application of Critical Account-
ing Policies, in 2002 (SEC 2002a) and FR-72, Interpretation: Commission Guidance Regarding Man-
agement’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, in 2003 (SEC 
2003a), they mainly use the term ‘critical accounting estimates’ (CAEs). The SEC defines CAEs as 
those judgmental and subjective estimates involved in the application of CAPs with material impact on 
a firm’s financial condition (SEC 2002a). However, U.S. firms use both terms to designate the corre-
sponding CAP section within their MD&A, and thus do not differentiate adequately between these two 
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often as a result of the need to make estimates about the effect of matters that are inher-
ently uncertain” (SEC 2001, p. 1). An accounting policy must be flagged as a CAP if 
changes in the underlying estimates are uncertain, and thus have a material impact on the 
presentation of a firm’s financial condition. Amongst others, economic uncertainty and 
management judgement are typical sources of such sensitive estimates.  
Yet, it remains unclear whether CAPs actually reflect individual uncertain financial state-
ment positions. On the one hand, firms may have an incentive to view CAPs as a mere 
‘compliance exercise’ or as a way to mitigate litigation (e.g., Levine and Smith 2011) and 
provide standardized boilerplate information without any real information content. On 
the other hand, if firms use CAPs in the regulators’ intended manner (e.g., SEC 2001, 
2002a, 2003a), they should be useful for identifying uncertain financial statements (i.e., 
accruals). Our study provides evidence by examining whether accruals are inherently 
more uncertain if they are classified as CAPs. Specifically, we examine whether ‘uncer-
tain’ (if the component is flagged as a CAP) accruals are less persistent with respect to 
future cash flows than accruals that are ‘certain’ (if the component is not flagged as a 
CAP). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze empirically the 
persistence of single uncertain accounting accruals that are flagged as CAPs with respect 
to future cash flows. As a result, we answer a call for additional research (Cole and Jones 
2005) and extent prior literature with respect to examining whether CAPs fulfil their in-
tended purpose (Glendening 2017).31 
According to our results, we provide several relevant new insights. We find that accruals 
that are flagged as CAPs are less persistent than accruals that are not flagged as CAPs 
with respect to future cash flows. This is consistent with the SEC’s intention that CAPs 
should capture instances of greater measurement uncertainty embedded in the measure-
ment process of the underlying accruals (e.g., Glendening 2017; SEC 2002a). In an addi-
tional analysis, we show that the effect of measurement uncertainties on the persistence 
of uncertain accruals is not equal across firms and industries. Specifically, we extend prior 
                                                 
categories (Fülbier et al. 2017). We use CAPs and CAEs interchangeably and refer mainly to CAPs 
within this study. 
31  We do not focus on the usefulness of related CAP disclosures for improving predictions about future 
earnings or cash flows. The main idea of our study is to analyze whether CAPs are useful for identifying 
uncertain accounting accruals and thus, whether uncertain accounting accruals are less persistent with 
respect to a firm’s future cash flow. 
CHAPTER 2: CRITICAL ACCOUNTING POLICY DISCLOSURES AND MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTIES  
67 
literature and find that uncertain accrual components are in fact not less useful in predict-
ing future cash flows per se; it also depends on their importance and, to a certain extent, 
the specificity for a given firm. 
Our study makes several important contributions. First, prior research on the usefulness 
of CAPs in identifying uncertain accounting positions is rare. Glendening (2017) finds 
that the predictive value of earnings is lower when firms provide ‘critical accounting 
estimate’ (CAEF32) disclosures. Chen et al. (2019) conclude that accruals which require 
more estimation (based on qualitative information in a firm’s footnote and CAP disclo-
sures) are less persistent. However, both studies capture the level of measurement uncer-
tainty on a largely aggregated basis and do not distinguish between the persistence of 
single accruals that are (not) susceptible to estimation errors. Compared to prior studies, 
our research design allows for a direct observation of whether CAPs provide information 
about the persistence of single accrual-based measures. Second, the type of uncertain po-
sitions as well as estimates varies substantially between firms, industries, and over time. 
We use a firm-specific measure that allows controlling for cross-sectional and temporal 
variation, in order to analyze whether the lower persistence of accruals depends on other 
factors such as the number of uncertain accruals, their importance or specificity for a 
given firm and industry. Third, we build upon initial empirical evidence suggesting that 
investors may benefit from corporate disclosures about uncertain accounting policies and 
estimates, so as to assess which accruals have more predictive power with respect to pre-
dicting future cash flows (Hope 2003a, 2003b; Wolk et al. 2017; Xie 2001). However, 
there is increasing concern that current disclosure requirements do not serve their in-
tended purpose, because of too much boilerplate information (e.g., Glendening 2017). In 
this context, we contribute to the debate regarding corporate disclosures about measure-
ment uncertainties in analyzing whether CAPs provide information about the credibility 
of financial statements. Overall, our findings suggest that CAPs are potentially useful for 
analysts as well as investors, in enabling them to catch up on measurement uncertainties 
in financial reports. This allows financial statement users to enhance their understanding 
of a firm’s highly uncertain accounting policies and estimates. 
                                                 
32  As stated before, we use the term CAP in our study, which comprises both terms introduced by the SEC. 
However, some studies use mainly the term CAE (e.g., Glendening 2012; Glendening 2017). Thus, in 
describing their findings, we will use the term CAE to ensure consistency. 
CHAPTER 2: CRITICAL ACCOUNTING POLICY DISCLOSURES AND MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTIES  
68 
We structure our paper as follows. First, we present our theoretical and regulatory frame-
work and review the literature. Second, we develop our hypothesis, present our empirical 
methods, and describe the data. Third, we exhibit and discuss our results and subject them 
to a range of robustness checks. The final section concludes. 
2 Corporate Disclosures about Measurement Uncertainties 
2.1 Relevance of Communicating Measurement Uncertainties 
The measurement of financial statements has increasingly been challenged by turbulent 
and changing market and business environments, as well as an increasing move towards 
fair value measurement of assets and liabilities (Christensen et al. 2012; Lev et al. 2010). 
To value financial statement positions accurately, managers have to process information 
from the market, business, and accounting environments (Palepu et al. 2016). However, 
fluctuations in such factors as interest and inflation rates, uncertain business models, un-
foreseen market developments, higher risk industries, as well as accounting distortion due 
to highly subjective and complex valuation models, lead to serious irreducible measure-
ment uncertainties in applying appropriate accounting policies and estimates (e.g., Palepu 
et al. 2016). This results in incomplete accounting information as well as an imprecise 
knowledge of valuation inputs. All this leads to a range of possible outcomes and it is 
impossible to know which will in fact occur (Beaver 1991; Duffie and Lando 2001; Lu et 
al. 2010). As a result, managers can neither derive precise probability distributions to 
forecast future outcomes (Bird et al. 2014) nor make reliable valuations of their assets 
and liabilities (Beaver 1991). Consequently, it is important to communicate effectively 
the sources of measurement uncertainty, so that users can incorporate such information 
into their decisions (Eilifsen et al. 2017).  
The usefulness of financial statement information “depends significantly on the user’s 
understanding of the accounting policies followed by the entity” (APB 1972, No. 7). As 
a result, understanding the measurement basis that shapes the value of financial statement 
positions is crucial. However, the application of accounting policies, estimates, as well as 
the selection of valuation inputs depends on internal decisions and information made by 
managers that, in some parts, is neither available through public channels nor common 
knowledge. From the perspective of outsiders, it is thus difficult to identify uncertain 
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positions, because single financial statement items alone cannot provide such infor-
mation. This increases the relevance of corporate disclosures, because they have the po-
tential to convey proprietary information about managerial estimates and projections (Lev 
et al. 2010). The literature has also focused on this issue and argues that investors may 
benefit from disclosures in order to analyze the persistence of financial statement numbers 
(Xie 2001). Hope (2003b) and Wolk et al. (2017) state that corporate disclosures about 
sensitive and complex accounting policies and related estimates help outsiders to under-
stand the nature and extent of measurement uncertainties. Consequently, financial state-
ment users may be able to verify the quality of reported financial information (Chartered 
Professional Accountants Canada 2016; Hope 2003a; Wolk et al. 2017). Further studies 
conclude that corporate disclosures with respect to measurement uncertainties have the 
potential to inform outsiders about the (potential) effects on a firm’s financial condition 
if sudden unforeseen changes occur (Campbell et al. 2003; Chartered Professional Ac-
countants Canada 2016; Gietzmann and Trombetta 2003; Healy and Palepu 1993). It is 
important that firms provide convincing disclosures as to which financial statement posi-
tions are inherently more uncertain, so that financial statement users can make ‘better’ 
and more informed decisions about their buy, hold, and sell strategy (Barth et al. 2016).  
2.2 SEC Regulation on Critical Accounting Policy Disclosures 
In the early 2000s, the SEC proposed disclosure requirements within the MD&A to en-
hance investor understanding of measurement uncertainties in companys’ financial state-
ments that are particularly difficult for the management to determine, due to significant 
subjective judgments and estimations (SEC 2001). Since 2001, firms have been encour-
aged to provide narrative and quantitative disclosures about their CAPs. The SEC defines 
them as those accounting policies and estimates that require “management’s most diffi-
cult, subjective, or complex judgements, often as a result of the need to make estimates 
about the effect of matters that are inherently uncertain” (SEC 2001, p. 1).  
Guidance related to the content of CAP disclosures is included in several SEC releases. 
In 2001, the SEC issued FR-60 and encouraged firms to include a discussion of the un-
certainties embedded in the measurement process of financial statements in their MD&A 
(SEC 2001). Subsequently, in May 2002, the SEC issued a Proposed Rule regarding CAP 
disclosures (SEC 2002a). According to the Proposed Rule, firms have to disclose detailed 
information about the estimate, the methodology, and any highly uncertain assumption 
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underlying the estimate (SEC 2002a).33 In December 2003, the SEC specified its require-
ments in FR-72 and focused even more on those accounting estimates with a significant 
level of subjectivity and judgement on highly uncertain matters (SEC 2003a). A company 
should provide disclosures only if the impact of the estimate on a firm’s financial condi-
tion is material. Based on the interpretive guidance, firms are required to address how 
they came up with the estimate, how accurate it has been in the past, and how much it has 
changed, as well as whether it is reasonably likely that the estimate will change in the 
future. Moreover, each company should analyze the sensitivity of each estimate with re-
spect to a firm’s financial performance (SEC 2003a). Although CAP disclosures are al-
ready presented separately from the notes, so as to reduce misleading inferences with 
other financial statement information, the SEC has emphasized that firms should not du-
plicate accounting policy disclosures already disclosed in the notes. However, no final 
draft has yet been released, but firms are advised to comply with prior releases of the SEC 
(e.g., FR-60, Proposed Rule and FR-72). 
CAP disclosures should comprise detailed information about highly uncertain estimates, 
which are in fact ubiquitous in accrual-based accounting and have a significant effect on 
a firm’s (future) financial presentation. In the context of our study, we analyze whether 
CAPs actually represent highly uncertain financial statement positions. If firms use CAPs 
in the regulators’ intended manner, financial statement users may be able to assess which 
balance sheet and income statement positions constitute measurement uncertainties. 
Thus, CAPs have the potential to provide proprietary information, which enhances inves-
tor understanding of a firm’s highly subjective and complex accounting estimates.  
3 Prior Literature 
To this day, only a handful of studies focus on whether CAP disclosures provide infor-
mation about measurement uncertainties in financial statements. Levine and Smith (2011) 
find that firms with ex-ante higher litigation risk are more likely to provide CAP disclo-
sures, indicating that firms use this disclosure practice to reduce the risk of litigation. The 
authors further show that the disclosure decision has predictive ability for changes in firm 
                                                 
33  Furthermore, firms should include both quantitative and qualitative discussions about material changes 
that may occur, an explanation as to why different estimates would have a material impact on a firm’s 
financial condition and a statement as to whether or not the management has discussed the selection of 
each CAP with the audit committee. 
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fundamentals that indicate potential uncertainty surrounding the underlying financial 
statements. They conclude that firms with fewer (more) CAPs than expected report more 
(less) reliable reported earnings. Glendening (2012) analyzes whether the presence of a 
CAE disclosure is associated with the value relevance of financial statement items. He 
finds that the value relevance of financial positions is negatively associated with the pres-
ence of a CAE disclosure and concludes that investors then perceive the underlying bal-
ance sheet items as less reliable. In a more recent study, Glendening (2017) examines 
how the predictive ability of current aggregated earnings with respect to future cash flows 
varies in the presence of CAE disclosures. He finds a negative association of the predic-
tive value of earnings with respect to future cash flows if there are disclosures about 
highly uncertain accounting estimates. However, he only focuses on whether there are 
disclosures about highly uncertain accounting estimates, rather than on which (uncertain) 
accrual components are (not) useful for predicting future cash flows. 
The SEC’s intention is to enhance investors understanding of the existence, nature, and 
impact of uncertain estimates for which management exercises significant managerial 
discretion. Thus, firms should flag each single accounting policy and/or the underlying 
accounting topic as uncertain, that fulfil the definition of a CAP. Having said that, CAPs 
have the potential to provide firm-specific information about measurement uncertainties 
that are embedded in single accrual-based measures. However, the aforementioned stud-
ies consider neither which single accrual-based measures are classified as uncertain, nor 
whether there are accruals that are not susceptible to estimation errors. Thus, current 
knowledge about the usefulness of CAP disclosures for the identification of uncertain 
financial statement positions is limited. 
4 Hypothesis Development 
A fundamental objective of financial reporting is to provide useful information to finan-
cial statement users about the amount, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows (FASB 
2010; Glendening 2017). In preparing of financial statements, managers have to apply 
accounting policies and estimates based on the assessment of present and expected future 
inflows and outflows associated with their assets and liabilities (Barth et al. 2016). After-
wards, accruals are used to adjust cash flows to reflect their expectations about the future 
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(Barth 2006; Mayorga and Sidhu 2012). Because accrual accounting incorporates man-
agers’ expectations about future cash flows, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) asserts that such accruals and their components have most predictive power with 
respect to future cash flow predictions (FASB 1978, 2010). In this context, several studies 
have confirmed that total accruals (e.g., Dechow 1994; Dechow et al. 1998; Greenberg et 
al. 1986) as well as disaggregating accruals into their components enhance future cash 
flow predictions (Barth et al. 2001; Barth et al. 2016). Nevertheless, numerous prior stud-
ies find that accruals are less persistent with respect to future cash flows (e.g., Allen et al. 
2013; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Dechow and Ge 2006; Richardson et al. 2005, 2006; 
Xie 2001). More specifically, Sloan (1996) finds that accruals are less persistent due to 
the subjectivity in their estimation. Lev et al. (2010) argue that accruals based on esti-
mates are less reliable for decision-making purposes. Richardson et al. (2005) demon-
strate that the lower persistence of accruals is mostly attributable to those accruals af-
fected by subjectivity and thus measurement uncertainties. More recent studies confirm 
prior results (e.g., Allen et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2014). In sum, estimations, complex 
valuations, and managerial discretion might reduce the benefits of accruals with respect 
to future cash flow predictions due to objective difficulties and related measurement un-
certainties (Glendening 2017; Lev et al. 2010). However, it is therefore important to iden-
tify single uncertain accrual components to assess which accruals are (less) useful for 
predicting future cash flows. In the following, we analyze whether CAP disclosures pro-
vide such information. 
Analyzing the predictive value of single accounting accruals that are flagged as CAPs is 
far from straightforward. On the one hand, it is probable that the proposed regulation of 
the SEC does not fulfil its intended purpose because firms might see CAP disclosures as 
a mere ‘compliance exercise’ or as a way to avoid litigation without real information 
content. Thus, firms may disclose CAPs without taking into account the uncertainty of 
the underlying accounting position. On the other hand, accounting estimates and mana-
gerial projections provide forward-looking proprietary information about the underlying 
financial statements (Lev et al. 2010). If management correctly identifies uncertainties in 
their accounting estimates, they might consider such information in the measurement pro-
cess of financial statements, thus leading not to diminished predictive ability with respect 
to future cash flows. In contrast, following the literature, measurement uncertainties 
might result in incomplete accounting information as well as an imprecise knowledge of 
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valuation inputs. Consequently, management can neither predict future outcomes accu-
rately, nor make reliable valuations, both of which lead to a reduced predictive power of 
accruals (Dechow and Dichev 2002). Based on the above arguments, we argue that ana-
lyzing the predictive value of accruals that are classified as CAPs remains an empirical 
question. 
We consider theoretical and empirical evidence and hypothesize that the disclosure of 
CAPs (non-disclosure) captures greater (lower) instances of measurement uncertainties 
embedded in accrual positions. Assuming that CAPs correctly identify highly uncertain 
accounting positions, ‘uncertain’ (if the component is flagged as a CAP) accruals should 
exhibit lower predictive ability rather than accruals that are ‘certain’ (if the component is 
not flagged as a CAP). Thus, CAPs should induce errors in accrual estimates, thereby 
limiting the usefulness of accruals to predict future cash flows. As a result, we predict 
that uncertain accrual components are less persistent with respect to future cash flows and 
state our first hypothesis (H1) as follows: 
H1:  Accruals that are flagged as CAPs have lower predictive power with respect to 
future cash flows.  
The type and importance of uncertain positions, as well as of estimates, varies strongly 
between firms, industries, and over time. First, there are huge discrepancies in the number 
of uncertain financial statement accounts as well as their importance to a given firm. 
Therefore, the amount of uncertain positions and the resulting effect on a firm’s financial 
condition may be firm-specific. Based on this assumption, we assume that predictive 
power depends on the importance to a given firm. Specifically, we argue that predictive 
power is even lower if the amount of total uncertain CAP accruals reflects a material 
proportion compared to total accruals (‘accrual importance’). Second, there is a wide dis-
persion in the types of CAPs across firms and industries (e.g., Fülbier et al. 2017; Levine 
and Smith 2011). While some accounting positions are by nature subject to estimation, 
others occur rarely in certain companies and industries. On the one hand, firms within the 
same industry might have equal CAPs because of similar business transactions, business 
models, and accounting strategies. On the other hand, while there are CAPs in almost 
every firm and are common within some industries (e.g., deferred taxes, pensions, intan-
gible assets), others are more unusual (e.g., regulatory accounting, leases, investments). 
We define the former as unspecific and the latter as specific CAPs. If firms have CAPs 
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that are more unusual compared to their peers, auditors, the audit committee, as well as 
the management would place greater emphasis on such estimations, because of their un-
common occurrence, leading to estimates that are more precise. In contrast, it might be 
more challenging for the management to make reliable estimates with respect to the un-
derlying transaction because of a lack of experience in dealing with such estimates.  
We argue that accrual importance and accrual specificity might be two moderators that 
affect the predictive power of uncertain accruals. Consistent with our first hypothesis, we 
assume that uncertain accruals (those that are flagged as CAPs) have even less predictive 
power with respect to future cash flows if they are more specific and important to a given 
firm. Therefore, we state our second hypothesis (H2) as follows: 
H2:  Predictive power is lower for more specific and important accruals that are 
flagged as CAPs. 
5 Research Design 
5.1 Sample Selection 
We begin our sample construction by using the S&P 500 composition as of 31.12.2016. 
We then extract all available 10-Ks from Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Re-
trieval (EDGAR) during 2002 and 2016.  
We use this period because the SEC’s first announcement of CAP disclosures was in 
December 2001 and the majority of firms began providing CAP disclosures in 2002 
(cf. Table 12). We obtain accounting data from Worldscope. Our sample selection proce-
dure is as follows. First, while we are interested in the prediction of future cash flows, we 
limit our sample to those firms with available cash flow data. Second, we eliminate those 
observations without sufficient financial data for all our analyses. Third, we eliminate all 
firms without complete time series data. As a result, we remain with 284 firms and 4,260 
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firm-year observations that span the period 2002 – 2016. Table 11 describes our sample 
selection procedure: 
To obtain information about a firm’s highly uncertain accounting policies and estimates, 
we extract the CAP section from the MD&A using Python and collect all CAP headings 
from each observation. Afterwards, we use a keyword-based coding system to assign each 
CAP to a single accounting position. Our coding system consists of thirty accounting 
positions and is based on the FASB Taxonomy and the study of Levine and Smith (2011). 
This procedure allows us to assess specific financial statement positions that are flagged 
as highly uncertain, and are thus affected by measurement uncertainties.  
5.2 Empirical Framework Analysis 1: Accrual Persistence 
5.2.1 Basic Empirical Model 
Our initial empirical model for all our analyses is based on the following prediction model 
(Equation 3). To forecast future cash flows, we follow Barth et al. (2001) and disaggre-
gate earnings into their accrual components. Specifically, the model includes future op-
erating cash flow (CFOt+1), current operating cash flow (CFOt), changes in accounts re-
ceivables (∆AR), inventories (∆INV), accounts payable (∆AP), the total amount of de-
preciation, amortization and depletion (DEPR), and other accruals (OTHER). Industry 
(IND) and year (YEAR) dummies are included in all our regressions. 
 
(3) 
Table 11 
Sample Selection Procedure 
   No. of Observations  
 Total Number of Observations with available 10-K between 2002 and 2016  7,280 
- Observations without Cash Flow and Sufficient Financial Data  1,811 
- Observations without Complete Time Series Data  1,209 
= Final Sample  4,260 
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5.2.2 Modeling ‘Certain’ and ‘Uncertain’ Accruals 
With respect to our first hypothesis, we assume that uncertain accruals (those that are 
flagged as CAPs) have less predictive power with respect to future cash flows than certain 
accruals (those that are not flagged as CAPs). To decompose accruals into ‘certain’ and 
‘uncertain’ accruals, we use a two-step approach that is generally based on the research 
design of Allen et al. (2013). In a first step, we regress total accruals (ACC) on the dis-
aggregated accrual components of the Barth et al. (2001) model at the industry level. This 
model takes the following form (Equation 4): 
 
(4) 
In a second step, we use our hand-collected data on CAP disclosures to identify whether 
each accrual component of Equation 3 is ‘certain’ or ‘uncertain’. Specifically, we use the 
coefficients of Equation 4 and aggregate the fitted values of those accruals that are flagged 
as CAPs as ACC_UNCERTAIN and the fitted values of those accruals that are not 
flagged as CAPs, as well as the intercept as ACC_CERTAIN. We further allocate the 
variable OTHER and the error term to ACC_OTHER, because we cannot assign single 
CAPs to these variables. Finally, we replace the disaggregated earning components of 
Equation 3 with the values of ACC_CERTAIN, ACC_UNCERTAIN, and 
ACC_OTHER. Appendix B provides a general example to clarify our procedure. The 
final model for testing whether ‘uncertain’ (CAP) accruals have a lower persistence with 
respect to future cash flows than ‘certain’ (non-CAP) accruals takes the following form 
(Equation 5):34 
 
(5) 
                                                 
34  As a robustness check, we also include the sum of cash flows from t+1 to t+3 as our main dependent 
variable to control for the long term realization of cash flows from accruals. 
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5.3 Empirical Framework Analysis 2: Important and Specific Accruals 
5.3.1 Cross-Sectional Cash Flow Prediction Model 
With respect to our second hypothesis, we analyze whether the predictive power of un-
certain accruals is determined by their importance and/or specificity. We test the useful-
ness of important and specific uncertain accruals in terms of their ability to forecast future 
cash flows. Assuming that important and specific uncertain accruals are less useful, their 
ability to predict future cash flows should decline, resulting in an increased prediction 
error. Our research design for our second hypothesis consists of two stages. In the first, 
we estimate firm-specific cash flow forecasts up to one year. A simple regression of a 
variable on lagged values of the same variable is not a test of predictive ability (Lev et al. 
2010). In this context, Poon and Granger (2003) argue that a good forecast model should 
“withstand the robustness of an out-of-sample test, a test design that is closer to reality” 
(Poon and Granger 2003, p. 492). Therefore, we use in-sample and out-of-sample regres-
sions to forecast the next period’s cash flows. We follow the general procedure of Hou et 
al. (2012) and Lev et al. (2010) by using in-sample tests of cash flows regressed on lagged 
values of the independent variables from Equation 3, using the previous ten years of data. 
By obtaining coefficients of the in-sample forecast, we estimate out-of-sample predic-
tions of cash flows for our final sample, using the model of Barth et al. (2001). Finally, 
we determine the prediction error for each firm by subtracting the predicted from the 
current cash flow. Figure 6 presents a timeline for the estimation procedure described 
above (Hou et al. 2012). Appendix C provides a general example to clarify our prediction 
procedure (example to forecast 2002 operating cash flow). 3F35 
                                                 
35  Although our final sample covers the period 2002 – 2016, we add additional financial variables from 
2000, 2001, and 2017 to run all our analysis. By doing so, we do not lose any observations. 
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Figure 6 
Timeline of Cash Flow Forecasts 
 
To evaluate the effect of measurement uncertainties contained in accounting positions 
and thus, whether or not they are flagged as CAPs, we conduct univariate statistical tests 
and analyze the pooled firm-specific mean absolute prediction error (MAPE) of our pre-
diction model. 
5.3.2 Measurement of Importance and Specificity 
Our second hypothesis posits that the level of measurement uncertainty depends on the 
importance and specificity of the underlying uncertain financial statement accounts. We 
argue that the predictive power of accruals will be lower for more specific (SPECIFIC-
ITY) and more important (IMPORTANCE) uncertain accruals. We define IM-
PORTANCE as the sum of all uncertain accrual components that are classified as CAPs, 
scaled by the sum of all accrual components of Equation 4. We argue that the predictive 
power of uncertain accruals with respect to future cash flows might be lower if IM-
PORTANCE is relatively high. Thus, we check whether accrual size affects our findings. 
Moreover, the effect of uncertain accrual components on the predictability of future cash 
flows may also depend upon their specificity. Using the proportion of single uncertain 
accrual components and the total number of uncertain accrual components may solve this 
problem. However, we argue that the effect depends on the occurrence and thus, on the 
specificity compared to their peers.  
year t-1 year t year t+1
(2)
Estimate coefficients of the cross-
sectional cash flow model using the
previous ten years of data
(1)
Oberserve accounting
variables between t-1 and t
Obtain cash flow predictions for the year
t+1 by multiplying accounting variables 
from (1) with coefficients from (2)
Oberserve actual cash flow
between t and t+1
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Our measure of SPECIFICITY (Equation 6) is based on a common term-weighting 
scheme from the textual analysis literature, namely term frequency-inverse document fre-
quency (tf-idf) (Loughran and McDonald 2011).4F36 Applied to our study, the general form 
of SPECIFICITY is then: 
 
(6) 
SPECIFICITY is estimated for each accrual component separately. 5 F37 We define Equa-
tion 6 as accrual specificity with cap_i (cap_n) as the raw count of the number of firms 
in a given year and industry (raw count of the number of firms in a given year), that 
classify an accrual component of Equation 4 as critical. N is the total number of firms in 
a given year and i the total number of firms per year and industry. SPECIFICTY is the 
mean of all four specificity scores. To test our second hypothesis, we split our sample by 
the median of IMPORTANCE and SPECIFICTY and compare the mean absolute predic-
tion error across these four groups. 
6 Results 
6.1 Analysis 1: Accrual Persistence 
6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 12 provides descriptive statistics about the number of firms providing CAP disclo-
sures, as well as the classification of each accrual component of Equation 3 as critical. 
Only four firms in 2002 and one in 2003 do not provide any CAP disclosures. In the 
following years, all firms in our sample provide a CAP discussion in their MD&A section. 
About 90 percent of our sample classify their depreciation, amortization and depletion as 
highly uncertain. 6F38 Compared to that, less than 10 percent of the sample have uncertain 
                                                 
36  In their study, Loughran and McDonald (2011) find that using tf-idf leads to better results than using 
simple proportions. 
37  Thus, we estimate SPECIFICTY_DEPR for the specificity of depreciation, amortization and depletion, 
SEPCIFICTY_AR for accounts receivables, SPECIFITICY_AP for accounts payables, and 
SPECIFICTY_INV for inventories. 
38  DEPR includes those CAPs that relate to accounting topics such as property, plant, and equipment, as 
well as intangibles. 
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accounts payable. Moreover, around 30 percent (35 %) of the sample have accounts 
receivables (inventories) that are highly uncertain.  
Table 13 presents summary statistics for the main variables of the Cash Flow Prediction 
Model (Equation 3), and the Certain and Uncertain Accrual Model (Equation 5). Current 
cash flows has a mean value (median) of 13.4 percent (12.1 %). Consistent with prior 
studies (e.g., Barth et al. 2001; Sloan 1996), we find that the means and medians of CFO 
are positive, and those of aggregated accruals (ACC = EARN – CFO), as well as 
ACC_CERTAIN, ACC_UNCERTAIN, and ACC_OTHER are negative. This is because 
aggregated accruals include depreciation, amortization and depletion, but the acquisition 
of depreciable and amortizable assets is related to investing, and not to the operating cash 
flow (Barth et al. 2001; El‐Sayed Ebaid 2011). Moreover, the magnitudes of ∆AR, ∆INV 
and ∆AP are smaller compared to DEPR. On average, firms disclose six CAPs. The ab-
solute number of CAPs ranges between zero and 14 CAPs. This finding is in line with the 
assumption that the number and types of CAPs vary between firms. Moreover, the num-
ber of uncertain accrual components (CAP_ACCRUAL) ranges from zero to four with a 
Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics of CAP Disclosures 
Year  CAP=1  CAP=0  AR  %  INV  %  AP  %  DEPR  %  N 
2002  280  4  89  31.79  99  35.36  24  8.57  204  72.86  284 
2003  283  1  95  33.57  107  37.81  21  7.42  224  79.15  284 
2004  284  0  98  34.51  102  35.92  24  8.45  232  81.69  284 
2005  284  0  95  33.45  103  36.27  21  7.39  231  81.34  284 
2006  284  0  90  31.69  101  35.56  23  8.10  233  82.04  284 
2007  284  0  84  29.58  102  35.92  23  8.10  243  85.56  284 
2008  284  0  86  30.28  103  36.27  23  8.10  249  87.68  284 
2009  284  0  85  29.93  103  36.27  21  7.39  251  88.38  284 
2010  284  0  81  28.52  103  36.27  23  8.10  251  88.38  284 
2011  284  0  79  27.82  101  35.56  24  8.45  250  88.03  284 
2012  284  0  76  26.76  98  34.51  26  9.15  251  88.38  284 
2013  284  0  75  26.41  98  34.51  27  9.51  250  88.03  284 
2014  284  0  69  24.30  94  33.10  26  9.15  250  88.03  284 
2015  284  0  66  23.24  99  34.86  27  9.51  252  88.73  284 
2016  284  0  62  21.83  97  34.15  25  8.80  253  89.08  284 
Table 12 presents summary statistics about the number of firms that classified each accrual component 
of the Barth et al. (2001) model as a CAP. AR is accounts receivables, INV is inventories, AP is accounts 
payable and DEPR is depreciation, amortization and depletion. See Appendix A for detailed variable 
descriptions. 
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mean of two (median of two). About 30 percent of all CAPs relate to those accruals in-
cluded in Equation 4. The number of all other CAPs (CAP_OTHER) ranges from zero to 
ten with a mean (median) of four. 
Because (multi-)collinearity may be a problem, we present a pairwise Pearson correlation 
matrix in Table 14 and Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) in Table 15. As expected, ACC 
is significantly negatively correlated with CFO. With the exception of ∆INV, all accrual 
components are significantly correlated with CFO and are generally correlated signifi-
cantly with each other. These findings are in line with the literature. The correlations of 
ACC_UNCERTAIN, ACC_CERTAIN and ACC_OTHER with CFO are negative. If ac-
crual components relate to ACC_CERTAIN, they do not relate simultaneously to 
ACC_UNCERTAIN, ACC_OTHER respectively. In addition, the highest VIF is 2.23 for 
∆AR and 2.12 for ∆AP. Thus, all correlations as well as VIFs are below established crit-
ical levels (Wooldridge 2013), so that we assume (multi-)collinearity not to affect our 
results.  
Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics Financial Variables Hypothesis 1 
Variables  Mean  Min  25 %  Median  75 %  Max  SD  N 
CFO  0.134  -0.064  0.081  0.121  0.172  0.423  0.079  4,260 
∆AR  -0.002  -0.182  -0.011  0.000  0.010  0.129  0.036  4,260 
∆INV  -0.002  -0.133  -0.006  0.000  0.004  0.091  0.026  4,260 
∆AP  -0.001  -0.122  -0.007  0.000  0.007  0.091  0.024  4,260 
DEPR  0.044  0.003  0.028  0.039  0.053  0.140  0.025  4,260 
OTHER  -0.009  -0.254  -0.030  -0.008  0.012  0.237  0.060  4,260 
ACC  -0.053  -0.292  -0.072  -0.046  -0.025  0.095  0.052  4,260 
ACC_CERTAIN  -0.014  -0.294  -0.023  -0.009  0.001  0.196  0.035  4,260 
ACC_UNCERTAIN  -0.032  -0.330  -0.046  -0.028  -0.012  0.178  0.040  4,260 
ACC_OTHER  -0.006  -0.376  -0.022  -0.005  0.012  0.210  0.044  4,260 
CAP_TOTAL  6  0  5  6  7  14  3  4,260 
CAP_ACCRUAL  2  0  1  2  2  4  1  4,260 
CAP_OTHER  4  0  4  4  5  10  2  4,260 
Table 13 presents summary descriptive statistics for all firm-year observations for the period 2002 through 
2016. CFO is operating cash flow. ∆AR is the year-to-year change in accounts receivables. ∆INV is the 
year-to-year change in inventories. ∆AP is the year-to-year change in accounts payable. DEPR is depreci-
ation, amortization and depletion. OTHER is the difference between total accruals and ∆AR, ∆INV, ∆AP 
and DEPR. ACC is earnings minus operating cash flows. ACC_CERTAIN are the fitted values from those 
accruals that are not flagged as CAPs and the intercept. ACC_UNCERTAIN are the fitted values from 
those accruals that are flagged as CAPs. ACC_OTHER are the fitted values from all other accruals and the 
residuals from Equation 4. CAP_TOTAL is the total number of CAPs. CAP_ACCRUAL is the number of 
accrual components of the Barth et al. (2001) model that are classified as CAPs. CAP_OTHER is the 
number of all other CAPs that are not already included in CAP_ACCRUAL. See Appendix A for detailed 
variable descriptions. 
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Table 15 
Variance Inflation Factors 
  Model 1  Model 2 
 
 Cash Flow  
Prediction Model  
 Certain and Uncertain  
Accrual Model 
CFO  1.23  1.09 
∆AR  2.23   
∆INV  1.76   
∆AP  2.12   
DEPR  1.14   
OTHER  1.63   
ACC_CERTAIN    1.33 
ACC_UNCERTAIN    1.36 
ACC_OTHER    1.26 
Table 15 presents variance inflation factors (VIFs) separately for the Cash Flow Prediction Model (Equa-
tion 3) (Model 1) and the Certain and Uncertain Accrual Model (Equation 5) (Model 2) of our main 
analyses. Dependent variable is CFO in t+1. CFO is operating cash flow. ∆AR is the year-to-year change 
in accounts receivables. ∆INV is the year-to-year change in inventories. ∆AP is the year-to-year change 
in accounts payable. DEPR is depreciation, amortization and depletion. OTHER is the difference between 
total accruals and ∆AR, ∆INV, ∆AP and DEPR. ACC_UNCERTAIN are the fitted values from those 
accruals that are flagged as CAPs. ACC_CERTAIN are the fitted values from those accruals that are not 
flagged as CAPs and the intercept. ACC_OTHER are the fitted values from all other accruals and the 
residuals from Equation 4. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
 
Table 14 
Pearson Correlations 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) CFO 1.00          
(2) ∆AR 0.03 1.00         
(3) ∆INV 0.00 0.51 1.00        
(4) ∆AP 0.08 0.66 0.55 1.00       
(5) DEPR 0.34 0.10 0.08 0.07 1.00      
(6) OTHER -0.22 -0.48 -0.47 -0.26 -0.13 1.00     
(7) ACC -0.31 0.14 0.13 0.02 -0.47 0.54 1.00    
(8) ACC_CERTAIN -0.10 0.35 0.22 0.01 -0.14 -0.23 0.18 1.00   
(9) ACC_UNCERTAIN -0.11 0.44 0.52 0.33 -0.32 -0.29 0.28 -0.34 1.00  
(10) ACC_OTHER -0.14 -0.42 -0.40 -0.22 -0.12 0.88 0.67 -0.21 -0.24 1.00 
Table 14 presents pairwise Pearson correlations. CFO is operating cash flow. ∆AR is the year-to-year 
change in accounts receivables. ∆INV is the year-to-year change in inventories. ∆AP is the year-to-year 
change in accounts payable. DEPR is depreciation, amortization and depletion. OTHER is the difference 
between total accruals and ∆AR, ∆INV, ∆AP and DEPR. ACC is earnings minus operating cash flows. 
ACC_UNCERTAIN are the fitted values from those accruals that are flagged as CAPs. ACC_CERTAIN 
are the fitted values from those accruals that are not flagged as CAPs and the intercept. ACC_OTHER are 
the fitted values from all other accruals and the residuals from Equation 4. See Appendix A for detailed 
variable descriptions. Bold indicates significances at the two-tailed 10 % level or higher. 
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6.1.2 Persistence of ‘Certain’ and ‘Uncertain’ Accrual Components 
First, we turn to our first hypothesis (H1). H1 posits that CAPs are informative with re-
spect to measurement uncertainties within accrual-based measures. Therefore, we predict 
that accrual components that are flagged as CAPs are less persistent with respect to future 
cash flows. Our test proceeds in two steps. In the first, we replicate the Barth et al. (2001) 
model finding that current cash flow disaggregated accrual components have predictive 
power with respect to future cash flows.  
Regression results are reported in Table 16. The first regression (Model 1) is the base 
regression of current cash flows and disaggregated earnings on future cash flows. Con-
sistent with Barth et al. (2001), we find that ∆AR, ∆INV, DEPR, and OTHER are signif-
icantly positively related, whereas ∆AP is significantly negatively related to future cash 
flows. Moreover, the coefficients of all accrual components are lower than the coefficient 
of CFO. This corroborates prior results that the accrual components are less persistent 
than the cash flow component (e.g., Allen et al. 2013; Richardson et al. 2005, 2006; Sloan 
1996). In a second step, we use our hand-collected data about CAPs and decompose ac-
cruals into ACC_CERTAIN, ACC_UNCERTAIN. We include further ACC_OTHER 
that captures all other components of Equation 4 that cannot be assigned to single CAPs. 
This step allows us to test whether uncertain accruals (those that are flagged as CAPs) are 
less persistent than certain accruals (those that are not flagged as CAPs). With respect to 
all other accruals (ACC_OTHER), we do not predict the height of the coefficient, because 
we cannot determine whether the underlying accrual components are uncertain or certain.  
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Model 2 of Table 16 includes ACC_CERTAIN, ACC_UNCERTAIN, and ACC_OTHER 
instead of each accrual component of the Barth et al. (2001) model (Equation 3). We 
predict that the coefficient of ACC_UNCERTAIN is lower than the coefficients of CFO 
and ACC_CERTAIN. The results presented in Table 16 are consistent with this predic-
tion. The coefficient of ACC_UNCERTAIN is 0.066, while the coefficients of CFO and 
Table 16 
Regression Results Accrual Persistence 
  Model 1  Model 2 
 
 Cash Flow  
Prediction Model  
 Certain and Uncertain  
Accrual Model 
CFO  0.760 ***  0.740 *** 
  (71.01)   (71.46)  
∆AR  0.354 ***    
  (12.04)     
∆INV  0.245 ***    
  (6.86)     
∆AP  -0.526 ***    
  (-12.46)     
DEPR  0.082 **    
  (2.42)     
OTHER  0.198 ***    
  (12.98)     
ACC_CERTAIN     0.141 *** 
     (5.67)  
ACC_UNCERTAIN     0.066 *** 
     (3.00)  
ACC_OTHER     0.087 *** 
     (4.57)  
Constant  0.034 ***  0.042 *** 
  (8.31)   (10.23)  
Fixed Effects  Y,I   Y,I  
R²  0.647   0.627  
N  4,260   4,260  
Table 16 presents regression results of the Cash Flow Prediction Model (Equation 3) (Model 1) 
and the Certain and Uncertain Accrual Model (Equation 5) (Model 2). Dependent variable is CFO 
in t+1. CFO is operating cash flow in t. ∆AR is the year-to-year change in accounts receivables. 
∆INV is the year-to-year change in inventories. ∆AP is the year-to-year change in accounts pay-
able. DEPR is depreciation, amortization and depletion. OTHER is the difference between total 
accruals and ∆AR, ∆INV, ∆AP and DEPR. ACC is earnings minus operating cash flows. 
ACC_UNCERTAIN are the fitted values from those accruals that are flagged as CAPs. 
ACC_CERTAIN are the fitted values from those accruals that are not flagged as CAPs and the 
intercept. ACC_OTHER are the fitted values from all other accruals and the residuals from Equa-
tion 4. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Each model is estimated with year- (Y) 
and industry- (I) fixed effects. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, 
respectively.  
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ACC_CERTAIN are 0.740 and 0.141, respectively. All differences between the coeffi-
cients are statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). What seems interesting is that the co-
efficient of ACC_OTHER is higher than the coefficient of ACC_UNCERTAIN. Thus, 
we assume that all accruals included in ACC_OTHER are unaffected by (a high degree 
of) measurement uncertainty. To sum up, we conclude that accruals classified as CAPs 
being the least persistent components indicating that CAPs depict subjective and uncer-
tain accrual positions. 
6.2 Analysis 2: Important and Specific Accruals 
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Based on the findings relating to our first hypothesis, we now turn to our second hypoth-
esis (H2). Panel A of Table 17 presents summary statistics of all variables used in the 
cross-sectional prediction model between 1991 and 2014. Panel B of Table 17 reports the 
average coefficients from the pooled regressions estimated each year between 2000 and 
2014. Panel C of Table 17 presents the observed accounting numbers between 2001 and 
2015 that are used to determine predicted cash flows. In all our yearly regressions, current 
cash flows and all disaggregated accrual components are highly persistent with respect to 
future cash flows. Consistent with our prior findings, ∆AR, ∆INV, DEPR, and OTHER 
are significantly positively related to future cash flows, whereas the coefficient of ∆AP is 
negative and significant in all our yearly regressions. 
We predict a firm’s operating cash flow in t+1 by multiplying the coefficient in t-1 (Table 
17, Panel B) with the corresponding accounting numbers in t (Table 17, Panel C). Panel D 
of Table 17 presents estimated predicted cash flows (PRED_CFO) between 2002 and 
2014, MAPE, estimated by the absolute difference between the actual and predicted cash 
flow and the mean absolute error term (MAET). The average (median) predicted cash 
flow is about 11.2 percent (10.4 %). This leads to a pooled mean absolute prediction error 
of 3.8 percent with a median of 2.6 percent. Comparing the mean absolute prediction er-
ror with the pooled mean signed error of the cash flow model (Table 17, Panel D), we 
conclude that the cross-sectional cash flow prediction model provides satisfactory results. 
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Table 17 
Descriptive Statistics Financial Variables Hypothesis 2 
Panel A: Cross-Section Prediction Model (Period: 1991 – 2014) 
Variables  Mean  Min  25 %  Median  75 %  Max  SD  N 
CFO  0.088  -0.341  0.035  0.088  0.146  0.450  0.088  73,199 
∆AR  -0.008  -0.400  -0.028  -0.001  0.022  0.280  -0.008  73,199 
∆INV  -0.004  -0.264  -0.013  0.000  0.009  0.203  -0.004  73,199 
∆AP  -0.003  -0.229  -0.016  -0.000  0.014  0.177  -0.003  73,199 
DEPR  0.054  0.005  0.031  0.046  0.066  0.203  0.035  73,199 
OTHER  0.001  -0.444  -0.043  -0.003  0.041  0.509  0.126  73,199 
Panel B: Average Coefficients from the Pooled Regressions (Period: 2000 – 2014) 
coeff_CFO  0.022  0.019  0.022  0.022  0.023  0.026  0.002  4,260 
coeff_∆AR   0.620  0.589  0.607  0.620  0.638  0.648  0.018  4,260 
coeff_∆INV   0.300  0.291  0.298  0.301  0.302  0.308  0.004  4,260 
coeff_∆AP   0.246  0.213  0.218  0.243  0.269  0.301  0.029  4,260 
coeff_DEPR   -0.442  -0.478  -0.466  -0.431  -0.426  -0.418  0.020  4,260 
coeff_OTHER   0.191  0.158  0.173  0.183  0.215  0.236  0.022  4,260 
coeff_constant  0.167  0.160  0.163  0.166  0.168  0.176  0.004  4,260 
Panel C: Observed Accounting Numbers (Period: 2001 – 2015) 
acc_CFO  0.134  -0.064  0.080  0.121  0.174  0.423  0.081  4,260 
acc_∆AR   -0.004  -0.182  -0.013  -0.001  0.010  0.129  0.039  4,260 
acc_∆INV   -0.002  -0.133  -0.007  0.001  0.004  0.091  0.028  4,260 
acc_∆AP   -0.002  -0.122  -0.008  -0.001  0.007  0.091  0.026  4,260 
acc_DEPR   0.045  0.003  0.029  0.039  0.054  0.140  0.025  4,260 
acc_OTHER   -0.008  -0.254  -0.030  -0.008  0.014  0.237  0.062  4,260 
Panel D: Estimated Predicted Cash Flows and Prediction Errors (Period: 2002 – 2016) 
PRED_CFO  0.112  -0.073  0.079  0.104  0.138  0.341  0.050  4,260 
MAPE (CFO)  0.038  0.001  0.011  0.026  0.051  0.412  0.040  4,260 
MAET (CFO)  0.031  0.001  0.009  0.021  0.040  0.408  0.034  4,260 
Table 17 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the in-sample and out-of-sample regressions. 
Panel A presents summary statistics of the variables used in the cross-sectional prediction model between 
1991 and 2014. Panel B reports the average coefficients from the pooled regressions estimated each year 
between 2000 and 2014 using the previous ten years of data. Panel C presents the observed accounting 
numbers between 2001 and 2015 that are used to determine predicted cash flows. Panel D presents esti-
mated predicted cash flows (PRED_CFO) between 2002 and 2016 and the mean absolute prediction errors 
(MAPE). MAET is the mean absolute error term estimated by the absolute value of the residuals of Equa-
tion 3. CFO is operating cash flow. ∆AR is the year-to-year change in accounts receivables. ∆INV is the 
year-to-year change in inventories. ∆AP is the year-to-year change in accounts payable. DEPR is depreci-
ation, amortization and depletion. OTHER is the difference between total accruals and ∆AR, ∆INV, ∆AP 
and DEPR. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
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6.2.2 Importance and Specificity 
Based on our findings for H1, we argue that a (lower) predictive power of uncertain ac-
crual components might also depend on their importance and specificity for a given firm. 
We hypothesize that the predictive power of uncertain accrual components is even lower 
for those that are important and specific. Compared to our empirical framework for H1, 
we analyze the usefulness of important and specific uncertain accruals in terms of their 
ability to forecast future cash flows. We assume that the absolute prediction error with 
respect to future cash flow is higher if a firm has more important and more specific un-
certain accruals. 
First, Table 18 presents summary statistics for our two measures IMPORTANCE and 
SPECIFICITY. As can be seen, the importance of uncertain accruals, estimated by the 
ratio between the sum of all uncertain accruals and the sum of total accruals, captures on 
average 42.2 percent with a median of 38.3 percent of all accrual components. By looking 
at our specificity values, DEPR has the lowest value at 0.203, indicating that the majority 
of firms classify their depreciation, amortization and depletion as uncertain. Thus, DEPR 
is the most unspecific uncertain accrual component in our sample. Compared to this, AR 
and AP are the most specific accrual components with a value of 0.979 and 1.009 respec-
tively. This indicates that a lower number of firms have receivables and/or accounts pay-
able that are affected by measurement uncertainties. 
Table 18 
Descriptive Statistics – Importance and Specificity 
Variables  Mean  Min  25 %  Median  75 %  Max  SD  N 
SPECIFICITY_AR  0.979  0.000  0.819  1.069  1.161  1.285  0.243  4,260 
SPECIFICITY_INV  0.810  0.000  0.699  0.993  1.090  1.271  0.416  4,260 
SPECIFICITY_AP  1.009  0.000  0.888  1.087  1.292  1.626  0.394  4,260 
SPECIFICITY_DEPR  0.203  0.095  0.143  0.174  0.264  0.423  0.081  4,260 
SPECIFICITY  1.885  0.000  1.173  1.707  2.922  4.113  1.056  4,260 
IMPORTANCE  0.422  0.001  0.149  0.383  0.685  1.000  0.301  4,260 
Table 18 presents summary descriptive statistics of the variables IMPORTANCE and SPECIFICITY. 
IMPORTANCE is the sum of all uncertain accruals scaled by total accruals. SPECIFICITY is a measure 
for the relative occurrence of a specific accrual CAP in the firm’s respective industry (determined by a 
procedure similar to tf-idf (Loughran and McDonald 2011). It is measured as the mean of SPECIFIC-
ITY_AR, SPECIFICITY_INV, SPECIFICITY_AP and SPECIFICITY_DEPR. SPECIFICITY_AR re-
lates to the relative occurrence of classifying accounts receivables as ‘critical’. SPECIFICITY_INV re-
lates to the relative occurrence of classifying inventories as ‘critical’. SPECIFICITY_AP relates to the 
relative occurrence of classifying accounts payables as ‘critical’. SPECIFICITY_DEPR relates to the rel-
ative occurrence of classifying depreciation, amortization and depletion as ‘critical’. See Appendix A for 
detailed variable descriptions. 
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Second, we split our sample into four groups by the median of IMPORTANCE and 
SPECIFICITY. Our 2x2 matrix is presented in Table 19. In Panel A, Group 1 (Group 2) 
includes the MAPE of those observations with less important and less (more) specific 
uncertain accruals. Group 3 (Group 4) depicts the MAPE of those observations with more 
important and less (more) specific uncertain accruals. By comparing the absolute predic-
tion error between these four groups, we find that firms in Group 4 have the highest, and 
firms in Group 1 the lowest prediction error. It is worth noting that the absolute prediction 
error based on important uncertain accruals (Group 3) is about 1.2 percentage points 
higher than for unimportant uncertain accruals (Group 1). This result is consistent with 
our prediction that the predictive value is even lower for more specific and important 
uncertain accruals, thus indicating a lower predictive ability. Moreover, the MAPE of 
Group 2 (Group 3) is significantly higher than that of Group 1. It seems that firms with 
more (less) important (and more specific) uncertain accruals have significantly higher 
Table 19 
Univariate Results – Importance and Specificity 
Panel A: Mean Absolute Prediction Error (MAPE) 
    SPECIFICITY 
(median split) 
  
    Low  High  Diff 
IMPORTANCE 
(median split) 
 Low  0.030  0.035  0.005 *** 
   n = 761  n = 1,369   
 High  0.042  0.044  0.002  
   n = 1,362  n = 768   
  Diff  0.012 ***  0.009 ***   
Panel B: Mean Absolute Error Term (MAET) 
    SPECIFICITY 
(median split) 
  
    Low  High  Diff 
IMPORTANCE 
(median split) 
 Low  0.026  0.029  0.003 ** 
   n = 761  n = 1,369   
 High  0.034  0.032  -0.002  
   n = 1,362  n = 768   
  Diff  0.008 ***  0.003 ***   
Table 19 presents results from two-sided t-tests for differences in means of the mean absolute prediction 
error (MAPE) (Panel A) and mean absolute error term (MAET) (Panel B). The sample (n = 4,260) is 
splitted by the median of IMPORTANCE and SPECIFICITY into ‘low’- (below median) and ‘high’-
affected (above median) groups, respectively. MAPE is calculated as the difference of current operating 
cash flow (CFO) and predicted operating cash flow (PRED_CFO). MAET is calculated as the mean ab-
solute error term estimated by the absolute value of the residuals of Equation 3. Presented are the means 
of these four groups. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. ***, ** and * denotes signifi-
cance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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prediction errors. However, our results seem to be driven primarily by the importance of 
uncertain accruals, because the results for specificity are marginal and inconclusive when 
comparing the mean absolute prediction error of firms in Group 3 with Group 4. Even if 
the difference of MAPE between Group 4 and Group 3 is positive, it remains insignifi-
cant. The results for MAET are presented in Panel B and confirm our results. 
In summary, our results indicate that the effect of all uncertain accruals on future firm 
fundamentals is not the same across firms. Furthermore, accrual components classified as 
CAPs do not have less predictive power with respect to future cash flows per se; it also 
depends mainly on their importance and to some extent on the specificity for a given firm. 
7 Robustness Checks 
We conduct several sensitivity tests to assess the validity of our results. The first two 
robustness checks refer to our first hypothesis, whereas the other robustness checks refer 
to our second hypothesis. 
In our first set of robustness checks, we follow prior studies (e.g., Barth et al. 2016; 
Glendening 2017) and argue that accruals not only affect a firm’s next period cash flow, 
but also cash flows in multiple (future) periods. We employ one alternative test to analyze 
the persistence of uncertain accrual components with respect to cash flows across multiple 
periods. We include CFO3Y, which equals the sum of CFO from t+1 to t+3 as our de-
pendent variable in Equation 5, and then re-perform our analysis. The regression results 
are presented in Table 20. The coefficient of ACC_UNCERTAIN is still lower than that 
of ACC_CERTAIN and CFO, but remains highly insignificant. Whereas uncertain accru-
als might still have predictive value for the next period’s cash flow, this finding implies 
that there is no incremental predictive value for cash flows across multiple periods. Thus, 
we confirm our results that CAPs convey information about imprecise and subjective es-
timates, thus reducing the predictive value of accruals with respect to future cash flows. 
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Second, the Barth et al. (2001) model that we used is based on four major accrual com-
ponents. Nevertheless, there may be additional accruals that are also related to future cash 
flows, but are aggregated in the variable OTHER. Barth et al. (2016) develop the Barth 
et al. (2001) model further and argue that the role of accruals in predicting future cash 
flows depends mainly upon their origin, i.e. whether the association of cash flows and 
accruals has occurred or will occur. Therefore, we follow Barth et al. (2016) and include 
two major types of accruals for which the associated cash flow occurs in the period after 
the economic event (e.g., pensions and accounts receivables), as well as before the eco-
nomic event (e.g., deferred revenue and inventories) (Barth et al. 2016). In sum, they 
assign 17 different accrual components to both variables. 7F39 Thus, the final model includes 
                                                 
39  SFPA is the sum of total receivables, deferred tax assets minus the sum of accounts payable, accrued 
expenses, pension liability, income taxes payable, and deferred tax liability. SFPB is the sum of inven-
tories, prepaid expenses, income tax refunds, property, plant and equipment, intangible assets, deferred 
charges, investments, advances-equity, long-term pension assets minus deferred revenue (Barth et 
al. 2016). 
Table 20 
Robustness Check I – Long Term Uncertain Accruals 
 
 Certain and Uncertain 
Accrual Model 
CFO  1.973 *** 
  (63.02)  
ACC_CERTAIN  0.269 *** 
  (3.55)  
ACC_UNCERTAIN  0.066  
  (1.01)  
ACC_OTHER  0.147 ** 
  (2.49)  
Constant  0.183 *** 
  (15.10)  
Fixed Effects  Y,I  
R²  0.639  
N  3,408  
Table 20 presents regression results of the Certain and Uncertain Accrual 
Model (Equation 5) (Robustness Check I). Dependent variable is CFO3Y. 
CFO3Y equals the sum of CFO from t+1 to t+3. CFO is operating cash flow 
in t. ACC_UNCERTAIN are the fitted values from those accruals that are 
flagged as CAPs. ACC_CERTAIN are the fitted values from those accruals 
that are not flagged as CAPs and the intercept. ACC_OTHER are the fitted 
values from all other accruals and the residuals from Equation 4. See Appendix 
A for detailed variable descriptions. The model is estimated with year- (Y) and 
industry- (I) fixed effects. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1 %, 5 % and 
10 % level, respectively. 
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a much larger number of accruals and may therefore be more suitable analyzing whether 
CAP disclosures are useful for determining the persistence of single accounting accruals. 
We further use CAP disclosures to flag each accrual component included in SFPA and 
SFPB as either ‘certain’ or ‘uncertain’. Using the procedure of our main analysis, we in-
clude SFPA_UNCERTAIN, SFPA_CERTAIN, SFPB_UNCERTAIN, and SFPB_CER-
TAIN in our final model and rerun our entire analysis.8F40 The results with respect to the 
analysis of our first (second) hypothesis are presented in Table 21 (Table 22). Table 21 
reveals that both uncertain components are less persistent than the respective certain com-
ponents with respect to future cash flows. Interestingly, both coefficients of SFPB are 
much lower than SFPA. This may be because SFPB contains more long-term accruals 
(such as intangible assets or property, plant and equipment) which, in particular, do not 
simply align in one-year ahead cash flows. However, our findings support all inferences 
by considering a larger number and distinct types of uncertain accrual components in our 
main analysis. With respect to our second hypothesis (Table 22), we find that the predic-
tive power of more important accruals that are classified as CAPs is slightly higher than 
for less important accruals. We further find that firms have significantly higher prediction 
errors if their uncertain accruals are more specific (but less important). Thus, we confirm 
our main results and conclude that IMPORTANCE and SPECIFICITY are two modera-
tors affecting the forecast ability of uncertain accrual components with respect to future 
cash flows.  
                                                 
40  See Appendix D for detailed explanations. 
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Table 21 
Robustness Check II – Accrual Persistence using the Barth et al. (2016) Model 
  Model 1  Model 2  
 
 Cash Flow  
Prediction Model  
 Certain and Uncertain 
Accrual Model 
 
CFO  0.743 ***  0.728 ***  
  (67.52)   (66.71)   
∆SFPA  0.123 ***     
  (8.78)      
∆SFPB  0.089 ***     
  (7.08)      
∆SFPA_CERTAIN     0.060 ***  
     (4.27)   
∆SFPA_UNCERTAIN     0.031 ***  
     (4.58)   
∆SFPB_CERTAIN     0.038 ***  
     (3.09)   
∆SFPB_UNCERTAIN     0.029 **  
     (2.28)   
OACC  0.093 ***  0.034 ***  
  (6.95)   (2.83)   
Constant  0.051 ***  0.051 ***  
  (12.07)   (11.96)   
Fixed Effects  Y,I   Y,I   
R²  0.631   0.627   
N  3,749   3,749   
Table 21 presents regression results of the Cash Flow Prediction Model (Model 1) and the Certain and 
Uncertain Accrual Model (Model 2) based on the model of Barth et al. (2016) (Robustness Check II). 
Dependent variable is CFO in t+1. CFO is operating cash flow in t. ∆SFPA is change in total receivables 
plus deferred tax assets minus the sum of accounts payable, accrued expenses, pension liability, income 
taxes payable, and deferred tax liability. ∆SFPB is change in the sum of inventories, prepaid expenses, 
income tax refund, property, plant, and equipment, intangible assets, deferred charges, investments and 
advances-equity, and long-term pension assets minus deferred revenues. ∆SFPA_UNCERTAIN 
(∆SFPA_CERTAIN) is the sum of those accruals contained in SFPA that are (not) flagged as CAPs. 
∆SFPB_UNCERTAIN (∆SFPB_CERTAIN) is the sum of those accruals contained in SFPB that are (not) 
flagged as CAPs. OACC is total accruals minus the sum of ∆SFPA and ∆SFPB. See Appendix A for de-
tailed variable descriptions and Appendix D for further explanation. Each model is estimated with year- 
(Y) and industry- (I) fixed effects. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respec-
tively. 
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Third, to verify whether our results for H2 are driven by the slightly different empirical 
approach that we used compared to H1, we disaggregate further ACC_UNCERTAIN of 
Equation 5 into ACC_UNCERTAIN_IMP and ACC_UNCERTAIN_NOIMP. Whereas 
the former refers to the fitted values of uncertain accrual components that are important 
for a given firm (above the median of IMPORTANCE), the latter captures the fitted value 
of uncertain accruals that are less important (below the median of IMPORTANCE). The 
results are presented in Table 23. We find that the coefficient of ACC_UNCER-
TAIN_IMP is even lower than ACC_UNCERTAIN_NOIMP and that the difference is 
highly significant. Compared to that, although the coefficient of ACC_UNCER-
TAIN_NOIMP is still smaller than that of ACC_CERTAIN, this difference remains in-
significant, indicating no significant difference in their persistence. As a result, accruals 
that are flagged as CAPs and are more important for a given firm, being the least persistent 
Table 22 
Robustness Check II – Importance and Specificity 
Panel A: Estimation Window 10 Years 
    SPECIFICITY 
(median split) 
  
    Low  High  Diff 
IMPORTANCE 
(median split) 
 Low  0.066  0.070  0.004 * 
   n = 807  n = 906   
 High  0.074  0.071  -0.002  
   n = 1,029  n = 736   
  Diff  0.008 ***  0.001    
Panel B: Estimation Window 5 Years 
    SPECIFICITY 
(median split) 
  
    Low  High  Diff 
IMPORTANCE 
(median split) 
 Low  0.068  0.072  0.004 * 
   n = 807  n = 906   
 High  0.077  0.075  -0.002  
   n = 1,029  n = 736   
  Diff  0.009 ***  0.003    
Table 22 presents results from two-sided t-tests for differences in means of the mean absolute prediction 
error (MAPE). Panel A (Panel B) presents results by using the previous ten (five) years of data to obtain 
the coefficients to determine predicted cash flows using the cash flow prediction model of Barth et al. 
(2016). The sample is splitted by the median of IMPORTANCE and SPECIFICITY into ‘low’- (below 
median) and ‘high’-affected (above median) groups, respectively. MAPE is calculated as the absolute 
value of the difference of current operating cash flow (CFO) and predicted operating cash flow 
(PRED_CFO). Presented are the means of these four groups. See Appendix A for detailed variable de-
scriptions. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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components of accruals with respect to the predictability of future cash flows. Moreover, 
we find inconclusive results for SPECIFICITY (untabulated results). 
In our fourth set of robustness checks, we use the previous five years of data to obtain the 
coefficients for determining predicted cash flows instead of using the previous ten years. 
Accordingly, we verify whether our results are driven by the period for our estimation 
window of the in-sample regressions. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 24. 
As shown, all major inferences regarding our second hypothesis remain qualitatively un-
changed. Moreover, we conduct a sensitivity test regarding our IMPORTANCE measure. 
To do this, we re-estimate IMPORTANCE as the sum of all uncertain accrual components 
Table 23 
Robustness Check III – Persistence of Important Accruals 
 
 Certain and Uncertain 
Accrual Model 
CFO  0.740 *** 
  (71.41)  
ACC_CERTAIN  0.146 *** 
  (5.81)  
ACC_UNCERTAIN_NOIMP  0.114 *** 
  (2.71)  
ACC_UNCERTAIN_IMP  0.062 *** 
  (2.80)  
ACC_OTHER  0.087 ** 
  (4.55)  
Constant  0.043 *** 
  (10.32)  
Fixed Effects  Y,I  
R²  0.632  
N  4,260  
Table 23 presents regression results by disaggregating ACC_UNCERTAIN 
further into ACC_UNCERTAIN_NOIMP and ACC_UNCERTAIN_IMP (Ro-
bustness Check III). Dependent variable is CFO in t+1. CFO is operating cash 
flow in t. ACC_UNCERTAIN_NOIMP are the fitted values from those accru-
als that are flagged as CAPs and are less important (based on IMPORTANCE). 
ACC_UNCERTAIN_IMP are the fitted values from those accruals that are 
flagged as CAPs and are more important (based on IMPORTANCE). 
ACC_CERTAIN are the fitted values from those accruals that are not flagged 
as CAPs and the intercept. ACC_OTHER are the fitted values from all other 
accruals and the residuals from Equation 4. See Appendix A for detailed vari-
able descriptions. The model is estimated with year- (Y) and industry- (I) fixed 
effects. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respec-
tively. 
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divided by total assets. The results of our 2x2 matrix are presented in Panel B of Table 
24. As can be seen, our alternative IMPORTANCE measure does not change our results. 
Fifth, our results may be driven by aggregating the fitted values of all accruals that are 
(not) flagged as CAPs. Hence, in our fifth robustness check (V), instead of using the fitted 
values, we classify each single accrual component of Equation 4 either as certain or un-
certain (i.e., ∆AR_CERTAIN and ∆AR_UNCERTAIN). Afterwards, we include both 
forms of each accrual component in our main model. This procedure allows us to directly 
analyze the effect of measurement uncertainties within single accruals on their persistence 
with respect to future cash flows. We present results in Table 25. As can be seen, all 
uncertain accrual components, except ∆INV_UNCERTAIN, are less persistent than their 
Table 24 
Robustness Check IV – 5 Year Estimation Window and Alternative Measurement of 
Importance 
Panel A: Estimation Window 5 Years 
    SPECIFICITY 
(median split) 
  
    Low  High  Diff 
IMPORTANCE 
(median split) 
 Low  0.030  0.035  0.005 *** 
   n = 763  n = 1,367   
 High  0.042  0.044  0.002  
   n = 1,362  n = 768   
  Diff  0.012 ***  0.009 ***   
Panel B: Alternative Measure of Importance 
    SPECIFICITY 
(median split) 
  
    Low  High  Diff 
IMPORTANCE 
(median split) 
 Low  0.030  0.072  0.004 * 
   n = 763  n = 1,367   
 High  0.042  0.075  -0.002  
   n = 1,362  n = 768   
  Diff  0.009 ***  0.003    
Table 24 presents results from two-sided t-tests for differences in means of the mean absolute prediction 
error (MAPE) of robustness check IV. The sample (n = 4,260) is splitted by the median of IMPORTANCE 
and SPECIFICITY into ‘low’- (below median) and ‘high’-affected (above median) groups, respectively. 
Panel A presents results from two-sided t-tests for differences in means of MAPE by using an estimation 
window of five years instead of ten years to estimate coefficients from the pooled regressions estimated 
each year between 2000 and 2014. Panel B presents results from two-sided t-tests for differences in means 
of MAPE by calculating IMPORTANCE as the sum of uncertain accruals divided by total assets. MAPE 
is calculated as the absolute value of the difference of current operating cash flow (CFO) and predicted 
operating cash flow (PRED_CFO). Presented are the means of these four groups. Two tailed t-statistics 
are presented in parentheses. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. ***, ** and * denotes 
significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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counterparts. We conclude that the predictive power of each accrual component is sig-
nificantly lower if it is flagged as uncertain.  
Table 25 
Robustness Check V – Persistence of Single Uncertain Accruals 
 
 Certain and Uncertain 
Accrual Model 
CFO  0.758 *** 
  (70.70)  
∆AR_CERTAIN  0.408 *** 
  (12.71)  
∆AR_UNCERTAIN  0.268 *** 
  (6.94)  
∆INV_CERTAIN  0.217 *** 
  (4.07)  
∆INV_UNCERTAIN  0.266 *** 
  (6.60)  
∆AP_CERTAIN  -0.531 *** 
  (-12.23)  
∆AP_UNCERTAIN  -0.516 *** 
  (-5.80)  
DEPR_CERTAIN  0.120 *** 
  (2.74)  
DEPR_UNCERTAIN  0.070 ** 
  (2.01)  
OTHER  0.198 *** 
  (12.96)  
Constant  0.035 *** 
  (8.45)  
Fixed Effects  Y,I  
R²  0.648  
N  4,260  
Table 25 presents regression results by classifying each accrual component as either ‘cer-
tain’ or ‘uncertain’ (Robustness Check V). Dependent variable is CFO in t+1. CFO is op-
erating cash flow in t. ∆AR_UNCERTAIN (∆AR_CERTAIN) is the year-to-year change in 
accounts receivables if accounts receivables are (not) classified as CAPs. ∆INV_UNCER-
TAIN (∆INV_CERTAIN) is the year-to-year change in inventories if inventories are (not) 
classified as CAPs. ∆AP_UNCERTAIN (∆AP_CERTAIN) is the year-to-year change in 
accounts payable if accounts payables are (not) classified as CAPs. DEPR_UNCERTAIN 
(DEPR_CERTAIN) is depreciation, amortization and depletion if a firm classified its de-
preciation, amortization or depletion (not) as CAPs. OTHER is the difference between total 
accruals and ∆AR, ∆INV, ∆AP and DEPR. The model is estimated with year- (Y) and in-
dustry- (I) fixed effects. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. ***, ** and * 
denotes significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Sixth, in our main analysis, we only consider firms with complete time series data. Thus, 
our results might be driven by ‘survivorship bias’. Therefore, to verify whether our results 
are in fact driven by this limitation, we include all observations with sufficient financial 
data, omit the restriction of complete time series data, and re-perform our entire analysis. 
This increases our final sample to 5,456 firm-year observations. As can be seen in Table 
26 and Table 27, our main results remain qualitatively unchanged.  
Table 26 
Robustness Check VI – Sample Selection without the Restriction of Complete Time 
Series Data – Accrual Persistence 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  
 
 Cash Flow 
Prediction Model 
 Certain and Uncertain 
Accrual Model 
 
CFO  0.749 ***  0.732 ***  
  (77.12)   (78.92)   
∆AR  0.246 ***     
  (9.62)      
∆INV  0.214 ***     
  (6.85)      
∆AP  -0.454 ***     
  (-12.20)      
DEPR  0.105 **     
  (3.38)      
OTHER  0.159 ***     
  (11.84)      
ACC_CERTAIN     0.075 ***  
     (3.33)   
ACC_UNCERTAIN     0.035 *  
     (1.73)   
ACC_OTHER     0.059 ***  
     (3.55)   
Constant  0.034 ***  0.041 **  
  (9.18)   (11.02)   
Fixed Effects  Y,I   Y,I   
R²  0.631   0.615   
N  5,456   5,456   
Table 26 presents regression results of the Cash Flow Prediction Model (Equation 3) (Model 1) and the 
Certain and Uncertain Accrual Model (Equation 5) (Model 2) using a sample without the restriction of 
complete time series data (n = 5,456). Dependent variable is CFO in t+1. CFO is operating cash flow in t. 
∆AR is the year-to-year change in accounts receivables. ∆INV is the year-to-year change in inventories. 
∆AP is the year-to-year change in accounts payable. DEPR is depreciation, amortization and depletion. 
OTHER is the difference of total accruals and ∆AR, ∆INV, ∆AP and DEPR. ACC is earnings minus 
operating cash flows. ACC_UNCERTAIN are the fitted values from those accruals that are flagged as 
CAPs. ACC_CERTAIN are the fitted values from those accruals that are not flagged as CAPs and the 
intercept. ACC_OTHER are the fitted values from all other accruals and the residuals from Equation 4. 
Each model is estimated with year- (Y) and industry- (I) fixed effects. See Appendix A for detailed vari-
able descriptions. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively.  
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8 Limitations and Future Research Suggestions 
Our research should be considered in the light of some limitations. Our sample is based 
on the S&P 500 composition, which includes the largest corporations in the U.S. There-
fore, our results might not be applicable to smaller stock corporations, and our findings 
might be driven by focussing only on larger firms. Consequently, future research might 
analyze the usefulness of CAP disclosures provided by smaller corporations with respect 
to measurement uncertainties embedded in financial statements. Having said that, there 
are huge discrepancies in the number and types of CAPs. In our main analysis, we focus 
only on those that relate to four distinct accrual components. Nevertheless, there are ad-
ditional accruals that are also related to future cash flows and might be classified as a 
CAP, but are not considered in our main analysis. While we address this in an additional 
Table 27 
Robustness Check VI – Sample Selection without the Restriction of Complete Time 
Series Data – Importance and Specificity 
Panel A: Mean Absolute Prediction Error (MAPE) 
    SPECIFICITY 
(median split) 
  
    Low  High  Diff 
IMPORTANCE 
(median split) 
 Low  0.033  0.038  0.005 *** 
   n = 935  n = 1,793   
 High  0.042  0.043  0.001  
   n = 1,769  n = 959   
  Diff  0.009 ***  0.005 ***   
Panel B: Mean Absolute Error Term (MAET) 
    SPECIFICITY 
(median split) 
  
    Low  High  Diff 
IMPORTANCE 
(median split) 
 Low  0.028  0.031  0.004 * 
   n = 935  n = 1,793   
 High  0.034  0.033  -0.001  
   n = 1,769  n = 959   
  Diff  0.006 ***  0.002 **   
Table 27 presents results from two-sided t-tests for differences in means of the mean absolute prediction 
error (MAPE) (Panel A) and mean absolute error term (MAET) (Panel B) using a sample without the 
restriction of complete time series data. The sample (n = 5,456) is splitted by the median of IM-
PORTANCE and SPECIFICITY into ‘low’- (below median) and ‘high’-affected (above median) groups, 
respectively. MAPE is calculated as the absolute value of the difference of current operating cash flow 
(CFO) and predicted operating cash flow (PRED_CFO). MAET is calculated as the mean absolute error 
term estimated by the absolute value of the residuals of the cash flow prediction model (Equation 3) 
Presented are the means of these four groups. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. ***, ** 
and * denotes significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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analysis, future research may develop another empirical approach in order to consider the 
entire number of CAPs provided by a firm. Moreover, the models of Barth et al. (2001) 
and Barth et al. (2016) only consider accruals that align to prior, current, and next-period 
cash flows. Most firms have long-term accruals. Therefore, the underlying uncertainty 
resulting from the measurement process may not only affect a firm’s next period cash 
flow, but also cash flows in multiple (future) periods. While we assess this in our first 
robustness check, future research could distinguish explicitly between CAPs that relate 
to short-term and long-term accruals to assess their predictive value with operating cash 
flows. By doing so, it would be possible to analyze how the difference between long-term 
and short-term accruals classified as CAPs affect our main inferences. Furthermore, we 
focus on whether CAPs contain any information about measurement uncertainties. How-
ever, to this day, it remains unknown whether CAP disclosures provide new information 
to analysts, investors, and other financial statement users. As stated before, CAP disclo-
sures reflect proprietary information about measurement uncertainties within financial 
statements that is not available through other public channels. This may increase the rel-
evance of CAP disclosures, because it provides detailed information about the measure-
ment process of highly uncertain financial statement items and their consequences for a 
firm’s financial performance. Therefore, future research could analyze whether CAP dis-
closures are useful for improving cash flow and earnings forecasts. 
9 Conclusion 
We shed light on the role of CAP disclosures to provide valuable information about firm-
specific measurement uncertainties within accruals, as well as the overall reliability of 
accounting estimates. The primary research question in this study addresses whether and 
how CAP disclosures provide information about the persistence of specific accruals with 
respect to future cash flows. We provide initial evidence that those accruals flagged as 
CAPs are less useful in predicting future cash flows. Thus, CAP disclosures might be 
informative with respect to the subjectivity and uncertainties within accruals. Based on 
our empirical approach, we further find that the predictive power of uncertain accrual 
components (those that are flagged as CAPs) is not lower per se; it also depends mainly 
on their importance and to some extent on the specificity for a given firm. Our findings 
underline the importance of corporate disclosures for communicating measurement un-
certainties in financial reports. Prior studies find that accruals based on a higher degree 
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of estimation are less persistent with respect to future earnings (e.g., Chen et al. 2019). 
Hence, it is necessary that investors, analysts, and other financial statement users are able 
to differentiate between accruals that are uncertain and those that are not susceptible to 
estimation errors. Our results show that CAP disclosures indeed convey such information.  
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Appendix A: Variable Descriptions  
Variable  Description 
ACC  Total accruals proxied as the difference between earnings and operat-
ing cash flow scaled by total assets (Source: Worldscope). 
ACC_CERTAIN  The fitted value from those accruals that are flagged as CAPs. 
ACC_UNCERTAIN  The fitted value from those accruals that are not flagged as CAPs. 
ACC_UNCERTAIN_IMP  The fitted value from those accruals that are flagged as CAPs and are 
less importance (below median of IMPORTANCE). 
ACC_UNCERTAIN_NOIMP  The fitted value from those accruals that are flagged as CAPs and are 
more importance (above median of IMPORTANCE). 
ACC_OTHER  The fitted value from all other accruals and the residuals from Equa-
tion 4. 
CAP_ACCRUAL  The number of accrual components of the Cash Flow Prediction 
Model of Barth et al. (2001) that are classified as CAPs. 
CAP_OTHER  The number of all other CAPs proxied as the difference of CAP_TO-
TAL and CAP_ACCRUAL. 
CAP_TOTAL  The total number of CAPs included in a firm’s MD&A (Source: hand-
collection). 
CFO  Operating cash flow in t scaled by total assets (Source: Worldscope). 
CFO3Y  The sum of CFO from t+1 to t+3. 
DEPR  The sum of depreciation, amortization and depletion scaled by total 
assets (Source: Worldscope). 
DEPR_CERTAIN  Depreciation, amortization and depletion scaled by total assets if de-
preciation, amortization and depletion are not classified as CAPs. 
DEPR_UNCERTAIN  Depreciation, amortization and depletion scaled by total assets if de-
preciation, amortization and depletion are classified as CAPs. 
IMPORTANCE  Importance of uncertain accrual components proxied as the sum of all 
uncertain accrual components scaled by the sum of all accrual compo-
nents using the cash flow prediction model of Barth et al. (2001) 
(Source: Worldscope). 
IND  Indicator variables for industry-fixed effects based on the Fama/French 
12 industry portfolio (Source: Worldscope). 
MAET  Mean absolute error term as the absolute value of the residuals from the 
cash flow prediction model of Barth et al. (2001). 
MAPE  Mean absolute prediction error as the difference between the predicted 
cash flow and actual cash flow (PRED_ERR). 
OACC  ACC minus the sum of ∆SFPA and ∆SFPB (Source: Worldscope). 
OTHER  The difference between total accruals (ACC) and disaggregated accrual 
components (∆AR, ∆INV, ∆AP, ∆INV, and DEPR) (Source: 
Worldscope). 
PRED_CFO  Predicted cash flow in t+1 as proxied by multiplying the coefficients 
from the cross-sectional cash flow prediction model in t-1 with the re-
lated accounting numbers in t. 
PRED_ERR  The difference between the actual and predicted cash flow. 
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Variable  Description 
SPECIFICITY  The mean of the specificity score of each uncertain accrual component 
(SPECIFICITY_AR, SPECIFICITY_INV, SPECIFICITY_AP, SPEC-
IFICITY_DEPR) based on a common term-weighting scheme from the 
textual analysis literature, namely term frequency-inverse document 
frequency (tf-idf) (Lougrahn and McDonald 2011). 
 
with: 
cap_i raw count of the number of firms in a given year and industry 
   that flagged AR, INV, AP, or DEPR as a CAP. 
cap_n number of firms in a given year that flagged their AR, INV, 
   AP, or DEPR as a CAP. 
N   total number of firms in a given year. 
i   total number of firms in a given year and industry. 
YEAR  Indicator variables for year-fixed effects. 
∆AP  The year-to-year change in accounts payable scaled by total assets 
(Source: Worldscope). 
∆AP_CERTAIN  The year-to-year change in accounts payables scaled by total assets if 
accounts payables are not classified as CAPs. 
∆AP_UNCERTAIN  The year-to-year change in accounts payables scaled by total assets if 
accounts payables are classified as CAPs. 
∆AR  The year-to-year change in accounts receivables scaled by total assets 
(Source: Worldscope). 
∆AR_CERTAIN  The year-to-year change in accounts receivables scaled by total assets 
if accounts receivables are not classified as CAPs. 
∆AR_UNCERTAIN  The year-to-year change in accounts receivables scaled by total assets 
if accounts receivables are classified as CAPs. 
∆INV  The year-to-year change in inventories scaled by total assets (Source: 
Worldscope). 
∆INV_CERTAIN  The year-to-year change in inventories scaled by total assets if invento-
ries are not classified as CAPs. 
∆INV_UNCERTAIN  The year-to-year change in inventories scaled by total assets if invento-
ries are classified as CAPs. 
∆SFPA  Total receivables plus deferred tax assets minus the sum of accounts 
payable, accrued expenses, pension liability, income taxes payable, and 
deferred tax liability (Source: Worldscope). 
∆SFPA_CERTAIN  The sum of accruals contained in SFPA that are not classified as CAPs. 
∆SFPA_UNCERTAIN  The sum of accruals contained in SFPA that are classified as CAPs. 
∆SFPB  The sum of inventories, prepaid expenses, income tax refunds, prop-
erty, plant and equipment, intangible assets, deferred charges, invest-
ments and advances-equity, and long-term pension assets minus de-
ferred revenue (Source: Worldscope). 
∆SFPB_CERTAIN  The sum of accruals contained in SFPB that are not classified as CAPs. 
∆SFPB_UNCERTAIN  The sum of accruals contained in SFPB that are classified as CAPs. 
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Appendix B: Additional Explanations Empirical Framework Analysis 1 
The following example will clarify our procedures to model ‘certain’ and ‘uncertain’ ac-
cruals:  
1) First, we verify which accruals components are flagged as CAPs. For instance, a firm 
classifies its accounts payables (∆AP) and depreciation, amortization and depletion 
(DEPR) as CAPs. Therefore, we argue that both accrual components are affected by 
measurement uncertainties and thus, are ‘uncertain’. Consequently, we assume that a 
firm’s accounts receivables (∆AR) and inventories (∆INV) are unaffected by measure-
ment uncertainties, and thus are ‘certain’.  
2) Second, we run Equation 4. Afterwards, we use the estimated coefficients and aggre-
gate the fitted values of the contemporaneous accounts receivables and inventory var-
iables that capture accruals without measurement uncertainties as ACC_CERTAIN 
and the fitted values of the accounts payables and depreciation, amortization, and de-
pletion variables that capture accruals with measurement uncertainties as ACC_UN-
CERTAIN. Moreover, we allocate OTHER as well as the error term into 
ACC_OTHER because we cannot assign single CAPs to these variables. The model 
takes the following form: 
Example: 
 
3) We re-perform this procedure for each observation of our sample. 
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Appendix C: Additional Explanations Empirical Framework Analysis 2 
The following general example illustrates our prediction procedures (example to fore-
cast 2002 operating cash flow).  
1) First, we estimate cross-sectionally the following regression using the previous ten 
years of data (spanning the period 1991 – 2000). 
 
(C1) 
2) Second, we obtain the estimated coefficients α0 and βi. Those coefficients are then used 
to predict firm-specific cash flows in 2002 by multiplying the independent variables 
in 2001 with the previously determined industry-specific estimated coefficients.  
 
 
 
(C2) 
3) Third, we determine the prediction error for each firm by comparing the estimated 
future cash flows with the actual cash flow. Therefore, we remain with predicted cash 
flow values from 2002 to 2014. 
(C3) 
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Appendix D: Cash Flow Prediction Model Barth et al. (2016) 
The general model of Barth et al. (2016) takes the following form:  
 
(D1) 
SFPA is the sum of total receivables and deferred tax assets minus the sum of accounts 
payable, accrued expenses, pension liability, income taxes payable, and deferred tax lia-
bility. SFPB is the sum of inventories, prepaid expenses, income tax refund, property, 
plant and equipment, intangible assets, deferred charges, investments and advances-eq-
uity, and long-term pension assets minus deferred revenue. ∆SFPA (∆SFPB) is the change 
of SFPA (SFPB). OACC are those accruals other than SFPA and SFPB. 
Following the procedure of our main analysis, we classify each accrual component that 
is included in SFPA and SFPB (see Appendix B) either as certain or uncertain using CAP 
disclosures: 
1) In a first step, we regress total accruals (ACC) on the disaggregated accrual compo-
nents of the Barth et al. (2016) model. 
2) In a second step, we disaggregate both accrual components into ‘certain’ and ‘uncer-
tain’. SFPA_UNCERTAIN and SFPB_UNCERTAIN (SFPA_CERTAIN and 
SFPB_CERTAIN) are the sum of the fitted values of those accruals contained in SFPA 
and SFPB that are (not) classified as CAPs. The following example will clarify our 
procedure: For instance, a firm classifies its pension liabilities, accounts payables, in-
ventories, intangible assets, and deferred revenue as CAPs. Thus, our main variables 
are estimated as the sum of the fitted values from the following variables: 
SFPA_CERTAIN = Accounts receivables + deferred tax assets – (accrued ex-
penses + income taxes payables + deferred tax liability) 
SFPA_UNCERTAIN = Accounts payable + pension liability 
SFPB_CERTAIN = Prepaid expenses + income tax refund + property, plant, 
and equipment + deferred charges + investments and ad-
vances equity + long-term pension assets 
SFPB_UNCERTAIN = (Inventories + intangible assets) – deferred revenues 
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3) In a third step, we replace the disaggregated earning components of the Barth et al. 
(2016) model and run the following regression: 
 
 
 
(D2) 
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3BCHAPTER 3: 
INSTITUTIONAL CORRELATES WITH 
FEMALE BOARD REPRESENTATION  
 
A b s t r a c t  
Gender equality on boards is a global and highly politicized issue. To this 
day, there is considerable cross-country variation in female board represen-
tation. We examine institutional supply- and demand-side factors associated 
with this issue. Our results indicate that a societal climate of gender equality 
contributes to more women on boards, mainly through fostering the supply 
of suitable candidates. Therefore, the glass ceiling should be improved 
through a societal supply-side effort which needs to complement demand-
side (quota) regulation. 
 
This part of the thesis is a joint project with Thomas R. Loy. Chapter 3 has been published as Loy, T., 
Rupertus, H. (2018), Institutional Correlates with Female Board Representation. Finance Research Let-
ters, 24, 238-246. DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2017.09.013. ELSEVIER, all rights reserved. © The authors. 
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1 Introduction 
Female corporate board representation is an increasingly important and highly politicized 
issue. Several European countries obligate a gender quota on corporate boards to foster 
female participation in economic activity. In 2008, Norway adopted the first mandatory 
gender quota regulation. Similar requirements have been or will be adopted in Belgium, 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands over the next years (Terjesen et al. 2015). Further 
European countries will likely follow in response to EU initiatives (European Commis-
sion 2016). Internationally, gender quotas are stipulated in a wide range of voluntary cor-
porate governance codes (Terjesen et al. 2015). However, despite these efforts, there still 
are considerable differences in terms of average female board membership (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 
Country-Level Average Percentage of Women on Boards of Directors 
 
On the high end, Scandinavian firms exhibit female board representation of about 30 per-
cent. Contrariwise, the ratio for firms from Brazil, India, Japan, or Singapore is less than 
10 percent. So far, the academic literature has focused on the business case for board 
gender diversity (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; for meta-analyses: Pletzer et al. 2015; 
Post and Byron 2015). Boards as corporations’ upper echelons enhance firm performance, 
in large part, through interaction and sharing of knowledge and resources (Ham-
brick 2007). Proponents argue that gender diversity improves the quality of board discus-
sions, attributable to more creativity (Nemeth 1986), and a wider range of perspectives 
(Hillman et al. 2007). Critics point to more conflicts between board members which arise 
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Norway
France
Sweden
Finland
UK
Germany
USA
Australia
Canada
Switzerland
India
Singapore
Brazil
Japan
CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL CORRELATES WITH FEMALE BOARD REPRESENTATION  
110 
from internal divisions and social categorization tendencies (Gul et al. 2011; Tajfel 1979). 
As such, prior studies provide mixed results regarding the association of board gender 
diversity and firms’ financial performance. Even more problematically, most studies fo-
cus on single countries (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Carter 
et al. 2003; Huang and Kisgen 2013; Gul et al. 2011). However, to make a convinced 
statement about the effect of female board representation on e.g., firm performance, future 
research should control for aforementioned global differences in gender equality as well 
as the underlying reasons. 
Yet, surprisingly little academic research tries to answer the question why in some coun-
tries women are far more underrepresented in the boardroom than in others. As such, we 
contribute to this ongoing debate and answer a call for additional cross-country research 
(Gabaldon et al. 2016) by systematically and empirically disentangling institutional sup-
ply- and demand-side factors associated with the issue. Our results exhibit that longer-
term supply-side factors need to complement short-term demand-side regulation in order 
to crack the glass ceiling. Hence, our paper contributes to the ongoing societal and polit-
ical discussion revolving around gender equality, corporate governance, and the glass 
ceiling. 
2 Theoretical Foundations and Research Questions 
Post and Byron (2015) present a meta-analysis of gender diversity and firm performance 
and find two mediating factors. First, they argue that increased shareholder protection and 
directors’ legal liability result in improved consideration of female directors’ experiences, 
knowledge, and values. If dissenting voices are wilfully dismissed but later proven to be 
correct, this will most likely result in repercussions against stereotyping directors. As 
such, it is in the best interest of their (male) colleagues to regard female cognitive frames 
as an advantage in sound decision-making. Second, there has to be a societal climate that 
enables women to acquire equal skills, education, and human capital to fulfil their fidu-
ciary role on corporate boards. Otherwise female socio-economic disadvantages render 
the effects of greater diversity obsolete. Moreover, a greater societal gender equality re-
sults in companies requiring female directors to gain legitimacy (e.g., Bear et al. 2010). 
Despite the general appeal of these theories, there is surprisingly little conversation in the 
literature why these considerable country-level differences exist in the first place. A rather 
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small line of research tries to explore some country-level factors that facilitate women 
entering boardrooms. It attributes most of the effect to fundamental legal and cultural 
institutions (Grosvold and Brammer 2011), emphasizes (smaller) gender pay gaps and the 
proportion of women in (middle) management, as a pool of potential board candidates 
(Terjesen and Singh 2008), focuses on actions by individual female politicians and their 
interplay with political parties, business associations, and other stakeholders (Seierstad et 
al. 2017), analyzes the determinants of (voluntary) gender quota regulation (Terjesen et 
al. 2015), or determines a larger proportion of women working full-time to be a crucial 
prerequisite of female board representation (Adams and Kirchmaier 2015). However, 
there is no research systematically examining which supply- or demand-side levers could 
be most effective in cracking the glass ceiling. 
We build on the notion that director selection is the result of a market process balancing 
firm needs, board dynamics, director characteristics as well as environmental and legal 
aspects (Withers et al. 2012). Thus, the glass ceiling likely has supply- as well as demand-
side explanations. Therefore, we answer a call for research by systematically and empir-
ically disentangling these factors. Gabaldon et al. (2016) highlight that this literature 
“would benefit from a more cross-cultural perspective, analyzing whether the gender gap 
on boards is due to supply or demand factors and how this varies across cultures” (Gab-
aldon et al. 2016, p. 381). We state the following research question: 
RQ:  Which supply- and demand-side factors are associated with the rate of female 
board representation on the country-level? 
3 Data and Estimation Strategy 
In order to test our research question, we consider institutional correlates with average 
female corporate board presence (Equation 7), based on a minimum of 10 firm-year ob-
servations per country-year to achieve country-level averages unbiased by a small number 
of outliers (Source: Thomson Reuters ASSET4 (GQBOARD)). This restriction results in 
a sample of 37 countries 9F41 or 418 country-year observations for the period 2002 through 
2015, respectively. 
                                                 
41 These are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea (Rep.), Malaysia, 
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(7) 
Initially, we follow Post and Byron (2015) and predict that societal gender equality as 
well as minority investor protection positively influence female board participation. We 
employ World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI). It combines 
a total of 14 variables covering topics from basic needs, such as health and survival, to 
political empowerment, economic participation, and opportunity. Furthermore, World 
Bank’s strength of minority investor protection index (INVPROT) combines three indices 
covering (1) the extent and frequency of related party transactions disclosure, (2) the abil-
ity to sue over related party transactions, and (3) the ease of those shareholder suits. More-
over, we add international mandatory quota regulations (QUOTA) as well as voluntary 
corporate governance code (GOVCODE) stipulations (Terjesen et al. 2015). We predict 
positive signs for investor protection, gender equality, as well as gender-related board 
regulation. The natural logarithm of GDP per capita (GDPCAP) proxies for overall eco-
nomic development. Legal orientation (LEGOR) clusters countries in terms of legal fam-
ilies. Although concrete legal frameworks may differ quite substantially across countries, 
basic premises rooted in common legal traditions still prevail (La Porta et al. 1998). Con-
tinent-fixed effects (CONTINENT) control for cultural heritage and path dependence in 
gender issues (Grosvold and Brammer 2011; Terjesen et al. 2015), as well as colonial 
history which still has a profound impact on social life, economic development, and edu-
cation (Klerman et al. 2011). Finally, we add year-fixed effects (YEAR). 
GGGI as an aggregate score does not differentiate between supply- and demand-factors. 
We employ confirmatory Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to extract two compo-
nents which reflect underlying commonalities among the 14 individual indicators. We 
classify the ratio of females over males in the labor force (LABFORCE), the ratio of 
female over male senior officials and managers (MANAGERS), and the ratio of female 
over male professional and technical workers (PROFESSIONALS) as supply factors. 
Whereas, wage equality for similar work (WAGEEQUALITY) is likely associated with 
                                                 
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Russian Federation, Sin-
gapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the U.K., and the U.S. Increasing 
the threshold to 20 (30) firm-year observations does not materially influence our results but decreases 
our sample size considerably. 
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the demand for female board members, estimated earned income (EARNINCOME) 
might both be a supply (i.e., females are more likely to apply if wages are higher) as well 
as demand (i.e., employers might assign a wage premium to women) factor. Moreover, 
we assign all four indicators covering educational attainment to the supply-side. These 
include the ratios of female over male enrolment in primary (PRIMARY), secondary 
(SECONDARY) and tertiary (TERTIARY) education, as well as female over male liter-
acy (LITERACY). If women achieve relatively higher educational levels, firms can 
choose their directors out of a larger candidate pool. Additionally, the female to male sex 
ratio at birth (SEXRATIO) and the ratio of healthy male to female lifespans (LIFEEX-
PECTANCY), likely affect demand. Since board positions regularly require some senior-
ity and firms also benefit from longer director tenure, their increased healthy life expec-
tancy should disproportionately benefit women. On the one hand, women in parliament 
(WOMENPARL) and in ministerial positions (WOMENMIN) are a result of female po-
litical empowerment. They serve as role models for other women who aspire positions of 
power, hence fostering the supply. On the other hand, we assign a country’s ratio of fe-
male to male heads of state over the last 50 years (FEMHEADSTATE) to the demand-
side. We assume that firms are more open-minded to female board appointments if the 
population votes women into the position of utmost power. Figure 8 summarizes WEF’s 
order by topic as well as our predictions with respect to demand- and supply-side effects 
of GGGI’s underlying variables. Bold font indicates significant and material factor load-
ings (>.3) in a PCA. There are no significant and material side loadings on the respective 
other component. 
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Figure 8 
Disaggregation of World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) 
into its Underlying Supply and Demand Factors 
 
Out of the 14 variables, six supply-side variables load significantly on the first component 
while four demand-side variables load on the second component. As such, MANAGERS, 
PROFESSIONALS, LITERACY, SECONDARY, and TERTIARY predominantly deter-
mine the SUPPLY component. Whereas, WAGEEQUALITY, LIFEEXPECTANCY, and 
FEMHEADSTATE load significantly on the second (DEMAND) component. EARNIN-
COME significantly loads on both components, also in line with our earlier discussion.10F42 
                                                 
42  The eigenvalues of both components are >1.0 and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) criterion is >.8, in-
dicating both suitability and good fit. Both components are essentially unrelated with a component ro-
tation value of .0699. Significant and material factor loadings (>.3) are .367 for MANAGERS, .432 for 
PROFESSIONALS, .308 for LITERACY, .375 for SECONDARY, .403 for TERTIARY, .520 for 
WAGEEQUALITY, .512 for LIFEEXPECTANCY, and .354 for FEMHEADSTATE. EARNINCOME 
Supply-
Demand
Topic
Code Description Supply Demand
Economic 
Participation 
and 
Opportunity
LABFORCE Females over males in labor force X
WAGEEQUALITY Wage equality for similar work X
EARNINCOME Estimated earned income X X
MANAGERS Female over male senior officials X
PROFESSIONALS Female over male professional and 
technical workers
X
Educational
Attainment
LITERACY Female over male literacy X
PRIMARY
Female over male 
primary/secondary/tertiary education
enrolment
X
SECONDARY X
TERTIARY X
Health and 
Survival
SEXRATIO Female to male sex ratio at birth X
LIFEEXPECTANCY Male to female healthy life expectancy X
Political 
Empowerment
WOMENPARL Ratio of women in parliament X
WOMENMIN Ratio of women in ministerial positions X
FEMHEADSTATE Ratio of female to male heads of state X
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Recent research also calls for addressing unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity in 
board governance (Wintoki et al. 2012). As the GGGI, and its components, might itself 
be influenced by socio-economic and long-standing cultural values, we employ dynamic 
panel estimation (SYS-GMM), which also alleviates concerns of autocorrelation (Blun-
dell and Bond 1998). As such, we include lagged GQBOARD as an additional control. 
SYS-GMM simultaneously estimates a system of equations in first differences and levels, 
in which the level equation includes time-invariant controls, such as legal orientation. We 
focus on a one-step estimation, as it entails similar efficiency compared to the two-step 
version, but provides more reliable estimates and unbiased standard errors in finite sam-
ples with shorter time-series (Soto 2009). 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results 
Average female board representation is 10.85 percentage points with a considerable 
standard deviation (Table 28). The GGGI has an average value of about 0.71 (out of a 
theoretical maximum of 1.0). Minority investor protection exhibits an average score of 
6.21 (out of 10). About 12 (7.40) percent of the observations are subject to ‘soft’ 
GOVCODE and ‘hard’ gender quota regulation, respectively. More than half of the ob-
servations are European, with Asia being a distant second (16.0 %). In terms of legal 
origin, the French code-law (37.1 %) and Anglo-Saxon case-law (32.8 %) traditions dom-
inate, followed by Germanic (20.0 %) and Scandinavian (10.0 %) code-law traditions. 
                                                 
loads significantly on the SUPPLY (.323) as well as the DEMAND (.368) component. No predeter-
mined supply-side variables significantly load on the DEMAND component, and vice versa. 
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Next, we present univariate results. Consistent with prior evidence, GGGI and INVPROT 
are significantly and positively associated with GQBOARD (Post and Byron 2015). So 
are ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ board gender regulations (Terjesen et al. 2015), as well as our newly 
created institutional supply- and demand-side prime components (Table 29).  
Table 28 
Summary Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Mean  25 %  Median  75 %  SD  N 
GQBOARD  10.85  5.470  8.850  14.56  7.830  418 
GGGI  0.710  0.671  0.703  0.751  0.058  418 
SUPPLY  0.128  -0.381  0.645  1.226  1.818  295 
DEMAND  0.000  -1.072  -0.064  0.996  1.319  295 
GENDERCULTURE  4.635  4.410  4.710  5.020  0.434  372 
INVPROT  6.207  5.000  6.000  7.300  1.642  418 
GDPCAP  10.21  9.911  10.39  10.60  0.603  418 
QUOTA  0.074        0.262  418 
GOVCODE  0.124        0.330  418 
EUROPE  0.507        0.501  418 
AFRICA  0.074        0.262  418 
ASIA  0.160        0.367  418 
AMERICA  0.136        0.343  418 
AUSPAC  0.122        0.328  418 
LEGOR_FR  0.371        0.484  418 
LEGOR_UK  0.328        0.469  418 
LEGOR_GE  0.200        0.401  418 
LEGOR_SC  0.100        0.301  418 
Table 28 presents summary descriptive statistics for all country-year observations for the period 2002 
through 2015. GQBOARD is the average ratio of female board members per country-year. GGGI is an 
index value of the Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum). SUPPLY is the first component 
of the principal component analysis of the 14 single scores which constitute GGGI. DEMAND is the 
second component of the principal component analysis of the 14 single scores which constitute GGGI. 
GENDERCULTURE is the value for cultural gender egalitarianism. INVPROT is an index value of the 
minority investor protection index compiled by the World Bank. GDPCAP is the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita. QUOTA is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the country’s non state-owned firms are 
subject to voluntary gender regulation, 0 otherwise. GOVCODE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
country’s non state-owned firms are subject to a mandatory gender quota, 0 otherwise. EUROPE, AF-
RICA, ASIA, AMERICA, and AUSPAC are indicator variables equal to 1 if the country is located in the 
respective continent, 0 otherwise. LEGOR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the country follows a 
certain legal tradition (French (FR), UK, Germanic (GE), Scandinavian (SC)), 0 otherwise. For binary 
variables only means and standard deviations are reported. See Appendix A for detailed variable descrip-
tions. 
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4.2 Multivariate Results 
Our results reveal several interesting insights. We are able to confirm the mediating ef-
fects of a societal climate of gender equality (GGGI) and minority investor protection 
(INVPROT) on board composition. The explanatory power of the OLS results is rather 
high with R² values between 73 and 76 percent. Investor protection is highly insignificant 
in the OLS specifications but significant in the SYS-GMM dynamic panel estimation 
which simultaneously controls for autocorrelation and endogeneity (Table 30). As previ-
ously discussed, the SYS-GMM results are likely more robust than cross-sectional meth-
ods for small samples. 
In terms of GGGI, we exhibit that overall gender equality also spills over onto corporate 
boards. A one standard deviation increase in the GGGI represents a (highly) significant 
increase in the average percentage of female directors between 0.65 (SYS-GMM) and 
2.68 (OLS) percentage points on the country-level. This confirms the signaling theory of 
board diversity (Bear et al. 2010). If a society implicitly expects gender equality, firms 
seem to cater to these expectations for legitimacy. As we substitute SUPPLY and DE-
MAND for aggregate GGGI, we encounter somewhat surprising results. While the SUP-
PLY component is significant, even in the stricter SYS-GMM setup, the DEMAND com-
ponent also has the expected positive sign, yet it is only significant on a five percent level 
in OLS. Moreover, we show that gender quota regulations, in the form of mandatory, 
‘hard’ regulations (QUOTA), and voluntary corporate governance code stipulations 
(GOVCODE) seem to incrementally contribute to more women on corporate boards, with 
the exception of the strictest specification (Model 4 of Table 30). In summary, this seems 
to suggest that highly regulated demand-side oriented legislation ought to be comple-
mented by a societal focus on supply-side measures, such as education and giving women 
more opportunities to move into managerial and professional roles, in order to achieve 
their intended goals. More specifically, career progressions are oftentimes impaired by 
the stress to balance work and family life. These measures might, therefore, include in-
creased opportunities to take advantage of childcare and improvements in paid maternity 
leave for mothers and fathers, alike (for a discussion of these issues, e.g., Grosvold and 
Brammer 2011; Adams and Kirchmaier 2015). 
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Table 30 
Main Results 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
  OLS  SYS-GMM  OLS  SYS-GMM 
GQBOARDt-1     0.808 ***     0.797 *** 
     (10.23)      (8.32)  
GGGI  44.63 ***  10.81 **       
  (5.11)   (2.42)        
SUPPLY        0.707 ***  0.288 ** 
        (2.71)   (2.31)  
DEMAND        0.964 **  0.304  
        (2.14)   (1.14)  
INVPROT  0.234   0.249 ***  0.307   0.441 *** 
  (0.98)   (2.66)   (0.91)   (3.23)  
QUOTA  6.107 ***  2.024 **  5.524 ***  1.568  
  (4.37)   (2.53)   (3.29)   (1.52)  
GOVCODE  2.514 **  0.898 **  1.089   0.589  
  (2.33)   (2.17)   (0.95)   (1.44)  
GDPCAP  0.097   -0.006   -0.048   0.064  
  (0.14)   (-0.02)   (-0.05)   (0.17)  
LEGOR_FR  -9.600 ***  -1.541   -12.45 ***  -1.391  
  (-4.59)   (-1.50)   (-7.32)   (-0.98)  
LEGOR_UK  -9.080 ***  -2.059 **  -11.60 ***  -2.747 ** 
  (-4.06)   (-2.33)   (-5.58)   (-2.09)  
LEGOR_GE  -10.65 ***  -1.687 *  -14.38 ***  -1.211  
  (-5.40)   (-1.93)   (-8.17)   (-1.25)  
EUROPE  -0.523   0.798   1.852   1.211  
  (-0.34)   (1.58)   (0.81)   (1.81)  
AFRICA  3.803 **  -0.191   2.474   -0.174  
  (2.63)   (-0.29)   (1.04)   (-0.19)  
ASIA  -2.797 *  -0.409   -1.601   -0.349  
  (-1.85)   (-0.87)   (-0.71)   (-0.49)  
AMERICA  -1.800   -0.239   -1.095   -0.124  
  (-1.18)   (-0.62)   (-0.55)   (-0.23)  
Constant  -19.38 **  omitted   17.89   omitted  
  (-2.16)      (1.65)     
Fixed Effects  Y   Y   Y   Y  
R²  0.732   n/a   0.760   n/a  
N  418   381   295   306  
Arr.-Bond AR(1)     0.004      0.031  
Arr.-Bond AR(2)     0.559      0.739  
Hansen (p-value)     1.000      1.000  
Table 30 presents multivariate results (Equation 7) for the OLS regressions (Model 1 and Model 3) and 
dynamic panel estimation models (SYS-GMM) (Model 2 and Model 4). See Appendix A for detailed 
variable descriptions. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level (two-tailed t-statistics (z-statistics) 
in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Arrelano-Bond tests reveal significant autocorrelations with respect to one-period lags 
but not two-period lags. Given that supervisory board members serve multiple year terms 
it does not seem surprising that contemporaneous female board representation is largely 
determined by past realizations. A potential downside of the SYS-GMM models is that 
they might be weakened through a comparatively large number of instruments in relation 
to country-year observations. Nevertheless, Hansen tests for overidentification determine 
that the results are robust. 
4.3 Additional Results 
Much research is devoted on the association of culture and gender roles and gender ste-
reotypes (e.g., Inglehart and Norris 2003). As (national) culture is comprised of long-
standing traditions and, therefore, is highly path-dependent, our main results may reflect 
differences in culture rather than the effects of political initiatives geared towards em-
powering women in corporate life. To control for the impact of culture, we employ the 
country-level score for gender egalitarianism values (GENDERCULTURE) from the 
Globe project43 (House 2004). 
Prior research, building on sex segregation theory (Cejka and Eagly 1999; Glick 1991), 
suggests that different industries require certain levels of masculinity and, thus, are more 
likely to appoint women to leadership positions (e.g., Cumming et al. 2015). Therefore, 
we re-estimate our institutional analyses on the firm-level and add industry-fixed effects 
(building on the Fama-French 12 industry-framework) to Equation 7 (Table 31). These 
analyses also employ lagged values of GQBOARD as an additional control, but build on 
OLS estimation, since SYS-GMM is less efficient and likely biases estimates for larger 
samples.44 Both additional analyses confirm our main results. GGGI as well as SUPPLY 
remain (highly) significant and are virtually unchanged. Our results are robust to the ad-
dition of cultural gender egalitarianism (GENDERCULTURE) or industry-fixed effects. 
  
                                                 
43  http://globeproject.com/ 
44  In contrast to the country-level analysis, with at most 418 country-year observations, the additional 
firm-year analyses have sample sizes of 25,646 (21,205) firm-year observations, respectively. 
CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL CORRELATES WITH FEMALE BOARD REPRESENTATION  
121 
  
Table 31 
Additional Results 
  Country-Level  Firm-Level 
Method  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
GQBOARDt-1  0.818 ***  0.809 ***  0.870 ***  0.873 *** 
  (8.98)   (7.53)   (184.71)   (179.12)  
GGGI  10.19 **     6.359 ***    
  (2.16)      (4.00)     
SUPPLY     0.264 **     0.176 *** 
     (2.21)      (4.71)  
DEMAND     0.319      -0.059  
     (1.09)       (-0.97)  
GENDERCULTURE  0.252   -0.123        
  (0.43)   (-0.17)        
INVPROT  0.283 **  0.475 ***  0.061   0.112 ** 
  (2.43)   (2.59)   (1.51)   (1.97)  
QUOTA  2.461 ***  2.247
 **  1.082 ***  0.898 ** 
  (3.24)   (2.04)   (4.92)   (2.51)  
GOVCODE  0.896 *  0.652
   1.087 ***  0.804 *** 
  (1.72)   (1.51)   (8.23)   (5.71)  
GDPCAP  -0.056   0.127   0.356 ***  0.885 *** 
  (-0.21)   (0.27)   (3.70)   (5.01)  
LEGOR_FR  -1.568   -1.183   -0.909 ***  -0.822 *** 
  (-1.49)   (-0.73)   (-3.06)   (-2.69)  
LEGOR_UK  -2.305 **  -2.733 *  -1.318 ***  -1.564 *** 
  (-2.34)   (-1.77)   (-5.28)   (-5.61)  
LEGOR_GE  -1.759 *  -1.695   -1.970 ***  -2.188 *** 
  (-1.91)   (-1.16)   (-6.94)   (-7.10)  
EUROPE  0.555   1.208   0.657 ***  0.570 *** 
  (0.89)   (1.59)   (4.41)   (3.01)  
AFRICA  -0.473   -0.548
   0.664 **  1.128 *** 
  (-0.64)   (-0.50)   (2.54)   (3.33)  
ASIA  -0.476   -0.272   -0.446 *  -0.813 *** 
  (-0.88)   (-0.33)   (-2.14)   (-2.89)  
AMERICA  -0.337   0.087   0.298 **  -0.317 * 
  (-0.64)   (0.13)   (2.00)   (-1.74)  
Constant  omitted   omitted   -5.443 ***  -6.317 *** 
        (-3.68)   (-3.34)  
Fixed Effects  Y   Y   Y, I   Y, I  
R²  n/a   n/a   0.816   0.821  
N  339   246   25,646   21,205  
Arr.-Bond AR(1)  0.012   0.046        
Arr.-Bond AR(2)  0.709   0.424        
Hansen (p-value)  1.000   1.000        
Table 31 presents additional multivariate results (Equation 7) for the dynamic panel estimation model 
(SYS-GMM) (Model 1 and 2) and OLS regression (Model 3 and Model 4). Standard errors are clustered 
at the country- (firm-) level (two-tailed t-statistics (z-statistics) in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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5 Conclusion 
Over the last decades, women have made significant advances in higher education, polit-
ical activism, as well as labor force participation. Despite these efforts, in most countries 
men still dominate top-level corporate positions by large margins. With respect to coun-
try-level, institutional correlates, we show that functioning outside investor protection as 
well as a societal climate of gender equality contribute to increased female board partici-
pation. Additionally, we provide initial evidence that supply-side factors seem to be nec-
essary to complement mandatory as well as voluntary gender quota regulation. 
Going forward, targeting board compositions of listed corporations through regulation 
may not be sufficient in itself, if there is insufficient supply of qualified women in the 
workforce. Therefore, our paper presents a societal case for gender fairness which goes 
above and beyond (sometimes) rather symbolic short-term fixes. While gender quotas 
might regulate the demand for female upper echelons, they likely are ineffective to in-
crease the supply of suitable candidates in the short run. Legislators should rather focus 
on supply-side measures, such as education and giving women more opportunities to 
move into managerial and professional roles. 
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Appendix A: Variable Descriptions
Variable  Description 
CONTINENT  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country is located on the respective con-
tinent (e.g., EUROPE, AFRICA, ASIA, AMERICA, Australia-Pacific 
(AUSPAC)). 
DEMAND  Second component of a PCA of the 14 single scores which constitute 
GGGI. The ratio of female to male wages for similar work 
(WAGEEQUALITY), the ratio of healthy male to female lifespans 
(LIFEEXPECTANCY), and the ratio of a female compared to a male head 
of state over the last 50 years (FEMHEADSTATE), as well as estimated 
earned income (EARNINCOME) load significantly on this component 
(factor loading >.3). 
GENDERCULTURE  Value for cultural gender egalitarianism based on the GLOBE project 
(Source: House et al. 2004). 
GDPCAP  Natural logarithm of GDP per capita (World Bank data code: 
NY.GDP.PCAP.CD). 
GGGI  Index value of the Global Gender Gap Index (Source: World Economic 
Forum). 
GOVCODE  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country’s non state-owned firms are sub-
ject to voluntary gender regulation in good governance codes, and 0 other-
wise (Source: Terjesen et al. 2015; additional hand-collection). 
GQBOARD   Average ratio of female board members (Asset4 code: CGBSO17V) based 
on a minimum of 10 firm observations per country-year. 
INVPROT  Index value of the minority investor protection index compiled by the 
World Bank based on three subindices (i.e., (1) Extent of Disclosure index, 
(2) Extent of Director Liability index, and (3) Ease of Shareholder suit in-
dex). 
QUOTA  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country’s non state-owned firms are sub-
ject to a mandatory gender quota on the corporate board, and 0 otherwise 
(Source: Terjesen et al. 2015; additional hand-collection). 
LEGOR  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country follows a certain legal tradition 
(e.g., French (LEGOR_FR), UK (LEGOR_UK), Germanic (LEGOR_GE), 
Scandinavian (LEGOR_SC)) (Source: LaPorta et al. 1998; Klerman et al. 
2011). 
SUPPLY  First component of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of the 14 single 
scores which constitute GGGI. The ratio of female over male senior offi-
cials and managers (MANAGERS), the ratio of female over male profes-
sional and technical workers (PROFESSIONALS), the ratio of female over 
male literacy (LITERACY), the ratios of female over male enrolment in 
secondary (SECONDARY) and tertiary (TERTIARY) education, as well 
as estimated earned income (EARNINCOME) load significantly on this 
component (factor loading >.3). 
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BCHAPTER 4: 
BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON CAPITAL MARKETS 
– NEW INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
 
A b s t r a c t  
We analyze investors’ perception and long-term effects of board gender di-
versity on firms’ capital market performance in an international setting. Our 
results, controlling for the endogenous nature of board appointments, indi-
cate that female board representation neither improves nor reduces firms’ 
long-term stock performance. Thus, investors seem to perceive female and 
male board members as being equivalent in the long-term and, on average, 
do not base their investment decisions on directors’ gender. Hence, we argue 
that it is imperative to go beyond the conventional thinking in terms of the 
business case for gender diversity and broaden the perspective also in order 
to incorporate societal and ethical aspects in the strive to board gender equal-
ity. Even more so, our results show that it does not entail reduced share-
holder value, which the literature on mandatory gender quotas commonly 
seems to suggest. 
This part of the thesis is a joint project with Thomas R. Loy. This paper is currently under review at 
Business & Society (3rd round). 
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1 Introduction 
Female board representation has been extensively examined in prior research with respect 
to its business case. As such, a majority of studies focuses on business-related arguments, 
such as improved corporate governance (e.g., Fondas 2000) as well as financial perfor-
mance (for meta-analysis, c.f. Post and Byron 2015; Pletzer et al. 2015). However, while 
most prior studies find a positive association of female board representation with corpo-
rate governance activities (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Nielsen and Huse 2010a, 
2010b), there are inconclusive results with respect to its impact on firms’ financial per-
formance. In this context, proponents argue that gender diversity improves the quality of 
board discussions, attributable to more creativity (e.g., Nemeth 1986) and a wider range 
of perspectives (Hillman et al. 2007). Critics point to more conflicts between board mem-
bers which arise from internal divisions and social categorization tendencies 
(Tajfel 1979). As such, it is not particularly surprising that some studies find a positive 
association (e.g., Dezsö and Ross 2012; Erhardt et al. 2003; Krishnan and Park 2005; 
Singh et al. 2001), while others conclude with the opposite or no significant effects (e.g., 
Adams and Ferreira 2009; Carter et al. 2010; Rose 2007; Shrader et al. 1997). 
Whereas most empirical research focuses on accounting performance, there is limited 
evidence on the association of board gender diversity with market performance. To this 
day, there are only a few studies analyzing short-term market effects of female board 
appointments, which likewise exhibit mixed results (e.g., Farrell and Hersch 2005; Kang 
et al. 2010; Lee and James 2007; Schmid and Urban 2016). To our surprise, previous 
studies have neglected the long-term market performance attributable to female board 
representation. 
Explicitly, taking a longer-term perspective is valuable for multiple reasons. First, short-
term market reactions proxy for the expected impact of female appointees on shareholder 
value. We are more interested in the actual association of gender diverse boards with 
long-term changes in shareholder wealth. Second, new board appointees require some 
time to enact organizational changes and shifts in firms’ investment patterns (Pan et 
al. 2016). The market also undergoes an adjustment period in which it evaluates the ap-
pointees’ quality (Pan et al. 2015). Due to this, there ought to be longer-term effects of 
female board representation on a firm’s stock performance. Third, a firm’s focus is growth 
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and going-concern and, therefore, to increase shareholder value. In connection, there are 
calls for increased board gender diversity from a wide variety of stakeholders, such as 
institutional investors (Byoun et al. 2016; Coffey and Fryxell 1991), stock exchanges 
(Terjesen et al. 2016), as well as regulators, such as the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) (SEC 2009). This external pressure might result in firms catering to the 
market demand for board gender diversity, or being punished if they fail to do so. In sum, 
there is a lack of evidence on the “relationship between board diversity and long-term 
stock price performance which is the ‘gold standard’ measure of shareholder value” 
(Rhode and Packel 2014, p. 391). 
Therefore, it seems important to analyze the effect of female corporate board participation 
and long-term changes in shareholders wealth. As a result, we attempt to answer the fol-
lowing two research questions (RQ): 
RQ 1:  Is female board participation associated with systematic differences in the long-
term development of investors’ wealth in a global setting? 
RQ 2:  Is female board participation associated with systematic differences in investors’ 
perception of firms which do (not) cater to the market demand for board gender 
diversity? 
Focusing on our two research questions, we provide several important contributions to 
current research. First, our study contributes to the social and economic debate regarding 
female board representation by analyzing how stakeholders (e.g., investors) perceive fe-
male board members and their contribution to firms’ profitability. Second, we investigate 
whether aforementioned societal pressures result in firms catering to these expectations 
or, if they fail to ‘comply’, whether they are punished by investors. Third, corporate board 
composition and its association with performance is a profoundly endogenously issue 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 2003), which is largely ignored by the majority of previous 
studies. We explicitly address this gap in the literature by employing Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM). Fourth, prior empirical studies have mainly focused on single countries 
(i.e., predominantly the U.S.). However, prior cross-country research shows that female 
board representation differs significantly between countries (e.g., Grosvold and Brammer 
2011; Grosvold et al. 2016; Loy and Rupertus 2018a; Terjesen and Singh 2008) and that 
there are still global differences in overall gender equality (WEF 2017). Hence, we test 
our research questions in an international setting. 
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Based on our analyses, we provide some interesting new insights into the relationship of 
female board participation and long-term market performance. Across a comparable set 
of firms, our results indicate no significant differences in annual stock returns. Moreover, 
we fail to document significantly reduced stock returns for firms that deviate from the 
expected ratio of female board membership. While female board appointments may have 
the reported short-term effects (e.g., Kang et al. 2010; Lee and James 2007; Schmid and 
Urban 2016), it seems that the market corrects this (negative) mispricing over the long 
run. In sum, our results do not suggest that improvements in gender equality are not a 
worthwhile undertaking. From the investors’ perspective, high-quality board members 
seem equivalent in the long term, regardless of their gender. Hence, implementing unbi-
ased hiring practices are a societal imperative for reasons of fairness, equality, and par-
ticipation (e.g., Grosvold et al. 2007; Singh et al. 2015). 
We structure our paper as follows. First, we develop our theoretical framework, discuss 
prior literature, and develop our hypotheses. Second, we explain our empirical methods. 
Third, we present the data and descriptive statistics. Fourth, we exhibit and discuss our 
multivariate results. Fifth, we challenge our findings through a range of robustness checks 
and discuss the implications of our results. The final section concludes. 
2 Theoretical Framework, Prior Literature and Hypothesis 
Development  
2.1 The Social and Business Case of Board Gender Diversity 
Internationally, board gender equality and the lack of female board representation has 
increasingly become the focus of political and societal debates in recent years (e.g., 
Grosvold 2011; Pande and Ford 2011; Singh et al. 2015; Terjesen et al. 2016). Despite 
international efforts to increase female board representation, there still remain huge dis-
crepancies in the proportion of female board members across and within countries (e.g., 
Loy and Rupertus 2018a; Terjesen and Singh 2008). 
Thus, men still dominate corporate boards and there seem to exist still significant barriers 
for women to reach the top of corporate management (i.e., the 'glass ceiling effect', e.g., 
Arfken et al. 2004). Whereas several studies focus on the causes of these major interna-
tional discrepancies in the number of women on corporate boards (e.g., Grosvold 2011; 
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Grosvold and Brammer 2011; Grosvold et al. 2016; Loy and Rupertus 2018a; Terjesen 
and Singh 2008), others focus on firm-level predictors for female board representation 
(e.g., Farrell and Hersch 2005; Hillman et al. 2007; Terjesen et al. 2009). In recent years, 
scientific studies put an increased focus on the motives for greater board gender diversity 
and rely upon social as well as business-related theories and lines of argument (Campbell 
and Minguez Vera 2010; Grosvold et al. 2016; Kilgour 2013; Singh et al. 2015). 
Figure 9 
The Social and Business Case of Board Gender Diversity 
 
With respect to the former, social arguments for greater board gender diversity include, 
among others, fairness, equal opportunities, and participation (e.g., Brammer et al. 2007; 
Rhode and Packel 2014; Singh et al. 2015) (Figure 9). As today’s women are more highly 
educated and participate in considerably more professional and technical occupations 
than their mothers and grandmothers (WEF 2016), continuing a pattern of unequal op-
portunities implies a great waste of talent and, thus, societal dead-weight-loss (Rad-
javi 2012). In summary, proponents of the current discussion with respect to increasing 
the number of female board members argue that today’s society overall benefits from 
gender diverse corporate boards. In line with this, firms have the distinct opportunity to 
send a positive signal to their share- and stakeholders by appointing women (e.g., 
Grosvold et al. 2007). 
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The business case of board gender diversity mostly relies on the assumption that female 
board representation improves organizational processes and performance (Rhode and 
Packel 2014). This includes corporate governance outcomes as well as firms’ financial 
performance (Grosvold et al. 2016). On the one hand, firm performance entails three di-
mensions: (1) Long-term financial (i.e., accounting) performance, (2) long-term market 
performance, as well as (3) short-term market reactions. On the other hand, in the context 
of corporate governance boards of directors have three central functions: (1) Shaping 
strategy, (2) monitoring top executives, as well as (3) enhancing accountability (Fon-
das 2000; Post and Byron 2015). Among others, boards are responsible for several tasks 
which are crucial for the corporation. For instance, the board selects and replaces the chief 
executive officer (CEO), provides advice and counsel to top management, represents the 
interests of shareholders, as well as monitors and controls management and company per-
formance. If boards efficiently fulfil these tasks, they can (positively) affect a company’s 
performance. More specifically, upper echelons theory (UET) establishes a framework in 
which board members’ unobservable cognitive base values (e.g., limited field of vision, 
selective perception, and means of acquiring and interpreting new information) or observ-
able characteristics (e.g., age, gender, or career experience) determine a board’s perfor-
mance in its primary tasks, its organizational practices, and approaches to strategy for-
mulation (Hambrick 2007; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Zahra and Pearce 1989). Based 
on these arguments, a large body of research suggests that female board members deter-
mine the boards’ activities and thus, may positively (or negatively) affect a company’s 
(financial) performance as well as corporate governance outcomes (Post and Byron 
2015). 
Proponents argue that women bring useful female leadership qualities and skills to the 
boards which improve corporations’ decision-making processes through fresh and well-
informed views on market and environmental issues (Boulouta 2013), risk awareness, as 
well as less radical and less overconfident decision making (Chen et al. 2016; Huang and 
Kisgen 2013; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). Moreover, gender diverse boards are more 
likely to engage in high-quality analysis and are less likely to take extreme positions (e.g., 
Dobbin and Jung 2011; Rhode and Packel 2014). By appointing more women to boards, 
the organization sends a signal that it offers fair opportunities for career progress for cur-
rent and future female employees (Hillman et al. 2007). If firms do not provide gender-
neutral access into corporate boards, they will lack female skills and perspectives (Holton 
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2000; Terjesen and Singh 2008). Hence, it enjoys and retains access to a broader pool of 
qualified present and potential employees on all organizational levels. Critics imply that 
increased female board representation may generate more diametrically opposed opinions 
and critical questions during board meetings (Lau and Murnighan 1998). Thus, decision-
making is less effective and more time-consuming (Miller et al. 1998). Moreover, Tajfel 
(1979) suggests that social categorization tendencies lead to gender salience and thereby 
more stereotypes within groups (Abrams et al. 1990). This can hinder functional team 
processes and possibly lead to increased inconsistencies in communication and coopera-
tion (van Knippenberg et al. 2004). Hence, conflicts between board members might out-
weigh the benefits of additional perspectives. 
2.2 Prior Literature 
To this day, extensive research shows that increased gender diversity has a positive im-
pact on board activities. For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female board 
members have better attendance rates and are more inclined to join monitoring commit-
tees. Nielsen and Huse (2010a, 2010b) find that female directors contribute positively to 
strategic board decisions, board effectiveness, and that boards with higher ratios of 
women have more board development evaluations and programs. Moreover, boards with 
a higher proportion of women hold more board meetings, are more likely to replace a 
CEO when stock performance is poor, and are positively associated with better board 
monitoring (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009). Overall, prior studies indicate a positive as-
sociation of board gender diversity with the effectiveness of corporate boards. 
Research assumes that if board gender diversity affects corporate boards’ efficiency, there 
should be an effect on e.g., financial as well as market performance (Dobbin and 
Jung 2011). So far, the literature has extensively focused on the association of female 
board membership with firms’ financial accounting performance. One strand of research 
finds a positive relationship (e.g., Dezsö and Ross 2012; Erhardt et al. 2003; Krishnan 
and Park 2005; Singh et al. 2001). Yet, another strand finds the opposite or no significant 
relationship (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Carter et al. 2010; Rose 2007; Shrader et 
al. 1997). Unsurprisingly, especially more recent studies argue that the link between 
firms’ financial performance and female board representation is complex and, above all, 
indirect (Forbes and Milliken 1999; Galbreath 2018). 
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With respect to the link of gender diversity and equity market performance, there is only 
a handful of studies analyzing short-term market reactions to the appointment of female 
board members. Whereas Kang et al. (2010) find positive short-term investor reactions to 
female board appointments in Singapore, Schmid and Urban (2016) take a more nuanced 
stance. They provide evidence that stock markets exhibit more negative short-term reac-
tions to deaths of female board members, especially in countries with low rates of female 
board representation. However, the authors state that this effect is largely clustered in 
countries with a stronger ‘glass ceiling’ and, thus, potentially attributable to more rigorous 
screening of female directors. On the contrary, Lee and James (2007) find negative an-
nouncement returns to female CEO appointments. And finally, Farrell and Hersch (2005) 
find a positive association between firm performance and the likelihood of appointing 
women to the board, but they do not find support for an associated market reaction. Thus, 
also prior studies analyzing short-term market effects find mixed results. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that a focus on short-term market effects can effectively meas-
ure the impact of board gender diversity on investors’ perception. Quite surprisingly, pre-
vious studies have neglected to investigate the long-term change in shareholder wealth 
attributable to female board representation, which is “the ‘gold standard’ measure of 
shareholder value” (Rhode and Packel 2014, p. 391). Our focus on the longer-term per-
spective is valuable for two reasons. First, short-term market reactions proxy for the ex-
pected impact of female appointees on shareholder value. Thus, it cannot capture the ac-
tual association. Second, new board appointees require some time to enact organizational 
changes and changes in firms’ investment patterns (Pan et al. 2016). Indicative of this, 
Pan et al. (2015) find evidence for an almost linear decline in equity volatility over a 
CEO’s first year of tenure. On average, stock volatility is highest at the appointment date, 
which likely biases short-term appointment returns. In the following, the market under-
goes an adjustment period during which it evaluates the quality of appointees, beyond a 
potential stereotypical bias. As a result, looking at the longer-term perspective seems to 
be a more convincing way to examine investors’ perception of female board representa-
tion and its actual effects.   
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2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Role congruity theory in psychology posits that women are regarded as less favorable 
candidates for leadership roles compared to men as a result of a perceived incongruity 
between female roles and leadership roles. Eagly and Karau (2002) advance existing the-
ories regarding prejudice and combine them with perceptions of managerial roles. More 
specifically, prejudice against women may arise when social perceivers have stereotypes 
about a social group that is incongruent with well-known and expected attributes of roles 
of another group. Once a negatively stereotyped person rises to the top of the corporation 
and, hence, an incongruent social role, this inconsistency diminishes the appreciation this 
person receives from others (Eagly and Karau 2002). In conclusion, role congruity theory 
explains that stereotypes of female gender roles might prescribe less leadership qualities 
to women than to men. 
Following this theory, one could argue that the effect of female board representation on 
capital market performance occurs mainly through societal stereotyping that may influ-
ence investors’ evaluation of a firms’ potential to generate future earnings (Post and By-
ron 2015). If individuals that deviate from social expectations occupy specific positions 
in the firm, investors may react negatively to firms with more female board members 
(e.g., Dobbin and Jung 2011). As international evidence shows, there still is a relatively 
low number of women on corporate boards (e.g., Grosvold and Brammer 2011; Grosvold 
et al. 2016; Loy and Rupertus 2018a; Terjesen and Singh 2008). Hence, this probably 
reinforces stereotypes about female (dis)qualifications for such positions. A large body 
of literature in organization theory shows that especially men believe that leadership po-
sitions are associated with masculine qualities (e.g., Gupta et al. 2009; Powell and But-
terfield 2002; Schein and Mueller 1992). Unsurprisingly, they view female appointees 
with considerable skepticism (Dobbin and Jung 2011; Lee and James 2007) and point out 
the detrimental effects of imposing board gender diversity through regulation (Ahern and 
Dittmar 2012). Moreover, investors may not be accustomed to women on corporate 
boards for the reason, which on the surface might seem more legitimate, that they lack 
business experience for such positions (Dobbin and Jung 2011). However, such negative 
preconceptions towards female board appointees would likely culminate in negative 
short-window stock reactions. As time progresses, investors may update their beliefs and 
revise their negative stereotypes to reflect the positive effects of newly implemented strat-
egies. Therefore, investors may continue investing to the extent that they are satisfied 
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with the female board appointees. On the contrary, they will discontinue or lower future 
investments if they are dissatisfied with the board’s direction (Lee and James 2007). Cu-
mulatively, we state our first hypothesis in positive form, but the issue remains an empir-
ical question: 
H1:  Firms with gender diverse corporate boards exhibit improved long-term equity 
capital market performance compared to their peers without women on their 
boards. 
Additionally, corporations are increasingly attentive to the desires of a wide range of 
stakeholders (e.g., national governments, politicians, employees) as well as shareholders 
(e.g., sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, or large institutional investors). On the one 
hand, there are numerous non-profit initiatives to promote female board representation in 
basically every highly-developed capital market. They aim to convince businesses to im-
plement gender fair corporate boards, even if this is not mandatory by law – or go beyond 
the quota. Additionally, board gender diversity is regarded as a key pillar of good gov-
ernance and fixated in numerous voluntary corporate governance codes, globally (Loy 
and Rupertus 2018a; Terjesen et al. 2015). The SEC even issued a rule that listed compa-
nies must disclose their views on board diversity (SEC 2009). On the other hand, there is 
evidence that investors pay attention to board structures (e.g., Gillan and Starks 2000; 
Yermack 2006) and make board diversity, individually and collectively, a higher priority 
in investment decisions (Dobbin and Jung 2011; Rhode and Packel 2014). Moreover, 
there is an increasing number of (institutional) investors who actively push firms to in-
crease their board gender diversity (Byoun et al. 2016; Coffey and Fryxell 1991; Fondas 
2000). Such groups can leverage their exposed position to influence internal decisions in 
order to advance female board representation among companies in which they hold sig-
nificant stakes (Dobbin and Jung 2011; Rhode and Packel 2014). 
In conclusion, we argue that equity markets form their own expectations about the ratio 
of female board members. If key players in equity markets demand a higher proportion 
of female board members, firms may face significant pressure to increase female board 
representation (Dobbin and Jung 2011; Rhode and Packel 2014; Terjesen et al. 2009). 
While firms’ fundamentals might not have changed too much over recent years, they still 
might feel inclined to cater to a market demand for female board representation or run the 
risk of being punished by investors over the long-term (Ghosh et al. 2016). As a result, 
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we argue that if firms do not meet investors’ expectations about gender diverse boards, 
they might be punished by a decline in long-term stock returns. Thus, we state our second 
hypothesis as follows: 
H2:  Firms exhibit impaired long-term stock market performance if the observable ra-
tio of female board representation is below market expectations. 
3 Empricial Models 
3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
An ideal empirical model would establish and test a causal relationship between explan-
atory and explained variables. A necessary condition is that explanatory variables are 
exogenous, and not prone to self-selection. In our context, corporate board composition 
is profoundly endogenous (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). The 
pure existence of corporate boards is exogenous – based on stock exchange requirements 
or incorporation laws, both well outside individual firms’ control. Nevertheless, their 
composition is largely endogenous, with some notable exceptions like mandatory gender 
quotas or co-determination with mandatory employee board representation (i.e., particu-
larly in the German case). As such, detecting a specific effect of female board represen-
tation on (market) performance is not trivial. 
There are only a handful of prior studies, which appropriately engage endogeneity. While 
one meta-analysis (Pletzer et al. 2015) does not mention the issue at all, Post and By-
ron  (2015) specifically name two-stage models as a potential remedy to be applied in 
future research. We implement this through a quasi-experimental approach, novel to this 
literature. PSM builds on identifying potentially relevant covariates, based on previous 
empirical findings and economic theory, which influence selection into the treatment 
group (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The control group is formed by sampling a large 
number of potential control firms for those which exhibit highly similar covariates to the 
treatment group. Incidentally, this answers a recent call for future research which deems 
“board selection processes (…) a fruitful avenue for future analysis” (Post and By-
ron 2015, p. 1562). Our PSM approach is based on the board gender diversity prediction 
model by Hillman et al. (2007) and Gul et al. (2011). To control for country-specific 
regulations and institutional factors, which likely also affect the ratio of female board 
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members, we estimate the conditional probability of receiving treatment on a country-by-
country basis (Equation 8): 
 
 
(8) 
Return on Assets (ROA). Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) examine determinants of 
changes among corporate directors. They hypothesize that firm performance has the ut-
most impact. If a firm’s financial performance is poor, incumbent directors are more 
likely to be removed and replaced by new hires. While the incumbent directors are likely 
male, new appointees can be of both genders. A number of studies finds a positive rela-
tionship between ROA and board gender diversity (e.g., Carter et al. 2010; Erhardt et 
al. 2003; Post and Byron 2015). On the contrary, others do not find significant associa-
tions (e.g., Dobbin and Jung 2011). Therefore, we refrain from a directional prediction. 
Firm Size (SIZE). Firm size covers a number of unobservable firm characteristics, such 
as public visibility and political costs. As such, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that 
larger firms exhibit increased demand for board diversity since they are subject to more 
public scrutiny and pressure to meet social expectations. Increased variety and a larger 
number of stakeholders, more common for larger firms, contribute to this social pressure 
(Hillman et al. 2007). Prior studies establish a positive relationship between the percent-
age of women on corporate boards and firm size (e.g., Carter et al. 2010). Therefore, we 
expect that firm size is likely positively associated with the probability of female board 
representation. 
Board Outsider (BOUTSIDE). Firms form interorganizational networks through their 
top managers’ outside directorships and other firms’ directors, to deal with environmental 
uncertainties as well as to obtain valuable information and important resources (Hillman 
et al. 2007; Pfeffer 1972). Interlocking directorates, thus, may provide additional infor-
mation about a supply of female directors which could lead to a diffusion of organiza-
tional practices, such as gender diversity (Hillman et al. 2007). Moreover, appointing ad-
ditional outside directors allows firms to add female perspectives to the board without 
necessarily having to replace experienced and suitable male directors. Therefore, we ex-
pect a positive association between the number of outside directors and female board 
representation. 
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Risk (RISK). A firm’s risk profile seems to be one of the most important and robust 
factors to determine the proportion of women on boards of directors (Adams and Fer-
reira 2009; Farrell and Hersch 2005). In both studies, the authors present a statistically 
significant, negative relationship between gender diversity and firm risk. These findings 
are in line with results by Chen et al. (2016) and Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), who 
determine that women are more risk averse with regard to financial and research & de-
velopment (R&D) investment decisions. On the contrary, Adams and Funk (2012) exhibit 
that female top executives are significantly less risk averse than their male counterparts. 
Therefore, we do not predict a sign.  
Total Diversification (TD). We include the total diversification measure of 
Palepu  (1985) as an indicator for firm strategy. Hillman et al. (2007) argue that a firm, 
which only operates in a single business, is environmentally more path dependent. On the 
contrary, multi-business corporations are inherently more prone to a broader set of per-
spectives and ties to more (diverse) stakeholders. As a result, we expect increased female 
board representation for more diversified firms. 
In accordance with Gul et al. (2011) and Hillman et al. (2007), we further include controls 
for firm age (AGE), sales growth (SGROWTH), and the debt-to-equity ratio (LEV). Ad-
ditionally, we include industry-fixed effects (IND), because there is ample evidence 
which suggests that industry is a significant explanatory factor of female board represen-
tation (e.g., Cumming et al. 2015), as well as year-fixed effects (YEAR) to control for a 
potential trend of increased female board representation in recent years (Loy and Rupertus 
2018a). To control for outliers, the values of all non-truncated variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Our dependent variable GENDER is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has at least 
one female board member, and 0 otherwise. We match each firm-year from the treatment 
group (GENDER = 1) in a given country (e.g., Spain) with another firm-year of the con-
trol group (GENDER = 0) from the same country with the closest propensity score, with-
out replacement. Conceptually, we expect that matched firms only differ with respect to 
the treatment (i.e., board gender diversity). 
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3.2 Value Relevance Design 
To further test our first hypothesis – the association of female board membership with 
long-term development of shareholder wealth – we employ a multivariate value relevance 
(VR) design. As such, we pool all country data sets and run the following regression: 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
The dependent variable is annual stock return corrected for possible dividend payments 
(RET) for the period nine months before through three months after fiscal year-end. This 
period corresponds to the disclosure of annual financial statements and the timing of an-
nual shareholders’ meetings at which new directors are voted into office. EPS is computed 
as net income before extraordinary items scaled by the number of shares outstanding. 
ΔEPS is the year-to-year change in EPS scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. Most importantly, we examine the incremental effect of information about 
female board representation. In the first regression (Equation 9), we build on the full sam-
ple and include the unmatched GENDER variable to estimate its predictive ability. At-
tributable to aforementioned endogeneity concerns, we concentrate on the matched sam-
ple (GENDERMATCH) in a second analysis (Equation 10). Both regressions include 
controls for industry- (IND) and year- (YEAR) fixed effects. To control for outliers, val-
ues of all non-truncated (i.e., non-binary) variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th per-
centile, as well. 
3.3 Gender Diversity Expectation Model 
To test our second hypothesis, we extend our value relevance design. We analyze whether 
deviations from the expected ratio of female board members affect shareholders long-
term investment decisions (Hypothesis 2). Therefore, we include ABSGENDIFF as the 
absolute difference between the observed proportion of female board members in a given 
firm and the expected ratio of female board representation (Equation 11): 
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(11) 
Prior research suggests that firms in certain industries are more likely to appoint women 
to leadership positions (e.g., Cumming et al. 2015). Thus, to determine the expected ratio 
of female board members, we use the average ratio of female board representation across 
all firms in a given industry-country cross-section. Moreover, we include an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm’s observed proportion of female board members down-
wardly deviates from the expected country-industry-based ratio of women on the board 
(NEGGAP). As we are primarily interested in the incremental effect of a downward de-
viation from expectations, we include the interaction term of both variables (ABSGEN-
DIFF NEGGAP). Hence, the baseline effect ABSGENDIFF measures the effect of a 
positive deviation. Finally, we include controls for industry- (IND) and year- (YEAR) 
fixed effects. 
4 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Initially, we consider all firms included in the Thomson Reuters’ Asset4 database for the 
period between 2008 and 2014. Main variables for all our investigations are board char-
acteristics with respect to the total number of board members and the percentage of 
women on the board. We limit our sample to firms from countries with a sufficient num-
ber of firm-years with available board characteristics and financial data from Worldscope 
to carry out our PSM estimations. Moreover, we eliminate firm-year observations with 
missing stock returns. Our final sample consists of 8,872 firm-year observations from 
13 countries.   
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We present our pooled sample by country in Table 32 and our unmatched (Column a) as 
well as matched (Column b) sample by year (Panel A), country (Panel B), and industry 
(Panel C) in Table 33. There is significant variation in the number of firm-years across 
countries. A majority of observations originate from Australia, Canada, Japan, the U.K., 
and the U.S. There are also unambiguous differences between the treatment (GEN-
DER = 1) and comparison group (GENDER = 0). On the one hand, the majority of U.S. 
firms have at least one woman on their boards of directors despite that there are no legis-
lative plans to implement a mandatory gender quota. France, Germany, the U.K., and 
Canada present similar patterns. On the other hand, most firms from Japan do not exhibit 
gender diverse boards. 
  
Table 32 
Geographical Sample Distribution 
Country  Total  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014 
Australia  532  40  51  78  89  90  88  96 
Brazil  100  4  9  17  13  28  11  18 
Canada  524  67  84  85  75  77  65  71 
France  291  66  68  73  20  22  20  22 
Germany  302  49  56  54  34  40  31  38 
India  161  6  14  19  28  33  27  34 
Italy  109  26  31  31  1  8  5  7 
Japan  2,272  319  321  345  323  325  307  332 
Singapore  116  24  25  27  10  10  10  10 
Spain  128  25  26  26  7  16  14  14 
Switzerland  218  34  33  40  26  29  29  27 
U.K.  427  72  75  78  50  51  50  51 
U.S.  3.692  411  540  598  595  586  452  510 
Σ  8,872  1,143  1,333  1,471  1,271  1,315  1,109  1,230 
Table 32 presents the geographical sample distribution. 
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Table 33 
Unmatched and Matched Sample Distribution 
Panel A: By Year 
  (a) Unmatched Sample  (b) Matched Sample 
    GENDER = 0  GENDER = 1    
GENDER-
MATCH = 0 
 
GENDER-
MATCH = 1 
  Total  N  %  N  %  Total  N  %  N  % 
2008  1,143  488  14.78  655  11.76  303  148  13.11  155  13.73 
2009  1,333  536  16.24  797  14.31  374  185  16.39  189  16.74 
2010  1,471  559  16.93  912  16.37  410  212  18.78  198  17.54 
2011  1,271  470  14.24  801  14.38  344  168  14.88  176  15.59 
2012  1,315  464  14.06  851  15.28  314  161  14.26  153  13.55 
2013  1,109  382  11.57  727  13.05  222  108  9.57  114  10.10 
2014  1,230  402  12.18  828  14.86  291  147  13.02  144  12.75 
Σ  8,872  3,301    5,571    2,258  1,129    1,129   
Panel B: By Country 
Australia  532  132  4.00  400  7.18  202  101  8.95  101  8.95 
Brazil  100  56  1.70  44  0.79  34  17  1.51  17  1.51 
Canada  524  98  2.97  426  7.65  84  42  3.72  42  3.72 
France  291  38  1.15  253  4.54  56  28  2.48  28  2.48 
Germany  302  73  2.21  229  4.11  102  51  4.52  51  4.52 
India  161  77  2.33  84  1.51  68  34  3.01  34  3.01 
Italy  109  50  1.51  59  1.06  36  18  1.59  18  1.59 
Japan  2,272  2,024  61.31  248  4.45  488  244  21.61  244  21.61 
Singapore  116  51  1.54  65  1.17  58  29  2.57  29  2.57 
Spain  128  25  0.76  103  1.85  26  13  1.15  13  1.15 
Switzerland  218  77  2.33  141  2.53  50  25  2.21  25  2.21 
U.K.  427  119  3.60  308  5.53  158  79  7.00  79  7.00 
U.S.  3,692  481  14.57  3,211  57.64  896  448  39.68  448  39.68 
Σ  8,872  3,301    5,571    2,258  1,129    1,129   
Panel C: By Industry 
NonDur  569  192  5.82  377  6.77  126  70  6.20  56  4.96 
Dur  421  259  7.85  162  2.91  92  50  4.43  42  3.72 
Manuf  1,200  583  17.66  617  11.08  259  131  11.60  128  11.34 
Enrgy  359  132  4.00  227  4.07  136  71  6.29  65  5.76 
Chems  502  212  6.42  290  5.21  124  69  6.11  55  4.87 
BusEq  921  356  10.78  565  10.14  300  145  12.84  155  13.73 
Telcm  291  90  2.73  201  3.61  62  31  2.75  31  2.75 
Utils  555  141  4.27  414  7.43  55  26  2.30  29  2.57 
Shops  757  229  6.94  528  9.48  194  101  8.95  93  8.24 
Hlth  340  81  2.45  259  4.65  46  20  1.77  26  2.30 
Money  1,602  408  12.36  1,194  21.43  325  162  14.35  163  14.44 
Other  1,355  618  18.72  737  13.23  539  253  22.41  286  25.33 
Σ  8,872  3,301    5,571    2,258  1,129    1,129   
Table 33 presents detailed sample distributions for the unmatched and matched sample by year (Panel A), 
country (Panel B), and industry (Panel C). 
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
For the pooled sample, average female board representation (GENQUOT) is 10.9 per-
centage points with a median of 10.0 (Table 34). Their mean (median) size (natural log-
arithm of total assets) is 16.1 (15.9) and the average (median) age, which corresponds to 
the period since the date of incorporation, is 40 (45) years. Furthermore, outside directors 
occupy on average (median) 6 (7) seats on the corporate boards and the mean (median) 
firm-specific risk is 0.036 (0.026).  
Research into the effects of board gender diversity is subject to severe endogeneity prob-
lems (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003) because firms with gender diverse boards could be 
systematically different from all-male board firms (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Hillman et 
al. 2007; Lai et al. 2017). Comparing our gender diverse (N=5,571) and non-gender di-
verse (N=3,301) sub samples, substantial and mostly significant differences along a num-
ber of dimensions are quite visible (cf. Table 37). 
Compared to their counterparts, firms with female board presence exhibit on average 
(median) higher stock returns of 4.8 (8.1) percent, are larger, younger and have more 
outside directors. Furthermore, they exhibit a lower risk profile. Generally, these descrip-
tive statistics are in line with prior research (e.g., Hillman et al. 2007). 
 
 
  
Table 34 
Descriptive Statistics – Pooled Sample 
Variables  Mean  25 %  Median  75 %  SD  N 
GENQUOT  0.109  0.000  0.100  0.182  0.571  8,872 
GENDER  0.628  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  8,872 
GENDERMATCH  0.500  0.000  0.500  1.000  0.500  2,258 
RET  0.119  -0.210  0.058  0.345  0.512  8,872 
ROA  0.040  0.010  0.034  0.070  0.061  8,872 
SIZE  16.14  15.03  15.92  17.08  1.58  8,872 
BOUTSIDE (ln)  1.839  1.609  1.946  2.197  0.525  8,872 
BOUTSIDE (#)  6  5  7  9  2  8,872 
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4.3 Correlations 
We present Pearson correlations in Table 35. Consistent with our descriptive statistics, 
female board presence is positively associated with RET, ROA, SIZE, BOUTSIDE, TD 
and LEV, but negatively associated with RISK, AGE and SGROWTH (Table 35). More-
over, we calculate Variance Inflations Factors (VIFs) to control for multicollinearity in a 
pooled cross-section. Additionally, we estimate VIFs for all variables (Model 1) as well 
as for each model (Equation 8 – 11, Model 2 – 5), separately (Table 36). All VIFs are far 
below conventional levels.  
  
Table 34 – continued 
Descriptive Statistics – Pooled Sample 
Variables  Mean  25 %  Median  75 %  SD  N 
RISK  0.036  0.015  0.026  0.044  0.035  8,872 
TD  0.877  0.553  0.871  1.204  0.464  8,872 
AGE (ln)  3.688  3.091  3.807  4.382  0.838  8,872 
AGE (#years)  40  22  45  80  2  8,872 
SGROWTH  0.079  -0.005  0.050  0.120  0.203  8,872 
LEV  3.219  0.811  1.517  3.043  5.644  8,872 
EPS  0.052  0.031  0.059  0.087  0.096  8,872 
ΔEPS  -0.008  -0.023  -0.001  0.011  0.797  8,872 
GENDIFF  0.000  -3.679  -0.610  3.976  7.699  8,872 
ABSGENDIFF  5.485  1.060  3.750  8.334  5.401  8,872 
NEGGAP  0.603  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.489  8,872 
ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP  2.743  0.000  0.610  3.679  4.299  8,872 
Table 34 presents summary descriptive statistics for all firm-year observations of the pooled sample for 
the period 2008 through 2014. GENQUOT is the observed percentage of women on the boards of directors. 
GENDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group (has at least one 
female board member), 0 otherwise. GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is 
included into the treatment group after applying the PSM model, 0 otherwise. RET is stock returns. ROA 
is return on assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. BOUTSIDE is the natural logarithm of 
outside directors. RISK is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations. TD is total diversification. 
AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age. SGROWTH is the average sales growth over the prior three 
fiscal years. LEV is the ratio of total debt to shareholders’ equity. EPS is earnings per share. ∆EPS is the 
year-to-year change in EPS. GENDIFF is the signed difference between the observed ratio of female board 
members in a given firm and the expected ratio of female board representation. ABSGENDIFF is the 
absolute value of GENDIFF. NEGGAP is an indicator variable equal to 1 if GENDIFF is negativ, 0 oth-
erwise. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
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While the VIF for the interaction term in the pooled cross-section is 5.87, which is still 
far below the critical level of 10, it is much smaller in the model in which it is actually 
employed (Table 36, Model 5). Therefore, we conclude that multicollinearity does not 
bias our analyses. 
Table 36 
Variance Inflation Factors 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Variables 
 
Pooled 
 PSM 
Model 
 VR-Model 
Unmatched 
 VR-Model 
Matched 
 Gender  
Expect. Model 
GENDER  2.90   
 1.00   
 
 
GENDERMATCH  2.90   
 
 
 1.00   
ROA  1.89  1.08   
 
 
 
 
SIZE  1.75  1.30   
 
 
 
 
BOUTSIDE  1.40  1.17   
 
 
 
 
RISK  1.17  1.19   
 
 
 
 
TD  1.08  1.03   
 
 
 
 
AGE  1.22  1.13   
 
 
 
 
SGROWTH  1.13  1.14   
 
 
 
 
LEV  1.40  1.11   
 
 
 
 
EPS  1.82   
 1.01  1.02  1.01 
ΔEPS  1.02   
 1.00  1.01  1.00 
ABSGENDIFF  2.92   
 
 
 
 
 2.04 
NEGGAP  3.34   
 
 
 
 
 2.17 
ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP  5.87        2.66 
Table 36 presents variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables in the pooled sample (Model 1) as 
well as separately for each Equation (Equations 8 – 11) of our actual analyses (Model 2 – Model 5). 
GENDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group (has at least 
one female board member), 0 otherwise. GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm 
is included into the treatment group after applying the PSM model, 0 otherwise. ROA is return on assets. 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. BOUTSIDE is the natural logarithm of outside directors. 
RISK is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations. TD is total diversification. AGE is the 
natural logarithm of firm age. SGROWTH is the average sales growth over the prior three fiscal years. 
LEV is the ratio of total debt to shareholders’ equity. EPS is earnings per share. ∆EPS is the year-to-year 
change in EPS. ABSGENDIFF is the absolute value of GENDIFF. NEGGAP is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if GENDIFF is negative, 0 otherwise. GENDIFF is the signed difference between the observed 
ratio of female board members in a given firm and the expected ratio of female board representation. See 
Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
 
CHAPTER 4: BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON CAPITAL MARKETS  
147 
5 Results 
5.1 Propensity Score Matching 
In the following, we aim to determine whether firms with gender diverse boards exhibit 
higher long-term stock returns compared to their counterparts. In a first step to test H1, 
we present univariate t-tests of differences in means for all variables included in our pre-
diction model as well as stock returns (Table 37).  
Consistent with our descriptive statistics, we find that before the matching process most 
differences are highly significant. Thus, we conclude that firms with gender diverse 
boards are systematically different from firms with all-male boards. Moreover, it seems 
that firms with female board presence exhibit significantly higher stock returns.  
 
Table 37 
Descriptive Statistics – Unmatched Sample 
  
No female director 
(GENDER = 0; N = 3,301) 
 
At least one female director 
(GENDER = 1; N = 5,571) 
 
Difference 
in means 
Variables  Mean  Median  SD  Mean  Median  SD  p-value 
RET  0.089  0.003  0.514  0.137  0.084  0.509  <0.001 
ROA  0.033  0.028  0.057  0.044  0.040  0.063  <0.001 
SIZE  15.79  15.61  1.36  16.35  16.14  1.667  <0.001 
BOUTSIDE (ln)  1.743  1.792  0.586  1.896  1.946  0.476  <0.001 
BOUTSIDE (#)  6  6  2  7  7  2   
RISK  0.038  0.028  0.037  0.034  0.025  0.033  <0.001 
TD  0.859  0.831  0.490  0.888  0.891  0.447  0.006 
AGE (ln)  3.809  4.094  0.813  3.617  3.664  0.845  <0.001 
AGE (#)  45  60  2  37  39  2   
SGROWTH  0.082  0.042  0.257  0.077  0.054  0.163  0.327 
LEV  2.596  1.248  4.509  3.589  1.694  6.191  <0.001 
Table 37 presents summary statistics and comparisons in means between firms with at least one female 
director (GENDER = 1) and without female directors (GENDER = 0). Presented p-values are based on 
two tailed t-tests for differences in means. GENDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included 
into the treatment group (has at least one female board member), 0 otherwise. RET is stock returns. ROA 
is return on assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. BOUTSIDE is the natural logarithm of 
outside directors. RISK is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations. TD is total diversification. 
AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age. SGROWTH is the average sales growth over the prior three 
fiscal years. LEV is the ratio of total debt to shareholders’ equity. See Appendix A for detailed variable 
descriptions. 
 
CHAPTER 4: BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON CAPITAL MARKETS  
148 
Nevertheless, to make a more convinced statement about the effect of gender diversity, 
we require a treatment and control group with similar firm fundamentals. To correct for 
the apparent self-selection, we employ PSM. Afterwards, firms of both groups should be 
similar with respect to firm characteristics that determine female board representation. 
Remaining differences in stock returns could, therefore, be attributed to differences in 
gender diversity. 
We present results of our prediction/matching model (Equation 8) for each country in 
Appendix B. These indicate that the matching process is highly effective. First, the post-
match pseudo-R² values are significantly smaller than their pre-match counterparts. Sec-
ond, post-match almost none of the explanatory variables still exhibits a significant asso-
ciation with the treatment. Hence, the matching process balances differences across co-
variates. Across the different pre-match country subsamples especially SIZE, AGE, 
SGROWTH, and BOUTSIDE largely have significant predictive ability towards receiv-
ing treatment. Overall, coefficients’ signs and estimated magnitudes are consistent with 
prior literature (Gul et al. 2011; Hillman et al. 2007). As such, the prediction model, alt-
hough developed for a U.S. setting, performs well internationally. 
Table 38 presents descriptive statistics for the matched sample as well as results of two-
sided t-tests for post-match differences in means. In comparison to the descriptive statis-
tics presented in Table 34 and Table 37, it again appears that the matching process is 
highly efficient. With the exception of TD and BOUTSIDE, no significant differences 
remain. Hence, we have first indication that H1 cannot be confirmed. Properly controlling 
for endogeneity and self-selection seems to render stock market performance differences 
insignificant. 
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As the average pre-match pseudo-R² amounts to about 33 percentage (Appendix B), other 
factors likely influence the propensity of board gender diversity. If the matches were 
(nearly) perfect, simple univariate t-tests for our variable of interest would suffice to dis-
prove the hypothesis (Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Heckman et al. 1997). However, in the 
following, we employ a multivariate regression design to control for any remaining dif-
ferences. 
5.2 Value Relevance Design 
Table 39 provides the regression results for our value relevance design (Equation 9 
and 10). Both investigate firms’ stock returns, which are explained by earnings per share 
(EPS) and the change in earnings per share (∆EPS). Moreover, we conduct our analyses 
for the unmatched (GENDER) and matched (GENDERMATCH) samples to exhibit the 
incremental impact of board gender diversity on stock returns. 
  
Table 38 
Descriptive Statistics – Matched Sample 
  
No female director 
(GENDERMATCH = 0;  
N = 1,129) 
 
At least one female director 
(GENDERMATCH = 1; 
 N = 1,129) 
 
Difference 
in means 
Variables  Mean  Median  SD  Mean  Median  SD  p-value 
RET  0.137  0.064  0.552  0.116  0.041  0.549  0.371 
ROA  0.043  0.036  0.065  0.042  0.041  0.072  0.745 
SIZE  15.58  15.46  1.383  15.49  15.33  1.479  0.501 
BOUTSIDE  1.662  1.609  0.570  1.620  1.609  0.543  0.073 
RISK  0.043  0.031  0.040  0.044  0.032  0.039  0.594 
TD  0.878  0.849  0.466  0.839  0.825  0.470  0.049 
AGE  3.536  3.584  0.866  3.515  3.611  0.897  0.580 
SGROWTH  0.110  0.078  0.209  0.110  0.069  0.233  0.967 
LEV  2.628  1.193  5.260  2.783  1.334  5.518  0.495 
Table 38 presents summary statistics and comparisons in means for the matched sample. Presented p-
values result from two tailed t-tests for differences in means. GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group after applying the propensity score matching, 0 
otherwise. RET is stock returns. ROA is return on assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
BOUTSIDE is the natural logarithm of outside directors. RISK is the standard deviation of cash flows 
from operations. TD is total diversification. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age. SGROWTH is the 
average sales growth over the prior three fiscal years. LEV is the ratio of total debt to shareholders’ 
equity. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
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Table 39 
Value Relevance Regression 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
  Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
GENDER  0.024 **     0.027 ***    
  (3.04)      (3.48)     
GENDERMATCH     0.005      0.004  
     (0.30)      (0.23)  
EPS  1.221 ***  1.261 ***  1.333 ***  1.193 ** 
  (10.18)   (4.64)   (8.47)   (2.88)  
ΔEPS  0.023   -0.004   0.022   -0.003  
  (1.42)   (-0.22)   (1.37)   (-0.18)  
ROA        -0.185   0.196  
        (-1.32)   (0.55)  
SIZE        -0.021 ***  -0.015  
        (-5.98)   (-1.57)  
BOUTSIDE        0.009   0.034  
        (0.96)   (1.59)  
RISK        0.449 *  0.544  
        (2.29)   (1.22)  
TD        0.019 *  0.001  
        (2.54)   (0.02)  
AGE        -0.022 ***  -0.038 *** 
        (-4.86)   (-3.79)  
SGROWTH        -0.042   -0.079  
        (-1.68)   (-1.54)  
LEV        0.001   -0.001  
        (1.24)   (-0.14)  
Constant  0.097 ***  0.066   0.480 ***  0.384 ** 
  (5.56)   (1.36)   (8.17)   (2.62)  
Fixed Effects  Y,I   Y,I   Y,I   Y,I  
R²  0.453   0.433   0.458   0.439  
N  8,872   2,258   8,872   2,258  
Table 39 presents results of OLS Value Relevance regressions (Equations 9 and 10) for the unmatched 
and matched sample (Model 1 and 2). In addition, all control variables from Equation 8 are included in 
Model 3 and 4 to control for potentially remaining post-match differences. Dependent variable is RET. 
RET is stock returns. GENDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment 
group (has at least one female board member), 0 otherwise. GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group after applying the PSM model, 0 otherwise. EPS 
is earnings per share. ∆EPS is the year-to-year change in EPS. ROA is return on assets. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. BOUTSIDE is the natural logarithm of outside directors. RISK is the standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations. TD is total diversification. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm 
age. SGROWTH is the average sales growth over the prior three fiscal years. LEV is the ratio of total debt 
to shareholders’ equity. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Standard errors are clustered 
on the firm-level (two-tailed t-statistics in parentheses). Each model is estimated with year- (Y) and in-
dustry- (I) fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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As can be seen in the first column, the coefficient on the GENDER indicator is signifi-
cantly positive at the 5 %-level (p < 0.05). This confirms the pre-match univariate results 
(Table 37). In the second column, we present results focusing on matched pairs. The co-
efficient on GENDERMATCH is still positive but highly insignificant. This implies that, 
by only considering comparable firms, female board representation has no incremental 
predictive value for stock returns. To alleviate concerns that PSM might not have suffi-
ciently addressed differences between the treatment and control group, we follow Dehejia 
and Wahba (2002) and include the full set of matching covariates as additional controls 
(Model 3 and 4). Nevertheless, all inferences remain unchanged. 
Summing up, the results from comparing all board gender diverse firms with their coun-
terparts reveal that GENDER has a significantly positive association with stock returns. 
Considering only matched pairs (i.e., a more comparable set of firms), the significant 
association vanishes. Hence, long-term changes in shareholder wealth seem independent 
from board gender diversity per se. To put it differently, just appointing (more) women 
to corporate boards (for instance, due to demand-side regulation), without putting in place 
additional good governance mechanisms and procedures, will likely be insufficient from 
the perspective of shareholders. 
5.3 Gender Diversity Expectation Model 
Table 40 reports results of our multivariate cross-sectional gender diversity expectation 
model employing the unmatched sample. In the first column, we present the pooled sam-
ple (Model 1). Furthermore, we conduct several additional tests. First, we split our sample 
according to the median of overall societal gender equality, based on World Economic 
Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI; Model 2). Second, we split the sample into 
firms which explicitly formulated a board gender diversity policy (BOARD_POL), and 
those that did not (Model 3). We follow Rhode and Packel (2014) and argue that corpo-
rations with a commitment to gender diversity have access to a broader talent pool with 
diverse leadership skills. To identify firms with gender diverse policies, we use the vari-
able CGBSDP0013 from the Asset4 database. It presents an indicator whether a firm has 
committed itself to a policy of board gender diversity. Third, we split the sample into 
industries in which women are historically more highly represented on corporate boards 
(i.e., service-oriented, labor-intensive and consumer product industries (Cumming et al. 
2015; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Harrigan 1981) and their counterparts (Model 4).  
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The coefficient on the interaction term ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP is significantly posi-
tive in the pooled sample (Table 40, Model 1). This indicates that the greater the actual 
ratio of female board members is below expectations, the more positive is the incremental 
effect on stock returns. Yet, the result seems primarily driven by firms located in countries 
with lower societal gender equality (Table 40, Model 2). On the surface, this might be in 
line with role congruity theory. In countries, which generally put less emphasis on em-
powering women, investors seem to punish firms for appointing female directors. Never-
theless, again attributable to endogeneity concerns, the unmatched sample may result in 
incorrect inferences. Therefore, Table 41 reports results based on the matched sample. 
For the pooled sample, the coefficient of the interaction term is now profoundly insignif-
icant. In line with our previous results, board gender diversity exhibits no incremental 
(negative) effect on stock returns by only considering matched firms. 
Referring to the generally insignificant coefficient of the interaction term (ABSGEN-
DIFF NEGGAP) across the cross-sectional sub-samples, we are able to confirm that 
firms do not exhibit impaired (nor improved) equity capital market performance if they 
downwardly deviate from the expected ratio of board gender diversity. While prior re-
search finds that a gender-friendly societal climate seems to translate, on average, into 
increased female board participation (e.g., Loy and Rupertus 2018a), our results indicate 
that firms which do not conform to these expectations do not seem to get significantly 
punished (or rewarded) by investors. 
5.4 Robustness Checks 
We conduct several sensitivity tests. Our first set of robustness checks (I.I through I.III) 
refers to the definition of GENDER in our main results. There, we define GENDER as 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has at least one female board member, and 0 
otherwise. However, using this indicator variable does not allow to make a convinced 
statement about the effect of adding more women. Prior research suggests that an unim-
pressive number of female board members (for instance, only one) would not receive 
great attention and only serve as a ‘token’ (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Rhode and 
Packel 2014). Hence, we include three additional robustness checks. First, we compare 
firms with a very high number of female board members (i.e., the top quartile of the dis-
tribution of GENQUOT) with firms with a low degree of board gender diversity (i.e., the 
bottom quartile). All our main inferences remain unchanged (Table 42 and Table 
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43, Panel A). Second, we match firms with a female board ratio of at least 25 percent with 
firms that have no female board members. Again, all inferences from our main analysis 
hold (Table 42 and Table 43, Panel B). Third, instead of binary indicator variables, we 
include the observed ratio of female board members as our main independent variable in 
the value relevance regression and re-run Equation 9 and 10. Both regressions yield sim-
ilar results to those presented in our main analysis (Table 43, Panel C). Thus, we conclude 
that besides the effect regarding the presence of female board members, adding more 
women does not seem to have an impact on a firm’s stock performance.  
Table 42 
Robustness Check I – Alternative Measurement of GENDER 
  
Panel A 
Robustness Check I.I 
High GQ ≥ p(75) & Low GQ ≤ p(25) 
 
Panel B 
Robustness Check I.II 
High GQ ≥ 25 % & Low GQ = 0 % 
 
  
GENDER-
MATCH = 0 
 
GENDER-
MATCH = 1 
 p-value  
GENDER-
MATCH = 0 
 
GENDER-
MATCH = 1 
 p-value  
RET  0.137  0.064  0.552  0.116  0.041  0.549  
ROA  0.043  0.036  0.065  0.042  0.041  0.072  
SIZE  15.58  15.46  1.383  15.49  15.33  1.479  
BOUTSIDE  1.662  1.609  0.570  1.620  1.609  0.543  
RISK  0.043  0.031  0.040  0.044  0.032  0.039  
TD  0.878  0.849  0.466  0.839  0.825  0.470  
AGE  3.536  3.584  0.866  3.515  3.611  0.897  
SGROWTH  0.110  0.078  0.209  0.110  0.069  0.233  
LEV  2.628  1.193  5.260  2.783  1.334  5.518  
EPS  0.054  0.057  0.094  0.041  0.053  0.102  
ΔEPS  -0.021  -0.001  0.891  -0.027  -0.002  0.937  
Table 42 presents comparison in means using three alternative measures for board gender diversity. 
Panel A presents results by matching firms with board gender diversity in the top quartile with firms with 
board gender diversity in the bottom quartile of the distribution. Panel B presents results by matching 
firms with female board representation of more than 25 percent with firms without any women on their 
boards. GQ is the observed ratio of female board members (GENQUOT). GENDERMATCH is an indi-
cator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group after applying the PSM model, 0 
otherwise. RET is stock returns. ROA is return on assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
BOUTSIDE is the natural logarithm of outside directors. RISK is the standard deviation of cash flows 
from operations. TD is total diversification. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age. SGROWTH is the 
average sales growth over the prior three fiscal years. LEV is the ratio of total debt to shareholders’ equity. 
EPS is earnings per share. ∆EPS is the year-to-year change in EPS. Presented p-values are based on two 
tailed t-tests for differences in means. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
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Our second set of robustness checks (II.I through II.III) adjusts our dependent variable 
(i.e., stock returns). First, as we are also interested in the long-term effect of gender di-
verse boards, we additionally employ three-year buy-and-hold returns (BHR). This builds 
on the notion that some new strategies take more time to implement and come into effect 
(e.g., Pan et al. 2016). While one could also consider even longer periods, at significant 
data loss, three years are probably sufficient for market participants to finally assess board 
members’ quality. The inferences from our main analysis remain virtually unchanged 
(Table 44 and Panel A of Table 45). Moreover, we use market- (MAR) as well as indus-
try-adjusted stock returns (IAR) to provide two alternative measures of changes in share-
holder value. On the one hand, we base our market return on the return of the top index 
of each country (Table 45, Panel B). On the other hand, industry returns are estimated as 
the average stock return in each industry per year. Hence, we subtract either the market 
or the industry return from a firm’s raw stock return and re-perform our analysis. Results 
from the two-sided t-tests (untabulated), value relevance regression our analysis as well 
as from the Gender Diversity Expectation Model remain qualitatively unchanged (Table 
45, Panel C). 
Table 44 
Robustness Check II – Alternative Measurements of RET – Univariate Results 
 
 Robustness Check II.I 
Buy-and-Hold Returns (BHR) 
 
 GENDER- 
MATCH = 0 
 GENDER- 
MATCH = 1 
  
  Mean  Mean  p-value 
BHR  0.269  0.213  0.182 
ROA  0.046  0.047  0.662 
SIZE  16.66  16.54  0.440 
BOUTSIDE  1.681  1.649  0.266 
RISK  0.042  0.043  0.643 
TD  0.870  0.854  0.553 
AGE  3.493  3.466  0.589 
SGROWTH  0.106  0.106  0.970 
LEV  2.623  2.244  0.201 
N  606  606   
Table 44 presents comparisons in means for the buy-and-hold return (BHR) over three years as well as 
three-year averages of the other variables. Presented p-values are based on two tailed t-tests for differ-
ences in means. GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treat-
ment group after applying the PSM model, 0 otherwise. ROA is return on assets. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. BOUTSIDE is the natural logarithm of outside directors. RISK is the standard 
deviation of cash flows from operations. TD is total diversification. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm 
age. SGROWTH is the average sales growth over the prior three fiscal years. LEV is the ratio of total 
debt to shareholders’ equity. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. 
 
CHAPTER 4: BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON CAPITAL MARKETS  
159 
  
T
a
b
le
 4
5
 
R
o
b
u
st
n
es
s 
C
h
ec
k 
II
 –
 A
lt
er
n
a
ti
ve
 M
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 o
f 
R
E
T
 –
 M
u
lt
iv
a
ri
a
te
 R
es
u
lt
s 
 
 
P
an
el
 A
 
R
o
b
u
st
n
es
s 
C
h
ec
k
 I
I.
I 
B
u
y
-a
n
d
-H
o
ld
 R
et
u
rn
s 
(B
H
R
) 
 
P
an
el
 B
 
R
o
b
u
st
n
es
s 
C
h
ec
k
 I
I.
II
 
M
ar
k
et
-A
d
ju
st
ed
 R
et
u
rn
s 
(M
A
R
) 
 
 
M
o
d
el
 1
 
 
M
o
d
el
 2
 
 
M
o
d
el
 1
 
 
M
o
d
el
 2
 
 
 
U
n
m
at
ch
ed
  
S
a
m
p
le
 
 
M
at
ch
ed
 
S
a
m
p
le
 
 
U
n
m
at
ch
ed
  
S
a
m
p
le
 
 
M
at
ch
ed
 
S
a
m
p
le
 
 
U
n
m
at
ch
ed
  
S
a
m
p
le
 
 
M
at
ch
ed
 
S
a
m
p
le
 
 
U
n
m
at
ch
ed
  
S
a
m
p
le
 
 
M
at
ch
ed
 
S
a
m
p
le
 
G
E
N
D
E
R
 
 
0
.0
5
8
 
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.0
2
2
 
*
*
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2
.0
3
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2
.8
4
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
E
N
D
E
R
M
A
T
C
H
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
2
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-
0
.5
4
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
2
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
B
S
G
E
N
D
IF
F
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
0
1
 
 
 
-0
.0
0
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
0
1
 
 
 
-0
.0
0
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-
0
.3
9
) 
 
 
(-
0
.6
5
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-
0
.7
3
) 
 
 
(-
1
.2
8
) 
 
N
E
G
G
A
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
8
3
 
*
*
 
 
-0
.0
3
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.0
3
2
 
*
*
*
 
 
-0
.0
1
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-
2
.5
3
) 
 
 
(-
0
.4
9
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-
3
.0
5
) 
 
 
(-
0
.6
4
) 
 
A
B
S
G
E
N
D
IF
F
N
E
G
G
A
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.0
1
6
 
*
*
*
 
 
0
.0
1
2
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.0
0
6
 
*
*
*
 
 
0
.0
0
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3
.9
2
) 
 
 
(1
.8
2
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4
.1
6
) 
 
 
(1
.4
3
) 
 
E
P
S
 
 
1
.9
2
4
 
*
*
*
 
 
1
.8
0
3
 
*
*
*
 
 
1
.9
1
6
 
*
*
*
 
 
1
.7
8
2
 
*
*
*
 
 
1
.1
7
7
 
*
*
*
 
 
1
.2
0
6
 
*
*
*
 
 
1
.1
7
9
 
*
*
*
 
 
1
.2
0
4
 
*
*
*
 
 
 
(1
0
.0
3
) 
 
 
(5
.1
6
) 
 
 
(1
0
.0
3
) 
 
 
(5
.1
1
) 
 
 
(9
.9
1
) 
 
 
(4
.4
7
) 
 
 
(9
.9
9
) 
 
 
(4
.4
8
) 
 
Δ
E
P
S
 
 
0
.0
0
7
 
 
 
0
.0
2
8
 
 
 
0
.0
0
7
 
 
 
0
.0
2
7
 
 
 
0
.0
2
2
 
 
 
-0
.0
0
4
 
 
 
0
.0
2
2
 
 
 
-0
.0
0
4
 
 
 
 
(0
.1
7
) 
 
 
(0
.6
2
) 
 
 
(0
.1
8
) 
 
 
(0
.6
0
) 
 
 
(1
.4
1
) 
 
 
(-
0
.2
2
) 
 
 
(1
.4
2
) 
 
 
(-
0
.1
9
) 
 
C
o
n
st
an
t 
 
0
.3
4
4
 
*
*
*
 
 
-0
.0
3
7
 
 
 
0
.4
0
2
 
*
*
*
 
 
-0
.0
4
5
 
 
 
-0
.2
5
3
 
*
*
*
 
 
-0
.2
7
2
 
*
*
*
 
 
-0
.2
2
9
 
*
*
*
 
 
-0
.2
5
8
 
*
*
*
 
 
 
(6
.1
7
) 
 
 
(-
0
.3
2
) 
 
 
(7
.3
5
) 
 
 
(-
0
.3
7
) 
 
 
(-
1
3
.6
7
) 
 
 
(-
5
.4
4
) 
 
 
(-
1
1
.3
5
) 
 
 
(-
4
.6
2
) 
 
F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
 
 
Y
, 
I 
 
 
Y
, 
I 
 
 
Y
, 
I 
 
 
Y
, 
I 
 
 
Y
, 
I 
 
 
Y
, 
I 
 
 
Y
, 
I 
 
 
Y
, 
I 
 
R
² 
 
0
.1
8
8
 
 
 
0
.2
0
2
 
 
 
0
.1
9
1
 
 
 
0
.2
0
5
 
 
 
0
.5
3
6
 
 
 
0
.5
2
8
 
 
 
0
.5
3
7
 
 
 
0
.5
2
8
 
 
N
 
 
5
,2
3
0
 
 
 
1
,2
1
2
 
 
 
5
,2
3
0
 
 
 
1
,2
1
2
 
 
 
8
,8
7
2
 
 
 
2
,2
5
8
 
 
 
8
,8
7
2
 
 
 
2
,2
5
8
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON CAPITAL MARKETS  
160 
Our third set of robustness checks (III) acknowledges the fact, that there is an increasing 
amount of firms that voluntarily commit to governance policies with respect to gender 
diversity on their boards. Thus, we include BOARD_POL as an additional covariate in 
our PSM model. Results regarding our first hypothesis remain unchanged (Table 46, 
Panel A).   
Table 45 
Robustness Check II – Alternative Measurements of RET – Multivariate Results 
– continued 
  Panel C 
Robustness Check II.III 
Industry-Adjusted Returns (IAR) 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
GENDER  0.024 **          
  (3.07)           
GENDERMATCH     0.004        
     (0.26)        
ABSGENDIFF        0.001   0.003  
        (0.22)   (1.20)  
NEGGAP        0.025   0.018  
        (2.34)   (0.60)  
ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP        0.005 ***  0.004  
        (3.64)   (1.50)  
EPS  1.179 ***  1.213 ***  1.182 ***  1.209 *** 
  (9.90)   (4.48)   (9.99)   (4.50)  
ΔEPS  0.022   -0.003   0.022   -0.002  
  (1.37)   (-0.15)   (1.38)   (-0.12)  
Constant  -0.088 ***  -0.136 ***  0.066 ***  -0.112 ** 
  (5.04)   (-2.74)   (3.44)   (-2.16)  
Fixed Effects  Y, I   Y, I   Y, I   Y, I  
R²  0.143   0.114   0.191   0.114  
N  8,872   2,258   5,291   2,258  
Table 45 presents results of OLS Value Relevance regressions (Model 1, Equation 9 and 10) as well as 
the Gender Diversity Expectation Model (Model 2, Equation 11) using three year buy-and-hold returns 
(BHR, Panel A), market-adjusted returns (MAR, Panel B) as well as industry-adjusted returns (IAR, 
Panel C) as the dependent variable. GENDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into 
the treatment group (has at least one female board member), 0 otherwise. GENDERMATCH is an indi-
cator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group after applying the propensity score 
matching, 0 otherwise. ABSGENDIFF is the absolute value of GENDIFF. NEGGAP is an indicator var-
iable equal to 1 if GENDIFF is negative, 0 otherwise. GENDIFF is the signed difference between the 
observed ratio of female board members in a given firm and the expected ratio of female board represen-
tation. EPS is earnings per share. ∆EPS is the year-to-year change in EPS. See Appendix A for detailed 
variable descriptions. Each model is estimated with year- (Y) and industry- (I) fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm-level (two-tailed t-statistics in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote signifi-
cance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON CAPITAL MARKETS  
161   
Table 46 
Robustness Check III – Including BOARD_POL in PSM Model 
Panel A: Two-Sided T-Tests 
 
 GENDER- 
MATCH = 0 
 GENDER- 
MATCH = 1 
  
  Mean  Mean  p-value 
RET  0.156  0.122  0.159 
ROA  0.043  0.043  0.908 
SIZE  16.66  16.56  0.383 
BOUTSIDE  1.654  1.607  0.048 
RISK  0.043  0.044  0.403 
TD  0.864  0.831  0.100 
AGE  3.506  3.513  0.845 
SGROWTH  0.114  0.111  0.791 
LEV  2.692  2.508  0.397 
BOARD_POL  0.206  0.191  0.391 
N  1,094  1,094   
Panel B: Value Relevance and Gender Expectation Model 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
GENDER  0.024 **          
  (3.07)           
GENDERMATCH     0.004        
     (0.26)        
ABSGENDIFF        0.001   0.003  
        (0.22)   (1.20)  
NEGGAP        0.025   0.018  
        (2.34)   (0.60)  
ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP        0.005 ***  0.004  
        (3.64)   (1.50)  
EPS  1.179 ***  1.213 ***  1.182 ***  1.209 *** 
  (9.90)   (4.48)   (9.99)   (4.50)  
ΔEPS  0.022   -0.003   0.022   -0.002  
  (1.37)   (-0.15)   (1.38)   (-0.12)  
Constant  -0.088 ***  -0.136 ***  0.066 ***  -0.112 ** 
  (5.04)   (-2.74)   (3.44)   (-2.16)  
Fixed Effects  Y, I   Y, I   Y, I   Y, I  
R²  0.143   0.114   0.191   0.114  
N  8,872   2,258   5,291   2,258  
Table 46 presents comparisons in means for the matched sample (Panel A) as well as of OLS Value Rele-
vance regressions (Model 1, Equation 9 and 10) and Gender Diversity Expectation Model (Model 2, Equa-
tion 11) (Panel B) by adding BOARD_POL to the PSM model. BOARD_POL is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the firm has a policy regarding gender diversity on its board, 0 otherwise. Dependent variable 
in Panel B is RET. RET is stock returns. Presented p-values in Panel A are based on two tailed t-tests for 
differences in means. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Each model in Panel B is esti-
mated with year- (Y) and industry- (I) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (two-
tailed t-statistics in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, 
respectively. 
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Nevertheless, results of our Gender Diversity Expectation Model change slightly. The 
coefficient on the interaction term ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP remains significant at a 
5 %-level, but is economically rather neglectable (Table 46, Panel B). Moreover, the in-
teraction term is essentially cancelled out by the larger, but insignificant, coefficient on 
the baseline effect NEGGAP. 
In our fourth set of robustness checks (IV), we re-run the PSM procedure only for coun-
tries which do not mandate a gender quota by law. We present related results of the two-
sided t-tests as well as multivariate analysis in Table 47. However, our main inferences 
remain unchanged.  
Table 47 
Robustness Check IV – Only Countries Without a Mandatory Gender Quota 
Panel A: Two-Sided T-Tests 
 
 GENDER- 
MATCH = 0 
 GENDER- 
MATCH = 1 
  
  Mean  Mean  p-value 
RET  0.135  0.115  0.383 
ROA  0.043  0.041  0.695 
SIZE  16.58  16.50  0.517 
BOUTSIDE  1.655  1.608  0.048 
RISK  0.043  0.044  0.581 
TD  0.876  0.839  0.062 
AGE  3.531  3.508  0.535 
SGROWTH  0.108  0.108  0.998 
LEV  2.608  2.801  0.403 
N  1,107  1,107   
Panel B: Value Relevance and Gender Expectation Model 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
GENDER  0.024 **          
  (3.03)           
GENDERMATCH     0.006        
     (0.40)        
ABSGENDIFF        0.000   -0.003  
        (-0.53)   (-1.34)  
NEGGAP        -0.030 ***  -0.026  
        (-2.86)   (-0.88)  
ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP        0.005 ***  0.005  
        (3.99)   (1.62)  
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Our full sample is heavily skewed towards U.S. and Japanese observations. We address 
this issue in our fifth set of robustness checks (V.I through V.III). In this context, prior 
literature suggests that differences in cultural factors and institutional systems might have 
a significant influence on the variation of female board representation (e.g., Grosvold and 
Brammer 2011; Grosvold et al. 2016). Thus, we re-run all our regressions once without 
U.S. observations, once without Japanese observations, and also without observations 
from both countries (Table 48 and Table 49). As can be seen, all major inferences hold. 
 
  
Table 47 
Robustness Check IV – Only Countries Without a Mandatory Gender Quota 
– continued 
  Model 1  Model 2 
 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched 
Sample 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched 
Sample 
EPS  1.225 ***  1.250 ***  1.228 ***  1.240 *** 
  (10.10)   (4.59)   (10.18)   (4.58)  
ΔEPS  0.025   -0.004   0.025   -0.004  
  (1.47)   (-0.22)   (1.48)   (-0.19)  
Constant  0.128 ***  0.183 ***  0.143 ***  -0.054 ** 
  (4.92)   (4.37)   (5.23)   (-1.26)  
Fixed Effects  Y, I   Y, I   Y,I   Y,I  
R²  0.455   0.114   0.455   0.436  
N  8,791   2,258   8,791   2,214  
Table 47 presents comparisons in means for the matched sample (Panel A) as well as of OLS Value 
Relevance regressions (Model 1, Equation 9 and 10) and Gender Diversity Expectation Model (Model 2, 
Equation 11) (Panel B) with a focus on countries without mandatory gender quotas. Presented p-values in 
Panel A are based on two tailed t-tests for differences in means. GENDER is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group (has at least one female board member), 0 otherwise. 
GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group after 
applying the PSM model, 0 otherwise. Dependent variable is RET. RET is stock returns. ROA is return 
on assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. BOUTSIDE is the natural logarithm of outside 
directors. RISK is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations. TD is total diversification. AGE 
is the natural logarithm of firm age. SGROWTH is the average sales growth over the prior three fiscal 
years. LEV is the ratio of total debt to shareholders’ equity. ABSGENDIFF is the absolute value of GEN-
DIFF. NEGGAP is an indicator variable equal to 1 if GENDIFF is negative, 0 otherwise. GENDIFF is the 
signed difference between the observed ratio of female board members in a given firm and the expected 
ratio of female board representation. EPS is earnings per share. ∆EPS is the year-to-year change in EPS. 
See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Each model in Panel B is estimated with year- (Y) and 
industry- (I) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (two-tailed t-statistics in paren-
theses). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Over the course of our period under consideration, several countries in our sample enacted 
mandatory gender quotas as well as voluntary corporate governance codex guidelines re-
garding board gender diversity. Thus, in our sixth set of robustness checks (VI), we ac-
count for mandatory gender quotas (QUOTA) as well as voluntary corporate governance 
code stipulations (CORPCODE). Results from our value relevance design as well as the 
Table 49 
Robustness Check V – Without the U.S., Japan, or Both – Multivariate Results 
– continued 
  Panel C 
Robustness Check V.III 
Without the U.S. & Japan 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
GENDER  0.024 **          
  (3.03)           
GENDERMATCH     0.006        
     (0.40)        
ABSGENDIFF        0.000   -0.003  
        (-0.53)   (-1.34)  
NEGGAP        -0.030 ***  -0.026  
        (-2.86)   (-0.88)  
ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP        0.005 ***  0.005  
        (3.99)   (1.62)  
EPS  1.225 ***  1.250 ***  1.228 ***  1.240 *** 
  (10.10)   (4.59)   (10.18)   (4.58)  
ΔEPS  0.025   -0.004   0.025   -0.004  
  (1.47)   (-0.22)   (1.48)   (-0.19)  
Constant  0.128 ***  0.183 ***  0.143 ***  -0.054 ** 
  (4.92)   (4.37)   (5.23)   (-1.26)  
Fixed Effects  Y, I   Y, I   Y,I   Y,I  
R²  0.455   0.114   0.455   0.436  
N  8,791   2,258   8,791   2,214  
Table 49 presents results of OLS Value Relevance regressions (Model 1, Equation 9 and 10) as well as 
the Gender Diversity Expectation Model (Model 2, Equation 11) excluding the U.S. (Panel A), Japan 
(Panel B) as well as the U.S. and Japan (Panel C) from the final sample. Dependent variable is RET. RET 
is stock returns. GENDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group 
(has at least one female board member), 0 otherwise. GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if a firm is included into the treatment group after applying the propensity score matching, 0 otherwise. 
ABSGENDIFF is the absolute value of GENDIFF. NEGGAP is an indicator variable equal to 1 if GEN-
DIFF is negative, 0 otherwise. GENDIFF is the signed difference between the observed ratio of female 
board members in a given firm and the expected ratio of female board representation. EPS is earnings per 
share. ∆EPS is the year-to-year change in EPS. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Each 
model in Panel B is estimated with year- (Y) and industry- (I) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm-level (two-tailed t-statistics in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, 
and 10 % level, respectively. 
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cross-sectional Gender Diversity Expectation Model are presented in Table 50. Our infer-
ences remain unchanged. 
Table 50 
Robustness Check VI – QUOTA and CORPCODE 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
GENDER  0.028 ***          
  (3.57)           
GENDERMATCH     0.005        
     (0.31)        
ABSGENDIFF        -0.001   -0.003  
        (-0.64)   (-1.31)  
NEGGAP        -0.035 ***  -0.025  
        (-3.39)   (-0.86)  
ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP        0.006 ***  0.005  
        (4.45)   (1.60)  
EPS  1.215 ***  1.256 ***  1.219 ***  1.252 *** 
  (10.11)   (4.63)   (10.18)   (4.64)  
ΔEPS  0.023   -0.004   0.023   -0.004  
  (1.43)   (-0.23)   (1.44)   (-0.20)  
QUOTA  -0.113 ***  -0.129 **  -0.112   -0.132 *** 
  (-3.52)   (-2.86)   (-3.46)   (-2.91)  
CORPCODE  -0.037 **  -0.025   -0.039   -0.031  
  (-2.62)   (-0.80)   (-2.79)   (-0.96)  
Constant  -0.145 ***  0.307 ***  -0.126 ***  0.331 *** 
  (-5.70)   (6.00)   (-4.75)   (5.92)  
Fixed Effects  Y, I   Y, I   Y,I   Y,I  
R²  0.455   0.114   0.454   0.436  
N  8,791   2,258   8,872   2,214  
Table 50 presents results of OLS Value Relevance regression (Model 1, Equation 9 and 10) as well as the 
Gender Diversity Expectation Model (Model 2, Equation 11) including QUOTA and CORPCODE as 
additional controls. Dependent variable is RET. RET is stock returns. GENDER is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group (has at least one female board member), 0 other-
wise. GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group 
after applying the PSM model, 0 otherwise. ABSGENDIFF is the absolute value of GENDIFF. NEGGAP 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if GENDIFF is negative, 0 otherwise. GENDIFF is the signed difference 
between the observed ratio of female board members in a given firm and the expected ratio of female 
board representation. EPS is earnings per share. ∆EPS is the year-to-year change in EPS. QUOTA is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the country has a mandatory gender quota in year t, 0 otherwise. 
CORPCODE is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the country has a voluntary corporate governance code 
stipulation regarding gender, 0 otherwise. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Each model 
in Panel B is estimated with year- (Y) and industry- (I) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm-level (two-tailed t-statistics in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 
10 % level, respectively. 
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In our seventh set of robustness checks (VII), to control for any remaining differences be-
tween the matched and unmatched sample, we also include all control variables from 
Equation 8 in our Gender Diversity Expectation Model (Equation 11). Nevertheless, our 
main results remain unchanged (Table 51). 
Table 51 
Robustness Check VII – Gender Diversity Expectation Model with Additional Controls 
 
 Gender Diversity 
Expectation Model 
 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Mached 
Sample 
ABSGENDIFF  0.001   -0.002  
  (-0.41)   (-0.99)  
NEGGAP  -0.027 ***  -0.014  
  (-2.63)   (-0.50)  
ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP  0.003 ***  0.003  
  (2.60)   (0.86)  
EPS  1.329 ***  1.187 *** 
  (8.45)   (2.88)  
ΔEPS  0.022   -0.003  
  (1.38)   (-0.16)  
ROA  -0.178   0.206  
  (-1.26)   (0.57)  
SIZE  -0.020 ***  -0.014  
  (-5.51)   (-1.51)  
BOUTSIDE  0.014   0.032  
  (1.54)   (1.45)  
RISK  0.445 **  0.540  
  (2.27)   (1.21)  
TD  0.019 **  -0.001  
  (2.54)   (-0.01)  
AGE  -0.022 ***  -0.038 *** 
  (-4.97)   (-3.74)  
SGROWTH  -0.047 *  -0.079  
  (-1.90)   (-1.55)  
LEV  0.001   -0.001  
  (1.22)   (-0.11)  
Constant  0.478 ***  0.396 *** 
  (7.92)   (2.72)  
Fixed Effects  Y, I   Y, I  
R²  0.457   0.438  
N  8,872   2,258  
Table 51 presents results for the Gender Diversity Expectation Model (Equation 11) for the unmatched 
and matched sample, including all control variables from Equation 8. Dependent variable is RET. RET is 
stock returns. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Each model is estimated with year- (Y) 
and industry- (I) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (two-tailed t-statistics in 
parentheses). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Moreover, we also perform several minor robustness checks. First, the PSM caliper of 
0.05 might influence our results. Thus, we reduce it to 0.01. This modification results in 
a considerably smaller sample, attributable to even less permissible differences in pro-
pensity scores, but qualitatively unchanged inferences in all analyses (Table 52 and Table 
53, Panel A).  
Second, we follow prior literature and employ one-year lagged board gender information 
in our analysis, as the effect of gender diverse boards will most likely occur over time 
(e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2009; Carter et al. 2010; Pan et al. 2016). Again, this decreases 
the number of observations but all inferences from the matching procedure for each coun-
try, the value relevance regressions, as well as the Gender Diversity Expectation Model 
remain qualitatively unchanged (Table 52 and Table 53, Panel B). Third, we include 
country-fixed effects in all our multivariate analysis. As such, we control for country-
specific, time-invariant institutional factors. However, our inferences remain robust (Ta-
ble 53, Panel C).  
Table 52 
Minor Robustness Checks – Univariate Results 
  
Panel A 
Robustness Check 
Caliper 1 % 
 
Panel B 
Robustness Check 
Lagged Board Data 
 
  Matched Sample  Matched Sample  
  
GENDER-
MATCH = 0 
 
GENDER-
MATCH = 1 
 p-value  
GENDER-
MATCH = 0 
 
GENDER-
MATCH = 1 
 p-value  
RET  0.146  0.142  0.876  0.044  0.042  0.633  
ROA  0.044  0.044  0.955  0.044  0.042  0.633  
SIZE  16.69  16.68  0.937  16.45  16.35  0.331  
BOUTSIDE  1.646  1.633  0.575  1.652  1.626  0.249  
RISK  0.043  0.043  0.835  0.042  0.043  0.654  
TD  0.865  0.859  0.759  0.851  0.844  0.693  
AGE  3.495  3.512  0.663  3.489  3.457  0.383  
SGROWTH  0.106  0.101  0.545  0.113  0.114  0.987  
LEV  2.524  3.437  0.278  2.628  2.689  0.788  
N  981  981    1,201  1,201    
Table 52 presents results from comparisons in means for the matched sample using a caliper of 1 percent 
(Panel A) and lagged board data (Panel B) in the PSM model. GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group after applying the PSM model, 0 otherwise. RET 
is stock returns. ROA is return on assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. BOUTSIDE is the 
natural logarithm of outside directors. RISK is the standard deviation of cash flows from operations. TD 
is total diversification. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age. SGROWTH is the average sales growth 
over the prior three fiscal years. LEV is the ratio of total debt to shareholders’ equity. See Appendix A for 
detailed variable descriptions. 
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6 Discussion 
The primary research questions addressed in this study are (1) if female board participa-
tion has long-term effects on investors’ perception of the firm and (2) what is the effect 
on a firm’s stock performance if the actual degree of female board representation differs 
Table 53 
Minor Robustness Checks – Multivariate Results – continued 
  Panel C 
Robustness Check 
Including Country-Fixed Effects 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
 Unmatched 
Sample 
 Matched  
Sample 
GENDER  -0.023 **          
  (-2.12)           
GENDERMATCH     0.006        
     (0.35)        
ABSGENDIFF        -0.001   -0.003  
        (-1.06)   (-1.13)  
NEGGAP        0.005   -0.009  
        (-0.39)   (-0.32)  
ABSGENDIFF NEGGAP        0.003 *  0.000  
        (1.75)   (0.21)  
EPS  1.207 ***  1.271 ***  1.207 ***  1.273 *** 
  (10.11)   (4.56)   (10.11)   (4.59)  
ΔEPS  0.022   -0.007   0.022   -0.006  
  (1.40)   (-0.34)   (1.39)   (-0.33)  
Constant  0.137 ***  -0.050 ***  0.125 ***  -0.023  
  (3.01)   (-0.64)   (2.74)   (-0.28)  
Fixed Effects  Y, I, C   Y, I, C   Y,I,C   Y,I,C  
R²  0.457   0.439   0.457   0.439  
N  8,872   2,258   8,872   2,258  
Table 53 presents results of OLS Value Relevance regressions (Model 1) as well as the Gender Expecta-
tion Model (Model 2) for the matched and unmatched sample. Panel A presents results with a PSM caliper 
of 1 percent. Panel B presents results using lagged board data. Panel C presents results including country-
fixed effects. Dependent variable is RET. RET is stock returns. GENDER is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group (has at least one female board member), 0 otherwise. 
GENDERMATCH is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group after 
applying the propensity score matching, 0 otherwise. ABSGENDIFF is the absolute value of GENDIFF. 
NEGGAP is an indicator variable equal to 1 if GENDIFF is negative, 0 otherwise. GENDIFF is the signed 
difference between the observed ratio of female board members in a given firm and the expected ratio of 
female board representation. EPS is earnings per share. ∆EPS is the year-to-year change in EPS. See 
Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Each model is estimated with year- (Y) and industry- (I) 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (two-tailed t-statistics in parentheses). ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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from investors’ expectations. Whereas most of the prior literature looks at the effects of 
board gender diversity on firms’ accounting performance in single country settings (for a 
meta-analysis, cf. Post and Byron 2015), we focus on long-term capital market perfor-
mance in an international setting. Our findings therefore offer some key contributions 
compared to prior literature. 
First, our study offers two contributions with respect to theory. On the one hand, role con-
gruity theory states that women may be perceived as less qualified for leadership positions 
(e.g., executive roles as board members) than men due to stereotypes and incongruent 
perceptions of social roles within a group. Thus, the theory has important implications for 
how stakeholder (e.g., investors) perceive female board members and how they may con-
tribute to a firm’s future profitability. Women on the board of directors are still relatively 
rare. Attributable to this, investors may believe that women do not have the same quali-
fication and business experience as men. As a result, female board representation might 
be met with considerable scepticism. However, incongruent perceptions of board mem-
bers based on gender differences would be captured in short-window stock reactions. 
Board members need some time to enact organizational changes and gain the trust of 
share- and stakeholder. Hence, the market requires an adjustment period to evaluate the 
actual quality of board directors instead of stereotypes. Therefore, looking at the longer-
term effects of board gender diversity on stock performance is more convincing. Our re-
sults suggest that investors perceive (high-quality) female and male board members as 
being equivalent in the long-term, as we do not find any indication that stockholders’ 
investment decisions seem to be influenced by directors’ gender. However, while female 
board appointments may have short-window effects on firm value (e.g., Kang et al. 2010; 
Lee and James 2007; Schmid and Urban 2016), the market seemingly corrects this mis-
pricing in the long run. Hence, this study contributes to a better understanding on how 
investors evaluate female board members despite of (alleged) perceived societal gender 
stereotypes. On the other hand, a lack of women on corporate boards might basically seem 
demonstrably unfair and could be perceived as a result of the ‘glass ceiling’-effect (e.g., 
Arfken et al. 2004). Unsurprisingly, there is much pressure from various stakeholder 
groups to remedy this issue. Based on that, catering theory argues that firms cater to in-
vestors’ and other stakeholders’ demands by appointing more women to their boards 
(Ghosh et al. 2016). Given that an increasing number of investors demand a strive for 
more female board representation, firms might get ‘punished’ for non-compliance with 
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these expectations. However, we find no evidence that these firms systematically incur 
lower stock returns. Our results provide new evidence that board gender diversity does 
not come at the expense of investors – something opponents of mandatory gender quotas 
seem to commonly suggest (e.g., Ahern and Dittmar 2012). More importantly, our results 
also do not necessarily imply that the catering theory of board gender diversity is wrong. 
While some investors might consider gender diverse boards in their investment strategies 
(e.g., Byoun et al. 2016; Coffey and Fryxell 1991) there are others that apparently do not, 
indicating a balancing effect. Nevertheless, as there is evidence that an increasing number 
of investors explicitly considers gender equality in their investment decisions (e.g., Byoun 
et al. 2016; Rhode and Packel 2014), this result might shift over time. 
Second, we offer some empirical contributions, as well. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
state that corporate board composition and its association with performance is a pro-
foundly endogenously issue. However, this factor is largely ignored by the far majority 
of previous studies. To mitigate threats associated with endogeneity, we employ the fe-
male director selection-model (Gul et al. 2011; Hillman et al. 2007) as a first step, in order 
to identify a comparable set of firms which only differs in terms of board gender diversity. 
As such, our PSM approach allows us to model a randomized quasi-natural experiment 
as closely as possible (Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In addi-
tion to the methodological contribution, most prior studies focus on single countries. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that female board representation still differs significantly 
between countries (e.g., Grosvold 2011; Grosvold et al. 2016; Loy and Rupertus 2018a; 
Terjesen and Singh 2008), despite global advances to close the gender gap over recent 
years. Post and Byron (2015) argue that the relationship of female board representation 
and financial performance varies according to the level of gender parity in each country. 
Thus, one cannot generalize from prior single-country results. Hence, we test our hypoth-
eses in a multi-country setting. 
Third, our study contributes to the social and economic debate regarding female board 
representation. To this day, it is indisputable that female board representation should be 
increased due to social reasons such as fairness, equality, and participation. However, 
gender equality in the boardroom is no longer perceived solely as a social issue, but is 
also recommended based on economic arguments (i.e., the business case for women on 
board). Whereas one strand of literature finds that women have a positive impact on col-
laboration and effectiveness of corporate boards, another strand provides inconclusive 
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results with respect to the association of female board representation with corporate (ac-
counting) performance. Having said that, to this day, the association of board gender di-
versity and long-term capital market performance is still unexplored. It is common sense 
that investors value ‘high-quality’ directors (e.g., Cao and Donnelly 2010; Schnatterly 
and Johnson 2014). Moreover, they emphasize board characteristics in their investment 
decisions (e.g., Bushee et al. 2014; Chung and Zhang 2011; Yermack 2006). However, 
according to our results, regardless of directors’ gender. Given competing findings and 
(methodological) limitations of prior studies, we follow Rhode and Packel (2014) who 
argue that the business case of improved corporate financial performance through board 
gender diversity should neither be overstated nor generalized. Thus, we argue for a more 
nuanced position. When diversity is well-managed, it can improve decision-making and 
enhance a corporation’s public image as it conveys a commitment to equal opportunity 
and inclusion (Radjavi 2012; Rhode and Packel 2014). Firms which adhere to the highest 
standards in terms of corporate governance – one of which undoubtedly is a commitment 
to gender equality – will enjoy positive capital market effects (e.g., Yermack 2006). In-
stead of political ‘quick fixes’ through mandatory gender quotas, stakeholders should en-
courage firms to continue to improve non-gender-biased hiring and promotion decisions 
to increase the pool of talented women in middle management and professional functions, 
who will eventually rise to top management and corporate boards. Hence, the focus in the 
current debate regarding the business case of female board representation should primar-
ily be placed on arguments with respect to improvements of, among others, board-deci-
sion making, governance and strategy implementation, corporate reputation, and a firms’ 
workforce rather than ‘expecting’ enhanced (accounting and market) performance. Gen-
der diversity at the leadership level offers a strategic advantage in meeting the challenge 
of globalization, as boards will benefit from female leadership qualities, such as cross-
cultural awareness and transformational leadership skills (Holton 2000; Terjesen and 
Singh 2008). 
7 Limitations and Future Research 
This research should be examined in light of some limitations. Our sample is based on 
Thomson Reuters’ Asset 4 database which includes the largest public corporations across 
the globe. Therefore, our results might not be applicable to smaller stock corporations or 
smaller capital markets. Nonetheless, given the high market capitalization of our sample 
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constituents, we are confident that we appropriately cover board gender diversity’s impact 
on an average investor’s wealth. Moreover, some smaller economies with the highest 
gender equality (e.g., Norway or Sweden) are not included in our sample because there 
are nearly no firms without female board representation. However, these countries are 
predominantly subject to mandatory gender quotas throughout our sample period, and 
previous research suggests negative capital market effects of such quotas (Ahern and 
Dittmar 2012). Forcing an inclusion of these countries into our study would render our 
quasi-experimental approach useless. 
Having said that, the distinct advantage of our PSM approach is that it allows us to draw 
quasi-causal inferences. However, while it seems to perform well in our international set-
ting, there might be additional observable and unobservable factors which likewise affect 
director selection and female board representation. Future research may identify addi-
tional covariates and improve the precision of the estimation model.  
Lastly, several countries in our sample have imposed mandatory gender quotas towards 
the end of – or after – our sample period (e.g., France, Germany). While we address this 
in a robustness check, future research may focus on the long-term capital market effects 
of quotas in these large economies. 
8 Conclusion 
In summary, our study sought to fill an important gap in the literature on investors’ per-
ception and long-term effects of board gender diversity on firms’ capital market perfor-
mance. Our results indicate that female board representation neither improves nor reduces 
firms’ long-term stock performance if one appropriately controls for the endogeneity of 
corporate board appointments. Investors seem to perceive female and male board mem-
bers as being equal in the long-term and do not base their investment decisions on direc-
tors’ gender.  
The board is the focal point of an organization’s strategic decision-making. It monitors 
important day-to-day business activities, supervises management, liaises with auditors, 
(dis-)approves merger and financing decisions and, finally, selects and appoints top ex-
ecutives (e.g., Hambrick 2007; Hambrick and Mason 1984). Over recent years, there have 
been reinforced calls for increased board gender diversity to make their approaches to 
new solutions and strategies more heterogeneous (e.g., Adams and Kirchmaier 2015). 
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Unsurprisingly, many stakeholder and investor groups demand improvements on the in-
dividual firm level. Prior research attributes country-level differences in female board 
representation, among others, to differences in the percentage of women working full-
time (Adams and Kirchmaier 2015), female enrolment in tertiary education, country-spe-
cific societal climates of gender equality (Loy and Rupertus 2018a), and differences in 
national political and institutional systems (e.g., Grosvold 2011; Grosvold and Brammer 
2011; Grosvold et al. 2016; Terjesen and Singh 2008). Given the importance of this topic, 
it seems necessary to go beyond the conventional thinking in terms of the business case 
for gender diversity and broaden the perspective to also incorporate social and ethical 
aspects. As such, our study might be the missing bridge between both perspectives.
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Appendix A: Variable Descriptions 
  
Variable  Description 
ABSGENDIFF  The absolute difference between the observed proportion of female board 
members in a given firm and the expected ratio of female board represen-
tation. The expected ratio in the main analysis is the average ratio of female 
board representation across all firms in a given industry, by country and 
year. 
AGE  The natural logarithm of firm age defined as the number of years since the 
date of incorporation (Source: Worldscope). 
BHR  The average buy-and-hold return over the preceding three years (Source: 
Datastream). 
BOARD_POL  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the company has a policy regarding the gen-
der diversity of its board, and 0 otherwise (Source: Asset4; code: 
CGBSDP0013). 
BOUTSIDE  The natural logarithm of outside directors measured as the difference be-
tween total number of board members (Source: Asset4; code: 
CGBSDP060) and the number of executive directors. 
CORPCODE  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country has a voluntary corporate gov-
ernance code stipulation regarding gender in year t, 0 otherwise (Source: 
Loy and Rupertus 2018a; Terjesen et al. 2015). 
EPS  Earnings per share (i.e., net income before extraordinary items scaled by 
the number of shares outstanding; Source: Worldscope). 
ΔEPS  The year-to-year change in earnings per share (EPS) scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year (Source: Worldscope). 
GENDER  Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group, 0 
otherwise. Our treatment group consists of firm-years, which exhibit at 
least one female board member (Source: Asset4; code: CGBSO17V). 
GENDERMATCH  Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is (still) included into the treatment 
group after applying propensity score matching, and 0 otherwise. 
GENDIFF  The signed difference between the observed proportion of female board 
members in a given firm and the expected ratio of female board represen-
tation. 
GENQUOT  Observed percentage of women on the boards of directors (Source: Asset4; 
code: CGBSO17V). 
GGGI  Index value of the Global Gender Gap Index (Source: World Economic 
Forum). 
IAR  Industry-adjusted stock returns estimated by the difference between the av-
erage stock return in a given industry and a firms’ raw stock return (Source: 
Datastream). 
IND  Indicator variables for industry-fixed effects based on the Fama/French 12 
industry portfolio (Source: Worldscope). 
LEV  Ratio of total debt to total shareholders’ equity (Source: Worldscope). 
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Variable  Description 
MAR  Market-adjusted stock returns estimated by the difference between the av-
erage market return of the top index of each country and a firm’s raw stock 
return. 
NEGGAP  Indicator variable equal to 1 if GENDIFF is negative, 0 otherwise. 
QUOTA  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the country has a mandatory gender quota 
in year t, and 0 otherwise (Source: Loy and Rupertus 2018a; Terjesen et 
al. 2015). 
RET   Stock return is computed as year-end share price plus dividends per share 
minus prior year-end share price divided by prior year-end share price. We 
employ the period from nine months before to three months after fiscal 
year-end. This corresponds with the timing of financial statement disclo-
sures and shareholders’ meetings (Source: Datastream). 
RISK  Rolling five year-standard deviation of cash flow from operations (Source: 
Worldscope). 
ROA  Return on assets is computed as net income before extraordinary items di-
vided by total assets at fiscal year-end (Source: Worldscope). 
SIZE  Firm size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets (Source: 
Worldscope). 
SGROWTH  Average sales growth over the prior three fiscal years (Source: 
Worldscope). 
TD  Total diversification computed as ⁡ , where  is the share 
of the ith industry segment compared to total firm sales (Source: Palepu 
1985). 
YEAR  Indicator variables for year-fixed effects. 
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Appendix B: Country-by-Country Matching Model Results 
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  Switzerland 
  
Unmatched  
Sample 
 
Matched 
Sample 
  GENDER 
 GENDER- 
MATCH 
ROA  -8.998  
 
0.466 
 
  (-1.47)  
 
(0.05) 
 
SIZE  0.209  
 
-0.283 
 
  (0.65)  
 
(-0.62) 
 
BOUTSIDE  2.810 *** 
 
-0.131 
 
  (4.06)  
 
(-0.14) 
 
RISK  13.76  
 
-15.82 
 
  (1.17)  
 
(-0.62) 
 
TD  -0.035  
 
0.222 
 
  (-0.07)  
 
(0.31) 
 
AGE  -0.824  
 
0.492 
 
  (-1.53)  
 
(0.55) 
 
SGROWTH  -0.926  
 
5.970 
 
  (-0.75)  
 
(1.35) 
 
LEV  -0.099  
 
-0.102 
 
  (-1.05)  
 
(-0.58) 
 
Constant  -6.669  
 
4.023 
 
  (-1.09)  
 
(0.44) 
 
Fixed Effects  Y, I  
 
Y, I 
 
R²  0.339  
 
0.088 
 
N  154  
 
67 
 
Appendix B presents results of logit models for the prediction of female board representation 
(Equation 8) for each country in our sample. Dependent variable is GENDER or GENDER-
MATCH. GENDER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment 
group (has at least one female board member), 0 otherwise. GENDERMATCH is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if a firm is included into the treatment group after applying the PSM model, 
0 otherwise. ROA is return on assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. BOUTSIDE 
is the natural logarithm of outside directors. RISK is the standard deviation of cash flows from 
operations. TD is total diversification. AGE is the natural logarithm of firm age. SGROWTH is 
the average sales growth over the prior three fiscal years. LEV is the ratio of total debt to share-
holders’ equity. See Appendix A for detailed variable descriptions. Standard errors are clustered 
on the firm-level (two-tailed t-statistics in parentheses). Each model is estimated with year- (Y) 
and industry- (I) fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, 
respectively. 
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This dissertation consists of two chapters on disclosure regulation (i.e., CAP disclosures) 
and two chapters on corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., board diversity). Chapter 1 
is the first comprehensive study on the regulatory framework, prior research, and the im-
plementation in practice of CAP disclosures over a 16-year period. It further shows how 
related disclosures comply with the SEC guidelines. Chapter 2 focus on whether and how 
CAP disclosures reflect instances of measurement uncertainties embedded in individual 
financial statement positions and how accruals flagged as CAPs are related to future cash 
flows. Chapter 3 expands existing knowledge in terms of supply and demand-side factors 
associated with considerable cross-country variation in female board representation. 
Chapter 4 explores the association of board gender diversity with long-term effects on 
shareholders’ wealth. Each chapter offers some key contributions with respect to theory, 
methodology, and the current public debate regarding disclosure regulation and govern-
ance mechanisms, which I will discuss thereafter. I focus on the key contributions of my 
dissertation. Further contributions and future research suggestions are described in detail 
in each chapter. 
First, my findings offer theoretical contribution. With respect to Chapter 2 of this disser-
tation, it remains unclear whether CAPs reflect instances of measurement uncertainties in 
accrual-based measures and how they are related with future cash flows. Analyzing the 
predictive value of accruals that are flagged as CAPs is far from straightforward. Firms 
may see CAPs as a mere ‘compliance exercise’ without providing any real information 
content. Further, implementing CAPs in the regulators intended manner could have two 
contrary effects. First, if management correctly identifies measurement uncertainties in 
their accounting estimates, they might consider such information in the measurement pro-
cess of financial statements, thus, leading to improved or not to diminished predictive 
ability with respect to future cash flows. Second, uncertainties in the measurement pro-
cess result in incomplete accounting information and imprecise valuation inputs. Conse-
quently, management cannot make reliable and accurate valuations, which might lead to 
reduced predictive power of accruals with respect to future cash flows. According to our 
results, we document that accruals flagged as CAPs are less persistent with respect to 
future cash flows. Thus, our results are in line with the studies of Richardson et al. (2005) 
and Sloan (1996) and show that subjectivity and uncertainties embedded in the measure-
ment process of accrual-based measures diminish their usefulness to predict future cash 
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flows. As there is no prior evidence on how to identify subjective and uncertain accruals, 
we demonstrate that CAP disclosures provide such information.  
The second part of this dissertation provides theoretical contribution about investors’ per-
ception of women on corporate boards. In this context, role congruity theory provides 
important implications on how stakeholders perceive female board members. Because the 
number of female board members is still relatively low, one might argue that investors 
believe women do not have the same qualification as men, and thus might be viewed with 
considerable skepticism. While prior studies solely focus on short-window effects of fe-
male board members on firm value, we extend prior evidence on role congruity theory 
and its implications for how investors perceive females on corporate boards in the long-
term. Furthermore, catering theory argue that firms cater to investors’ demands by ap-
pointing more women to the boards. Given that an increasing number of investors demand 
female board representation, firms might get ‘punished’ for non-compliance with these 
expectations. We find no evidence that firms incur lower stock returns if they fail to do 
so. Nonetheless, our results do not imply that catering theory in the context of board gen-
der diversity is wrong. We argue that while there is empirical evidence that some inves-
tors explicitly consider gender equality in their investment decisions (e.g., Rhode and 
Packel 2014), others do not, indicating a balancing effect.  
Second, this dissertation offers methodological and empirical contributions. Regarding 
the first part of this dissertation, to best of my knowledge, I am the first who focus on 
(qualitative and descriptive) reporting characteristics of CAP disclosures. While quanti-
tative information about CAPs have been studied before, prior research neglected the 
qualitative information content beyond CAP disclosures. This is quite interesting because 
regulators and practitioners repeatedly emphasized the important to provide clear, under-
standable, and simple disclosures. In recent years, the importance of textual analysis in 
accounting research has grown tremendously (e.g., Hering 2018; Loughran and McDon-
ald 2016), because it allows to abstract and characterize narrative information across sev-
eral distinct dimensions. Using tools from computational linguistics, I provide first evi-
dence about four reporting characteristics that are in line with the evolving textual analy-
sis literature. Specifically, I find that the average length of CAPs has constantly increased 
from 2001 to 2016, CAP disclosures are very similar over time, they do not contain a 
large portion of specific information, and are highly complex (i.e., difficult to read). It 
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seems that my findings stand in contrast with the SEC intention to provide understanda-
ble, clear, and specific disclosures in plain English. However, as my findings here are 
only descriptive in nature, they need to be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, my find-
ings provide initial evidence on the reporting characteristics beyond CAPs. Future re-
search could analyze how CAP disclosures are associated with a firm’s information en-
vironment or whether and how high quality CAP disclosures help analysts to improve 
their forecasts about future cash flows and earnings.  
The second part of this dissertation focuses on the recent governance research call to ad-
dress unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity in board governance choices. This indi-
cates that current values of governance variables are dynamically related to its historical 
values (Wintoki et al. 2012). As such, we employ dynamic panel estimation (SYS-GMM) 
in Chapter 3 (Blundell and Bond 1998) and use lagged values of the explanatory variable 
(i.e., lagged values of the average ratio of female board members) as instruments for cur-
rent changes of the same variable to alleviate concerns of autocorrelation (e.g., Wintoki 
et al. 2012). Furthermore, corporate board diversity and its association with performance 
is a profoundly endogenously issue (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). Accordingly, it can-
not be said with certainty whether performance (e.g., capital market performance) drives 
board diversity or whether board diversity is the outcome of other unobservable variables, 
which are also related to performance. Interestingly, the issue of endogeneity is largely 
ignored by the majority of previous studies. Therefore, we implement a quasi-experi-
mental approach to mitigate threats of endogeneity in Chapter 4. Specifically, we employ 
propensity score matching (PSM) to identify a comparable set of firms, which only differ 
in terms of board gender diversity.  
Third, my dissertation contributes to the current public debate regarding CAP disclosures 
as well as board gender diversity. The SEC started a series of initiatives to make corporate 
disclosures more transparent. However, stakeholders have raised concerns about the use-
fulness of corporate disclosures in recent years due an increasing number of new and 
additional financial reporting requirements as well as voluntary disclosures made by firms 
(the so-called ‘information overload’) (e.g., Hellman et al. 2018; Schick et al. 1990). 
Thus, it is questionable whether new and/or additional disclosure regulations are helpful 
for financial statement users. It is important that firms provide convincing information 
about financial statements positions that are inherently more uncertain, so that financial 
statement users can incorporate such information into their decisions. We shed light on 
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the role of CAP to provide such information. The conclusions drawn from Chapter 1 
and 2 show that CAPs fulfil the SEC’s goal to communicate highly uncertain accounting 
policies and estimates. Further, they help investors to obtain greater insights into the var-
iation of measurement uncertainties and the way uncertainties inherent in accounting es-
timates affect a company’s financial performance. Thus, we contribute to the debate re-
garding corporate disclosures about measurement uncertainties in analyzing whether 
CAPs provide information about the credibility of financial statements. Furthermore, the 
IASB is currently discussing on how to improve disclosures about accounting policies, 
judgements, and estimation uncertainties, because there is increasing concern that current 
requirements do not fulfil their intended purpose (IASB 2019). While U.S. firms provide 
consistent and extensive information about their CAPs in the MD&A, disclosure practice 
about estimation uncertainties in the notes to the financial statement is mixed (Fülbier et 
al. 2017). Based on my findings as well as prior evidence, I suggest that the IASB might 
consider parts of the CAP regulation in their future discussion to revise and improve ac-
counting policy disclosures.  
Moreover, the motives to appoint women to the board of directors are based on social as 
well as business-related theories and arguments (i.e., the social and business case of 
women on boards, cf. Figure 9). Whereas it is indisputable, that female board representa-
tion should be increased because of social reasons, prior literature finds inconclusive re-
sults with respect to the association of female board representation and corporate (ac-
counting) performance. It further neglects the relation to long-term market performance. 
Our results expand existing literature suggesting that investors perceive female and male 
board members as being equivalent in the long-term. It is common sense that investors 
value ‘high quality’ directors and emphasize board characteristics in their investment de-
cisions. However, our results show that this is unrelated to a director’s gender. We argue 
that the business case of board gender diversity should not be overstated nor generalized. 
Specifically, we argue that firms which adhere to the highest standards of corporate gov-
ernance – one of which seems to be the commitment to gender equality – will enjoy pos-
itive effects on capital markets (e.g., Yermack 2006). Based on our findings in Chap-
ter 3 and 4, we conclude that legislators might rather focus on supply-side measures and 
firms might improve their non-gender-biased hiring and promotion decisions to give 
women more opportunities to move into managerial and professional roles and thus, to 
increase the pool of talented women for top management positions and corporate boards. 
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Given the importance of this topic, it seems necessary to go beyond the conventional 
thinking of the business case regarding female board representation and, in particular, 
incorporate social and ethical aspects.  
Overall, this doctoral dissertation contributes to the emerging field of literature examining 
disclosure regulation (i.e., CAP disclosures) and corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., 
board diversity). Given the limitations of the four studies presented, I provide several 
fruitful avenues for future studies. As regulators, practitioners, politicians, and the inter-
national press still intensively discuss both topics, I am excited about seeing future re-
search in these fields to enhance our knowledge on disclosure regulation as well as gov-
ernance mechanisms. 
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